



Daily Report

East Europe

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Partition of Kosovo Seen as 'Very Possible'

AU0206162295 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian
1 Jun 95 p 4

[Commentary by Arben Popoci: "Between Agreement and Coercion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the Albanian side, only President Rugova has mentioned solving the question of Kosova by partition, in reply to questions on this matter. Rugova's responses were political and are of no interest for the question itself and the way it has been broached by Serbian intellectuals. Rugova's reply that Kosova is a compact territorial whole is a political standpoint that cannot claim to be anything more than a short reply at a news conference.

Among Albanian intellectuals who have taken the trouble to express opinions on the options for Kosova, only Rexhep Qosja in his book "The Albanian Question..." has mentioned the subject of partition. Here too, Rexhep Qosja confines himself to outlining how Serbian representatives view this idea, and to a kind of history of the evolution of this idea.

In his book, Qosja considers the Serbian idea of the partition of Kosova as "a concept threatening the democratic principle of respect for the will of the majority in determining borders between peoples; although it is a concept that shows that these Serbian intellectuals will not easily abandon the Greater Serbian colonial ideology regarding Kosova, the idea of the partition of Kosova nevertheless represents a step forward in the evolution of their political thinking to a slightly more realistic level."

It can, therefore, be seen that Qosja considers the idea of Cosic, Djindjic, P. Simic, etc. to be in principle a "step forward," although he does not go on to discuss it more deeply.

As we know, the idea of partition has not yet become respectable in Serbia, especially not in political circles, because Serbian options are much more radical. The people who have put forward this idea have not been anathematized as traitors because of their nationalism, which is evident in the drafting of the radical plans that are now being carried out.

"The partition of Kosova" is still a taboo phrase among the Albanians, not because it is considered "high treason" of any kind, but because nobody dares to write about it, thinking "who knows what tomorrow will bring," and of what might happen to Serbia. However, by virtue of the declaration of Kosova as an independent state, the negotiation of a "partition" between Kosova and Serbia becomes inevitable.

Borders between states are political questions and cannot be defined by one side alone without a possible war or even after one. The claim that Kosova has its own borders, and that there is nothing to be discussed in connection with this subject, will not hold water at the discussion table. Kosova's formal administrative borders, established for form's sake under communist Yugoslavia, cannot be taken precisely as a state border. The famous "partition" of Kosova might be expressed in more optimistic language as the establishment of borders between Kosova and Serbia.

Of course, Cosic and his disciples have not been thinking about the kind of separation that would mean the redress of border irregularities. They have thought of a real partition, according to which the larger part of Kosova would, of course, belong to Serbia, while Albania would be given the part that is without real importance for Serbia. The determining factors for the Serbian claims such as mineral resources, roads, churches, and the Serbian population have been studied carefully by these Serbian intellectuals. Serbian plans have laid down precisely where concessions might be made, where Serbia might be insistent for the sake of winning a compromise, and what parts must be held at any price. Bosnia is the best example of this. Suddenly there appeared as if from the heavens Serbian statistics about property, land registers, and strategic roads to link "Serbian lands." Population movements and ethnic cleansing took place in order to finally achieve the partition of Bosnia and the seizure of 51 percent of its territory, as had been proposed at the start of the war.

Unfortunately, the nearer the tumultuous collapse of Yugoslavia draws to its close, the more we will hear about this matter of the partition of Kosova. This is because any future dialogue with the Serbs will not discuss the position of the Serbs in a "neutral Kosova," but the border with Serbia.

For the moment, the Serbs have more ambitious plans for Kosova than its partition, and are continuing their violence in order to evict as many Albanians as possible. However, they have concentrated their violence more on those territories they think they will retain, if they are forced to scale down their plans to a partition of Kosova.

It is vital to study the variants that Serbia might put forward in any possible dialogue, either imminently or following a war that Serbia would incite, in order to ethnically cleanse territories it considers to be particularly important. In all the compromise solutions achieved in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the international community has tended to favor the variant of Serbia, as the most relevant partner.

It is very possible that such a solution as partition will be served up to us at the conference table tomorrow. If the Albanian representatives go to those talks without a mandate to move "even a millimeter," the results can be understood. It is not hard to foresee and to analyze the variants that Serbia might offer, and to judge where concessions might be made. We must have a rough idea before the day of talks comes what Serbia's maximum demands are and where the limit of compromise might be. The word "partition" is taboo for us today, but our leadership may be compelled to sign such a partition tomorrow.

Serbian intellectuals, the masterminds of the plan for Greater Serbia, thought up the idea of the partition of Kosova before they thought of a special status, autonomy, or another solution that gives the Albanians some sort of position within Serbia. This shows that such solutions involving "autonomy" are much less acceptable to Serbia, and are, therefore, less likely to happen.

Sofia Not To Participate in Bosnia Operations

LD0406161295 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1552 GMT 4 Jun 95

[By Dusan Drazic; "Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sofia, June 4 (TANJUG)—Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov has said here that his country would not participate in military operations in the Balkans in any form, neither directly nor indirectly.

In an interview to TANJUG, Pavlov said that Bulgaria would "not allow its territory to be used for such actions. Bulgaria's foreign policy in the Balkans is an extension of it European policy which in practice means respect of international norms by Balkan states."

"Bulgarian policy in the region is directed at the stabilisation of the Balkans on the basis of the following principles: no territorial pretensions, mutual recognition of inviolability of borders, respect of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs," Pavlov said.

Pavlov supports an "urgent ceasefire in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the search for a peaceful settlement of the conflict," in the former Yugoslav Republic.

"Our country urges the settlement of controversial issues by political means and is opposed to the creation of focuses of crises and spheres of influence in the Balkans," he said.

He described Yugoslavia's moderation as a dignified stance regarding the conflict in its immediate vicinity, especially since the war in Bosnia affects a population dear to the Yugoslav people.

He said that causes of the conflict in Bosnia were extremely complex, and are among other things linked to the interests of the big powers who are incapable today of finding an acceptable joint solution.

Careless division of protagonists in the Bosnian drama into aggressors and victims, the guilty and the innocent, is an example of scant knowledge of Balkan history and of specific modern processes in the region, he said.

Bulgaria urges the lifting of anti-Yugoslav sanctions out of its own interests and also as an expression of its friendly ties with neighbouring Yugoslavia.

He said that it was in the mutual interest of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to develop bilateral relations with the general aim of being integrated in European trends, as states enjoying stability and having good prospects for the future.

When sanctions against Yugoslavia are lifted, necessary conditions will be created for the cooperation of the two

countries' armies similar to the cooperation Bulgaria has already established in this field with other Balkan states, Pavlov said.

Speaking about today's military political situation in the Balkans the minister said that "lasting stabilization of the Balkans is only possible by establishing and supporting dialogue in all spheres of cooperation between countries of our region."

The time has come for Balkan countries to determine their own positions about their future and not to count on others settling their regional problems, Pavlov said.

Security Council Debates NATO Membership

AU0206152195 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
30 May 95 pp 1-2

[DEMOKRATSIYA staff report: "BSP Blackmails Opposition in Connection With NATO Issue"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sofia—No consensus was reached on the issue of Bulgaria joining NATO at yesterday's meeting of the Consultative Council on National Security, convened by President Zhelev. However, according to the official communique on the meeting, it was decided that consensus should be sought and that "the Parliamentary Commissions on Foreign Policy and National Security and the National Assembly delegation to the North Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly should continue to discuss the positions regarding NATO in relation to guaranteeing our national security through the European and Euro-Atlantic structures." A participant in the council's meeting said that the basis for these discussions would be the text of the draft resolution that a working group prepared last week (and which the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] refused to discuss at its meeting on 26 May). The official communique also states that Nikolay Dobrev (BSP), chairman of the National Security Commission, also advocated continuing the dialogue in the spirit of what had already been achieved. Our source believes that the ruling party will demand further concessions in the text of the draft resolution.

A source in BSP headquarters said that the Socialists are using their firm electorate as a justification for the stance dictated to them by Moscow. The Khorizont Program of Bulgarian National Radio, however, quoted Zhan Videnov as saying that the cabinet's view on NATO remains unchanged. At the Council session, Videnov is said to have informed the council of the positions that he had stated as head of the cabinet at various international forums. In Strasbourg and Brussels six weeks ago, Videnov said that Bulgaria would join NATO if the latter reforms itself and if this does not represent a

threat to any other state (meaning Russia). He reiterated this position during the visit by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Yordan Sokolov, leader of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] parliamentary group, stated the SDS position that Bulgaria should declare its clear and categorical desire for full NATO membership. The same view was expressed by Veselin Metodiev of the People's Union and Stoyan Denchev of the DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement].

NATO membership is the political ticket with which one enters the European Union. President Zhelev declared this on the Khorizont Program two hours before the meeting started. [passage omitted]

Pavlov, Former USSR Marshal Discuss Defense
AU0206135595 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 2 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Marshal Viktor Kulikov, who is on an unofficial visit to Bulgaria, met today with Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov and Colonel General Tsvetan Totomirov, head of the Bulgarian Army General Staff.

Opinions were exchanged about the progress of democratic reforms in Bulgaria and Russia. A common opinion was expressed that it is impossible to live with the old positions and attitudes from the Warsaw Pact time, but it is necessary to demonstrate mutual understanding and tolerance in seeking new roads toward future development. The need to establish new mutual relations in military cooperation between the two countries was pointed out.

Foreign Policy Decisionmaking Process Outlined
95BA0229A Sofia MEZHDUNARODNI
OTNOSHENIYA in Bulgarian
Vol XXIV No 1, 95 pp 36-42

[Article by Irena Ilieva: "The Mechanism for Making a Foreign Policy Decision"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The foreign policy mechanism consists of the following:

1. Agencies for the foreign relations of the state with specific authority to make foreign policy decisions;
2. A procedure for the formulation and execution of foreign policy decisions, based on domestic law;
3. A subsystem for coordination among different agencies authorized to operate in the foreign policy area. Furthermore, as part of this institutional-procedural aspect, the making and execution of foreign policy decisions could also be considered an information process, i.e., a

process for gathering, processing, and transmitting information with a view to achieving specific objectives.

The sources of relevant information may be found in two radically different areas: the area of international relations and the area of domestic politics. This difference predetermines the complexity of the mechanism for making foreign policy decisions, and the existence of lack of definition, risk, and difficulties in studying this mechanism.

Theoretically, the process of foreign policy decision-making goes through the following steps and stages:

1. Determining national interests by the managing actors;
2. Reaching agreement on said interests by the governing political forces—domestic-policy consensus;
3. Setting objective goals—determining what should be achieved in the foreign policy area;
4. Developing a scale of priorities;
5. Choosing courses of behavior—action or inaction—a stage which requires the existence of no fewer than two possible alternatives;
6. Processing the decision by institutions;
7. Implementing a foreign policy decision by the competent authority (authorities);
8. Observing the effect of the foreign policy decision—the existence, or lack, of a result;
9. Obtaining and analyzing feedback information on the results of the decision.

I. Foreign Relations Agencies of the Republic of Bulgaria

Based on the principle of the separation of powers, authority in the area of foreign policy in our country is granted to the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the President and the Constitutional Court have a special constitutional-legal status.

1. As the supreme authority of state power in Bulgaria, the National Assembly is exclusively competent in the following:
 - a. Resolving problems of declaring war and signing of peace (Article 84, Item 10 K [of the Constitution]);
 - b. Permitting the sending and use of Bulgarian armed forces abroad and the stay of foreign troops on the national territory, or the transit of the country by foreign troops (Article 84, Item 11 K);

c. Declaring a state of war or emergency over the entire national territory, or part of the territory, in response to a proposal from the president or the Council of Ministers (Article 84, Item 12, K). In this case, the National Assembly is not absolutely autonomous and requires a relevant proposal by the president or the Council of Ministers.

The National Assembly is not an actor in international relations. For that reason it does not conclude international treaties. Its authority resides in the ratification and denunciation of international treaties, which:

- Are of a political or military nature;
- Are related to the participation of the Republic of Bulgaria in international organizations;
- Stipulate corrections in the boundaries of the Republic of Bulgaria;
- Involve financial commitments by the state;
- Stipulate the participation of the state in arbitration or in the legal settling of international disputes;
- Apply to the basic rights and freedoms of man;
- Have legal application or require measures of a legislative nature for their implementation;
- Explicitly require ratification.

The treaties ratified by the National Assembly may be amended or renounced only in accordance with the procedure stipulated in the treaties themselves or in accordance with universally recognized standards of international law. The primacy of the Council of Ministers is found in the stipulations of Article 85, Paragraph 3 K: "The conclusion of international treaties that require amendments to the Constitution must be preceded by the adoption of said amendments."

With Decision 7, dated 2 July 1992, the Constitutional Court provided a mandatory interpretation of Article 5, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 K, and resolved and decreed that the publication of international treaties holds a very important position in the authority of the National Assembly. It is only the successive processes of the three acts—ratification, publication, and enactment—that make the concluded international treaties part of the country's domestic law. "International treaties, ratified and enacted in the Republic of Bulgaria that remain unpublished in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK are not part of the country's domestic law unless they were passed and ratified prior to the current Constitution and, in accordance with the procedure applied in the ratification, their publication was not mandatory. The latter do not have priority in the sense of Article 5, Paragraph 4 of K over the standards of domestic legislation. This priority

is acquired as of the moment of their publication." (DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, Issue 56, 10 July 1993).

The permanent commission on foreign policy at the National Assembly assists the Assembly's activities in the field of international relations of the Republic of Bulgaria. In accordance with Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Regulation on the Organization and Activities of the National Assembly in Determining the Structure of Permanent Commissions, the principle of proportional representation in parliamentary groups is applicable (DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, Issue 105, 19 December 1991). All parliamentary forces regard this commission (as well as the permanent commission for national security) as being of crucial importance, because of the critical situation in the Balkans, but these forces have radically different views on the trends through which the Commission's activities should be developed and as to the range of authority which it must have.

One of the important functions of the permanent commission on foreign policy is parliamentary control. We shall discuss that in our consideration of the legal procedure for decisionmaking.

It must be made clear that the chairman of the National Assembly has representative functions only in terms of the parliament and not the state. The Constitution assigns to him just the organizing of external relations for the National Assembly.

2. The Council of Ministers, based on the adopted classical principle of separation of powers, guides and implements the nation's domestic and foreign policy in accordance with the Constitution and the laws. According to Article 106 K, it has the authority to conclude, ratify and denounce international treaties in the cases stipulated by law.

However, the basic part of foreign policy activity is implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its head, the minister of foreign affairs, who makes and executes operative decisions. From the point of view of structure and personnel, our foreign policy administration has had a number of shake-ups in recent years. The lack of stability in personnel and the absence of a principled attitude concerning departmental structures after "decommunization" could not fail to influence the process of foreign policy decisionmaking in the direction of nonprofessionalism and reacting to circumstances. The elimination of diplomatic ranks within the system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created confusion among our foreign partners because they cannot determine the level of the diplomats with whom they establish contacts in the country. The lack of a law on the diplomatic service and the greatly delayed discussion and adoption of a regulation for temporarily

filling this vacuum in the regulation on the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is hindering the study of the mechanism for making foreign policy decisions. The insufficiency in legal regulation, however, does not mean that there is no procedure for making and implementing foreign policy decisions by the ministry. The making of routine foreign policy decisions is currently of great importance as an overall role due to the unstable features of this institution.

3. According to the Constitution, the president is the head of state. He personifies the unity of the nation and represents the Republic of Bulgaria in international relations. In other words, his authority in the field of foreign policy is representational and strictly regulated by the Constitution. According to Article 98 K, the President:

—Concludes international treaties in the cases stipulated by law (Item 3);

—Ratifies changes of the borders (Item 5).

In both cases his prerogatives are restricted by law. International treaties signed by him must be ratified by the supreme authority of the state: the National Assembly. Without that approval, they cannot become part of Bulgarian law, even though they may be perfect from the point of view of international law.

Also limited by the Constitution are the president's functions in appointing and dismissing the heads of diplomatic missions and permanent representatives of the Republic of Bulgaria to international organizations. This occurs by proposal from the Council of Ministers and is not the exclusive right of the president. According to certain political forces, there is a need to restrict even further such presidential prerogatives. (For example, A. Dogan suggests that the parliament should appoint high-ranking diplomats, and the president would simply sign the ukases.)

The representational functions of the head of state include the acceptance of letters of accreditation or of recall of foreign diplomatic representatives in the country.

The president's rights are relatively broader in the field of national security (for details see Article 100 K).

4. The Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court, too, has certain rights in the foreign policy decisionmaking mechanism. These rights belong to two categories: 1) rights within the decisionmaking process itself; 2) rights embodied in the mechanism for the coordination of the foreign policy process.

According to Article 149, paragraph 1 K, the Constitutional Court must issue an opinion on the consistency between the international treaties signed by the Republic of Bulgaria and the Constitution, prior to their ratification, as well as on the consistency between the laws and the universally accepted standards of international law and international treaties signed by Bulgaria (Item 4), i.e., in the process of making foreign policy decisions, the Constitutional Court is authorized to exercise preliminary control over the consistency between the Constitution and a specific category of decisions—concluded international treaties.

The second line of control by the Court is to determine the consistency between the laws and the standards of international law which has precedence. The remaining rights of the Constitutional Court will be considered with the mechanism for the coordination of the foreign policy process.

II. Defined Legal Procedure for Making Foreign Policy Decisions.

It stems from the correlation between the authorities of the different agencies with functions in the foreign policy area.

1. In principle, setting of goals and the making of principled and long-term decisions are tasks belonging to the National Assembly as the supreme and most representative body, a universally authorized agency of state power in the Republic of Bulgaria. These processes are manifested in a variety of legal forms. In the specific area of international relations, these legal forms most frequently are resolutions, declarations, and appeals. Whereas a resolution is a juridical act and is mandatory for all state agencies, organizations, and citizens, declarations and appeals are political manifestations of the will of the Republic of Bulgaria and expresses views on problems of foreign policy and international relations (such as the National Assembly Declaration with respect to the letter of the chairman of the Yugoslav National Assembly of 6 March 1990) (DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, 21, 13 March 1990). Particularly interesting from the viewpoint of the practice of the National Assembly in the field of foreign policy is the law on the withdrawal of reservations and the passing of declarations on international conventions, adopted on 1 April 1993 (DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, 30, 9 April 1993). According to it, Bulgaria can withdraw some reservations related to international treaties it has signed and acknowledge the authority of the Committee on Human Rights, the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Committee Against Torture (based on the respective international conventions signed by Bulgaria). In other words, the declaration recognizing the

competence of these authorities is a law which commits our country.

According to the principle of the separation of powers, the acts passed by the National Assembly may not annul foreign policy decisions of the Council of Ministers or the minister of foreign affairs. Should they conflict with the acts of the National Assembly, the only instrument applicable in this case is parliamentary control that, if fully carried out, may lead to a vote of no confidence in the cabinet and to its resignation.

The parliamentary commission on foreign policy assists the National Assembly in its activities in this area. It reviews in advance international documents submitted for ratification (Article 70, paragraph 1, Regulation on the Organization and Activities of the National Assembly), as well as draft resolutions, declarations, and appeals; it discusses them, issues its opinion concerning them, calls for their acceptance or rejection, and hears reports submitted by the minister of foreign affairs, ambassadors, and other senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The National Assembly may demand that the prime minister or the minister of foreign affairs attend sessions of the parliament or of the foreign policy commission to answer questions.

The National Assembly's legally regulated procedure for foreign policy decisionmaking has some features that differ from the process used when it makes other decisions, declarations, and appeals. First, considering the particular importance of the foreign policy area and the fact that vital national interests are affected, the sessions of the permanent foreign policy commission are, in principle, closed (Article 22, paragraph 3, Regulation on the Organization and Activities of the National Assembly). As an exception and by decision of the commission's leadership, some meetings may be open to the public. The second characteristic of the procedure is the formulation of a preliminary conclusion on the ratification and denouncing of international treaties by the National Assembly which has already been discussed.

The regulation on the organization and activities of the National Assembly calls for special procedural deadlines for making decisions and issuing declarations and appeals. The drafts of such acts are assigned by the National Assembly chairman to the respective permanent commissions within three days of their receipt by him; the permanent commissions must review the drafts within 15 days of their distribution and submit their views to the chairman; the National Assembly plenum discusses and votes on the draft resolutions, declarations and appeals no later than seven days after receiving the views of permanent commissions.

2. As already indicated, the president has limited rights in making foreign policy decisions. He has representational functions and must establish connections among the three areas without belonging to any one of them. The constitution grants the Council of Ministers the authority to conduct foreign policy.

According to Article 98, Item 2 K, the President may address appeals to the people and the National Assembly, including those matters of foreign policy and on the country's international relations. In reality, considering the drastic polarization of political forces in parliament and the still insufficiently established center, the role of the President has increased greatly in the foreign policy area. The great domestic political and international prestige of Zhelyu Zhelev means that each one of his statements, appeals, and interviews is analyzed to determine the trends in the country's foreign policy.

Assigning the National Intelligence Service (Foreign Intelligence) to the presidential office creates a major link in the foreign policy mechanism. This link provides information (to a certain extent) for making of foreign policy decisions. In this sense, we may draw the conclusion that in addition to representation, the role of the President and the NRS [National Intelligence Service] under his jurisdiction is informational as well. In other words, if we consider the making of a foreign policy decision as an information process, the President and the subordinate service to him provide a relatively small but important and strategic part of the information needed in decisionmaking.

3. The Council of Ministers also sets foreign policy targets, but on a lower level than the National Assembly does. As the supreme authority of the executive branch, it formulates the trends, ways, and means for the implementation of foreign policy, and assigns tasks to the minister of foreign affairs and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its decisions in that area are binding upon for all state agencies, organizations, and private citizens. For this reason, it can cancel decisions made by the minister of foreign affairs if they violate the law, or are improper acts (Article 107, K).

The fundamental functions of the Council of Ministers are the following:

It expresses the official position of Bulgaria on international issues;

It assumes political obligations on its behalf;

It submits proposals for the ratification or denunciation of international treaties;

In some cases stipulated by the law, it may discuss and take direct measures concerning the country's national interests;

It discusses and adopts draft international treaties as a subject of international relations and assigns the signing of them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an authority with universal competence in the foreign policy area; it provides diplomatic and consular representation abroad, engages in activities with the diplomatic corps in our country, represents the country, and protects its rights and interests in international relations. It has quite broad and varied functions, for which reason the foreign policy department makes and implements a great variety of decisions, which are in terms of their nature and character, of a tactical rather than a strategic nature; these are resolutions which provide a choice of the means for attaining already set objectives. In accordance with information received and goal-setting made on a higher level, the resolutions passed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are of the following type:

- a. Resolutions related to the choice of its own actions (or inactions);
- b. Draft resolutions;
- c. Assessment resolutions and, relatively infrequently,
- d. Ultimatums and resolutions requiring mandatory obligations by other subjects of international relations.

The study of the legally regulated procedure for making foreign policy decisions by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is hindered by the lack of any regulation on the diplomatic service as well as by the natural departmental closeness and limited access to information affecting the national interests. However, the basic concepts regulating the activities of this department, such as centralization, hierarchical subordination, and one-man command are sufficient grounds for drawing the conclusion that the administrative principle of transferring the work to the lowest level—the territorial administration—is observed.

The dynamics of international relations and the great variety of situations which require the making of foreign policy decisions raise the issue of the specific distribution of the tasks within the department. They demand high professionalism in decisionmaking on the career level.

At this point, we could include only the problems of the extent of autonomy and frameworks of authority in making foreign policy decisions by the heads of our diplomatic missions abroad, for executing resolutions passed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs abroad, the

coordination between the center and the missions, and feedback information on the results of the resolutions and their processing and evaluation.

III. System of Coordination Between Agencies With the Authority to Make Foreign Policy Decisions

The existence of the aforementioned agencies with authority in the area of foreign policy necessarily requires coordination among them: ensuring coordination in target-setting and strategy, as well as in the tactics and practical implementation of foreign policy decisions.

A. Legally regulated coordination

1. Coordination through the mandatory interpretation of the Constitution by the Constitutional Court in cases of doubt concerning the application of its stipulations (Article 139, paragraph 1, Item 1 K).

2. Control over the constitutionality of laws and other acts of the National Assembly and presidential acts (Article 149, paragraph 1-2 K) by the Constitutional Court.

3. The Constitutional Court also resolves disputes over competence between the National Assembly, the President, and the Council of Ministers (Article 49, paragraph 1-3 K).

4. The Constitutional Court evaluates the consistency between international treaties signed by Bulgaria and the Constitution, prior to their ratification (Article 149, paragraph 1-4 K).

5. Mandatory parliamentary ratification of all international treaties of military and political nature.

6. Coordination of intentions and division of the right to appoint and recall Bulgarian ambassadors between the Council of Ministers and the President.

b. Institutional coordination:

1. Coordination within the Council of Ministers. This involves coordination among the different ministries and the departments and is centralized and strictly based on hierarchy. In reality, each ministry or central department engages in international activities within the range of its authority and makes departmental-level foreign policy decisions. The prime minister guides and coordinates the overall policy of the government and is responsible for it. Foreign policy is part of the general policy and, consequently, the responsibilities of the prime minister apply to this area as well. The minister of foreign affairs (like all other ministers) is responsible for his actions. Their oversight is regulated and expressed in the right of the Council of Ministers to rescind illegal or improper acts by the minister of foreign affairs (Article 107 K).

2. Coordination within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs falls within the category of internal coordination. It is based on the principle of hierarchial subordination of the individual units, responsibility, and one-man command.

3. Foreign coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Assembly and its foreign policy commission. This is implemented by the parliamentary foreign policy secretary, who is a high-ranking official of the foreign policy department. There also exists non-institutionalized coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the presidency that, considering the aforementioned features of the presidential institution, should be flexible and, to a certain extent, informal.

IV. Personal Substitution in Making Foreign Policy Decisions

The problem of personal substitution affects the individuals who formulate, adopt and implement decisions by virtue of their authority, without being actors in of international organizations (for details see Georgi Stefanov, *Vunshnopoliticheskoto reshenie* [Foreign policy decision], Sofia, 1989, pp 59-60).

It is quite important and has a variety of aspects affecting all levels in the making of foreign policy decisions.

On the highest level of authority, individuals participating in the process of foreign policy decisionmaking represent parliamentary political forces. The formulation of foreign policy decisions, where there is a dialogue among these forces and competition among opinions, contributes to the variety and enhances the range of possibilities for a choice of behavior. On the other hand, extreme polarization of views and their irreconcilability, due to strictly party interests, would hinder the making of some foreign policy decisions (ranging from blocking the mechanism for decision making to making delayed or erroneous decisions).

On a lower level (Council of Ministers and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) professionalism and the making

of accurate, prompt, and effective decisions, from the administrative and not only political viewpoint, are of particular importance. It is presumed that a consensus has been reached concerning national interests and that the process of target setting has taken place.

This short review of the mechanism of making foreign policy decisions indicates its great dependence on the law. In this case, we have dealt only with the stipulations of domestic law in the Republic of Bulgaria, deliberately setting aside the requirements of international law, which raise other problems.

The existing constitutional regulation provides merely the foundations of the mechanism for foreign policy decisionmaking and it also creates prerequisites for arguments concerning the competence of individual agencies with authority to deal in the field of foreign policy. There may be fluctuations in the application of the stipulations of the Constitution in this area. The authority of the Constitutional Court provides constitutional sections.

A considerable proportion of the legally established procedure is related to particular internal-departmental regulations and its study is difficult. As we indicated, there is no law or regulation on the diplomatic service, which would provide a stable regulation of the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where most operative decisions are formulated. An opportunity exists to use procedures to block the mechanism for formulating and making foreign policy decisions by the National Assembly and its permanent commissions if the polarization of political forces prevails, or if irreconcilability prevails on foreign policy problems of vital importance to the country, or if no agreement can be reached on priorities or if some decisions are aimed at promoting partisan interests.

A more profound study of the foreign policy decision-making mechanisms would make it possible to prevent conflicts on all administrative levels and improves the process for the sake of Bulgaria's national interests.

Havel on Communist Officials, Personal Villa

LD0406164695 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network
in Czech 1215 GMT 4 Jun 95

[Weekly "Conversations at Lany" interview with Czech President Vaclav Havel by Vladimir Pavrovsky at Havel's villa in Prague; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Pavrovsky] The Office for the Documentation and Investigation of Communist Crimes intends to charge and prosecute Czech culprits of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia for high treason, taking this step now, five years after the fall of the totalitarian regime. In my view, however, this is a matter for legal interpretation and trial proceedings. There is also a moral and political aspect to it. I am very interested in your view, Mr. President.

[Havel] We have longstanding problems in coming to terms with the past. We are not the only ones; all postcommunist countries are experiencing them. We are, in fact, well aware of many different attempts to tackle this and that they faded away. I hope this attempt will not fade away as all the previous ones did because guilt should meet its punishment. This does not mean I would like to see some people, who have meanwhile grown old, serving their sentences in prison. However, it is a matter of principle; it would serve the continuity of moral values in our society, serve our society's moral hygiene.

[Pavrovsky] Today's "Conversations" are conducted at your home, Mr. President, in the villa you bought and have furnished. This is at a time when our public is annoyed by the way the prime minister attempted to solve his housing problem [Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus was recently invited by Prague 6 district council to apply for a council flat and subsequently was offered one]. I am aware you do not comment on such issues, but I think our listeners would like to hear your view on this.

[Havel] It is extremely important for every person to have his own home, and this applies to politicians as well. I experienced it myself because for some time I lived in the state residence at Prague Castle, and, despite all of its luxuries, I did not feel comfortable there. I felt like a part of the castle's inventory, chained to the castle. As soon as I moved to my own house, my life changed fundamentally, and, since then, I feel my roots more strongly, am calmer and more self-confident.

I fully understand the prime minister's longing to have his own home and not to be dependent on [former communist Prime Minister Lubomir] Strougal's villa, where he is currently living. As a human being, I fully un-

derstand him. Probably because of being overburdened by other tasks, he had chosen an unfortunate way—something he came to realize a few days later. That is all.

Defense Official Views NATO Admission Process

AU0306151995 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
31 May 95 p 21

[Interview with J. Novotny, senior director of the Defense Ministry's Foreign Relations Section, by Jiri Roskot; place and date not given: "In the United States, They Are Already Discussing How Much NATO Enlargement Will Cost"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Roskot] The Alliance should complete the first version of a study on its possible enlargement in May. What information have you received from your foreign partners?

[Novotny] Our Western partners are interested in the views of the applicants for Alliance membership, but I do not know if any of these views will be included in the study because this is the Alliance's internal affair. The frequency of meetings at various levels, however, is increasing. I have just returned from a 24-day visit to the United States. A seminar on NATO enlargement was held, for example, at the National War College. In the United States now, they are moving from the theoretical level to practical matters, especially toward considering the issue of how much enlargement will cost.

[Roskot] When will it become clear in whom NATO is interested?

[Novotny] Dialogue with the applicants should begin probably at the turn of October-November. What will be conveyed to us will depend on the outcome of the discussion within the Alliance following publication of the aforementioned study. I do not think that, at this point, they will say: You yes, you no. Forms of rapprochement with NATO structures will obviously be discussed. Each country will have to decide for itself whether it is ready to cooperate in this or that sphere. I think that the economic ability to share in the costs associated with this will also play a certain role. No one can expect that closer cooperation will be bestowed on anyone.

[Roskot] Has our ministry drafted a study on the costs of membership?

[Novotny] Until the specific figures are known—for example, the contribution to the joint structures—we can only proceed from the costs for the joint activities within the Partnership for Peace program such as joint exercises, our officers in Brussels and Mons, seminars,

conferences, and so on. Perhaps we will know more after the talks in November.

[Roskot] What opinion is being expressed about the Czech Republic?

[Novotny] The Czech Republic is spoken about everywhere—in tandem with Poland—as one of the first candidates for membership. I uphold the view that we have nothing against the admission of one of our neighbors first—for example, Poland. This causes some surprise, but, if you look at the map, it is in our interest for our border with NATO to be as long as possible. In this issue, the influence of Americans of Polish origin is palpable in the United States.

[Roskot] What inspires confidence in the Czech Republic?

[Novotny] Our biggest advantages are successful economic reform, political stability, and the fact that we do not traipse around the world asking for financial assistance. We are also refusing to take part in a race over membership in the Alliance. If we want to be a normal democratic country in accordance with our concepts for it, we have to transform and restructure the Army anyway, whether we are invited to join NATO or not.

[Roskot] Are isolationist tendencies manifesting themselves in the United States?

[Novotny] I encountered them in academic circles, but they are far from being prevalent even there and not at all in the Pentagon or other institutions. I also spoke to people from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I would say that NATO enlargement is one of the few issues on which the administration and Congress just about agree. The Republicans are in fact pressing the administration to enlarge NATO.

[Roskot] Did you also discuss NATO with your Russian counterparts?

[Novotny] We held staff talks with the Russian Armed Forces in Moscow in March. The Russian side was opposed to our possible admission to NATO. I tried to explain that, if we become a member, it will not mean that we are enemies. The problem is that no one in Russia has even attempted in recent years to change NATO's image among the public.

Defense Minister Discusses Army Transformation

AU0306150595 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech
31 May 95 p 3

[Interview with Defense Minister Vilem Holan by Ferdinand Peroutka; place and date not given: "Further Fundamental Changes Will Be Made in the Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Peroutka] Have you altered your opinion on the role of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] units following the recent events in Bosnia?

[Holan] I want to say that what the Bosnian Serbs are doing with regard to the UNPROFOR troops cannot be described as anything but terrorism. It is also necessary to remember that, on the one hand, our units are guarding the separation zone in Croatia while, on the other, we have 30 observers at posts throughout the former Yugoslavia. The international command supervises the observers' actual deployment and the way their tasks are fulfilled. Therefore, the interventions to free the detained observers are also supervised by the international command. The nations that made up the former Yugoslavia must, first and foremost, come to a final political solution themselves. The international community is helping them in this. In view of developments, however, we think that it is right that the mandate by which the international forces operate there be amended. It is essential to increase the authority of UNPROFOR.

[Peroutka] What kind of amendment to the UNPROFOR mandate do you envisage?

[Holan] The issue involves making sure that the United Nations is authorized to carry out the kind of operations that would prevent violent terrorist acts. The UNPROFOR units should be armed so that they can defend themselves effectively.

[Peroutka] Personnel policy is an army evergreen. How has it changed under your ministry?

[Holan] In the actual filling of posts, we are moving toward higher quality in selection. We are trying to place in the important posts young officers who have undergone sufficient training and passed courses in NATO member countries. We are also improving the quality of those selected for these courses. Naturally, we are placing the main emphasis on changing the whole system of personnel work. This involves, first and foremost, the principles for the career system, which lays out the principles by which the course of a career soldier's service is governed, how he proceeds through posts and ranks, and what the conditions are for this

progression. Another strategic document in this sphere is the targeted systematization of posts.

[Peroutka] What progress is being made in inverting the pyramid of posts, in placing the Army on a broader base of more junior officers and warrant officers, and in rejuvenating the Army?

[Holan] The ideal pyramid of ranks is clear to us. The current appearance of the rank hierarchy pyramid is also known. Inverting it to its proper shape depends, first and foremost, on the interest shown by young people in serving in the Czech Army. Since November 1989, interest in serving in the Army has unfortunately been declining continually. There is a distinct improvement this year, mainly in interest in the military academies. The Army will complete its fundamental reorganization this year; numbers are being reduced. Of course, it is necessary to understand that fundamental changes can only be made by implementing the career system.

[Peroutka] Has the stance regarding civilian service hardened? Apparently consideration is being given to setting up commissions that would inquire into the applicants' reasons...

[Holan] The law on civilian service, including its amendment, is being coordinated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, not by the Defense Ministry. Nevertheless, the amendment indeed takes certain tougher conditions into consideration. The length of civilian service is to be 24 months, and commissions established by the district offices are to operate. These proposals, however, do not come from the defense department. The number of citizens refusing military service has no influence on the number of soldiers in basic service that the Army needs to call up every year.

[Peroutka] The Partnership for Peace program has been received rather skeptically as a substitute for NATO membership. Can you say how the Partnership has brought us closer to admission to NATO?

[Holan] In its Presentation Document, submitted on 17 May 1994, the Czech Republic declared that it views the offer of the Partnership for Peace program as an opportunity to intensify its preparations for future NATO membership. This document outlines the steps that have been or will be taken to achieve the political aims of the Partnership and that should lead to the gradual attainment of the long-term aim—compatibility between the Czech Republic's Armed

Forces and NATO. One of the first and, at the same time, very important steps toward achieving this long-term aim was the participation of select staff officers and units in joint international exercises; for example, there were five of these in 1994. Courses and short-term assignments for our soldiers in the NATO states' armies are also an element of this project.

[Peroutka] Are you satisfied with the language courses that should contribute to compatibility with NATO?

[Holan] No. The current standard of linguistic ability among the majority of Czech Army officers does not correspond to requirements. A new system of language training is being created throughout the Army. The aim is to establish a system that will lead to a relatively rapid rise in the number of linguistically proficient officers—to a level corresponding to NATO standards. This system must also be acceptable to the Army from an economic point of view.

[Peroutka] Rearming the Air Force has been under discussion for several years. Has any definitive decision been made?

[Holan] We have reached a definitive decision on removing the MiG-29 aircraft from our armaments and purchasing L-159 aircraft for the Czech Army. The L-159 project is part of the concept for modernizing the Army. The Air Force is undergoing transformation at the moment; modernizing aircraft hardware is also part of this. The MiG and Su series of aircraft will—after reaching the end of their "technical lives"—be replaced gradually by modern aircraft, both domestic and imported, that are fully compatible with NATO standards. In particular, this involves the L-159 subsonic multipurpose tactical aircraft supplied by the AERO Vodochody company. Renewing the pool of supersonic aircraft, however, also requires an equally fundamental solution. The modernization of the MiG-21's is being considered for defense continuity in this sphere.

Christian Democrats, KDS To Merge Next Spring
*LD0206212895 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network
 in Czech 2100 GMT 2 Jun 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Christian Democratic Party [KDS], led by Ivan Pilip, are to merge in spring of next year, according to a merger timetable agreed upon by top officials of the two parties today. [passage omitted]

State Secretary Sestak Assesses Washington Talks
AU0206162395 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA
in Slovak 1 Jun 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Jozef Sestak, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Jozef Janto in Bratislava; date not given: "Our Businessmen Can Seize the Chance of Developing Trade With Latin America"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Janto] The first stop on your 20-day tour of the American Continent was the United States. This was immediately after the Moscow summit of Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton.

[Sestak] During the Moscow summit, as well as during my talks with U.S. officials, the number-one topic was the enlargement of NATO. The question of Slovakia and its integration into North Atlantic structures is on a qualitatively new level now. Great appreciation was voiced in Washington for our economic results, for the building of democratic institutions, and, of course, for the signing of the Slovak-Hungarian interstate treaty. The contribution of the Slovak Government and, in particular, the prime minister, who, as was stressed, could play a historic role on our continent, was particularly highlighted in this context. Regarding our integration into West European structures, I believe that, from today's viewpoint, admission to NATO comes into consideration before EU admission. However, a certain role is played here also by the issue of [presidential] elections—in the United States as well as in the Russian Federation. [passage omitted]

Weekly Interview With Prime Minister Meciar

LD0206210795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 2 Jun 95

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Zuzana Stukovska in Bratislava on 2 June—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Stukovska] As of yesterday, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus still did not have your answer to his letter asking for approval of the cancellation of the payments agreement with Slovakia. Provided we are prepared for all possible and variant solutions to the problem, as is claimed by Deputy Prime Minister Sergej Kozlik, what can Slovakia gain from delaying an answer to the letter?

[Meciar] Prime Minister Klaus did not tell me he demanded my approval. In fact, he demanded my response by 31 May to the steps to be taken by the Czech side. I gave my opinion and sent a verbal message. I have not sent a written statement on the issue yet because I have been authorized by the government

to decide on both the contents of the reply and its date at my own discretion.

The Government of the Czech Republic accepted the postponement of the Slovak reply yesterday. This means that the whole issue will be delayed by at least one month. We are waiting to see what steps the Czech side is going to take. We are really prepared for all variables. [passage omitted]

[Stukovska] At the meeting with the representatives of French businessmen this week, you confirmed that the Slovak Republic would have fully convertible currency by the end of this year. The currency outlook for the National Bank of Slovakia [NBS] does not foresee such a measure being implemented by 1 January 1996. How would you explain what looks like a minor discrepancy between the government's plans and the NBS's outline?

[Meciar] I do not think there is any discord between the government and the NBS. A much earlier date for the convertibility of the Slovak koruna, though incomplete, is noted in the 1995 outlook, which was presented to the International Monetary Fund. Convertibility may be incomplete, but it will be under way.

Everything depends on the situation both at home and abroad. Positive developments—for example, the increase of our hard currency reserves, a positive balance in our foreign trade, an active balance in our trade with the Czech Republic, and progressive trends in the whole of our economy—mean that we can make this issue, the convertibility of the Slovak koruna our program. Naturally, there must be an accord between the government program and the bank program.

The credibility of the Slovak Government, from the NBS's point of view, rests on the fact that, at the beginning of 1995, once the new government policy statement was presented and the political mechanisms implemented, interest rates went down. Similarly, we work toward achieving full convertibility. It is an act of outstanding historical importance, provided we manage it. I have one plea: We ask people who cannot help us not to make it more difficult for us. It is a very complicated social issue. It is necessary to discuss the pros and cons and not laugh at it.

The situation is this: The Czech Republic is striving for full convertibility. One of the Czech side's proposals is to make the Czech koruna the basic currency in our trade relations. The Slovak side proposes the Slovak koruna. It is clear that we have to find a compromise; either one of the currencies, or both, or a third currency will be used.

Considering our relations abroad, we have received a proposal from one foreign country—I will not reveal its

name at this point—to conduct our mutual trade using the Slovak koruna as a unit for our accounts. Naturally, if this were to become reality, the economic policy of the Slovak Government and the NBS must lead to a stable Slovak koruna so that it can work as a currency both at home and abroad.

When we look at one of the aspects indicating developments of currencies—that is, when we look at the currency black market or at retail sales and black markets in the neighboring countries—we realize that the Slovak koruna is a welcome and sometimes even a preferred currency.

The trend of improvement is under way. It is unnecessary to deny it. The increase of value of the Slovak koruna in stable prices is higher than expected, so we should be glad about it rather than mock it.

[Stukovska] The way in which privatization is being carried out is now being criticized not only by the opposition but also by the trade unions and, to some extent, by the supervisory board of the National Property Fund. The latter said that the date for the beginning of the second wave of coupon privatization was under threat because decisions on some 150 privatization projects have not been made yet. Of that number, 100 decisions relate to the setting up of joint-stock companies. Prime Minister, is this not a situation calling for personnel changes? At least an outsider's view seems to point in that direction.

[Meciar] The government has dismissed the state secretary and the head of office of the Privatization Ministry at their own request. The substance of the matter does not relate to personnel changes but to the future system of privatization.

I met businessmen this morning, and they approved all of the steps taken by the government in the privatization process. I also briefed the businessmen on the new principles that are under preparation for the so-called coupon privatization. We are no longer discussing the exact technical term for this process because it does not reflect the substance of the new model, which is going to be much more favorable for people. It will put real and concrete property values into people's hands, and people will be free to manage this property. It will also result in a much fairer economic model than the previous one, which was applied in the first privatization wave. The previous model resulted in a situation in which a majority of our people lost control over their property. The property fell under full and absolute control of privatization funds, some of which did not have honest intentions. [passage omitted] Cabinet ministers will work on Sunday. The economic ministers will discuss and draft this new model of the

so-called coupon privatization. The word so-called is appropriate. We will present this model to the public on the "Press club" roundtable discussion on 6 June.

New norms will be needed, and I am appealing to the National Council chairman and the deputies to be so kind as to give priority to relevant legislation so that the whole process of the second privatization wave can be launched by the end of the month.

To summarize the above, everything is going to be different, and everything is going to be better.

[Stukovska] By the end of which month?

[Meciar] Be the end of this month. [passage omitted]

[Stukovska] It seems that yesterday yet another political scandal emerged in Slovakia. As regards the petition lists to enable political parties to take part in the 1994 elections, the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], your coalition partner, found itself in a situation similar to that of the Democratic Union [DU]. Do you fear for the stability of the government coalition?

[Meciar] In all three parties, in fact four parties, we are aware that a certain model of the development of the Slovak Republic depends on the cohesion of the government coalition. Any crack in this cohesion would logically lead to a change in the course of developments. This is why we have defended the coalition regardless of the views around us, regardless of the views held by individual parties. This is the reason we strive to preserve the coalition, to preserve it for four years. I do not see any parallel between the situation of the Democratic Union and that of the Association of Workers of Slovakia. [passage omitted]

Of course, various speculations have been circulated, and a question has been asked about those Association of Workers of Slovakia's petition lists, but ZRS Chairman Jan Luptak gave me his word that it was not true. Whatever someone has against Luptak, there is no doubt that, in the coalition, it has been so far possible to rely on his word. Once he gives his word, he sticks to it and does what he promises. This is why I have no reason whatsoever to doubt the words of the ZRS chairman.

Weekly Says 1993 Election of Kovac Illegal

AU0206152695 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA
(SLOVENSKO DO TOHO supplement) in Slovak
1 Jun 95 p 1

[Commentary by Stanislav Haber: "Michal Kovac—Self-Styled President of the Slovak Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "Future events cast their shadow forward," the classic Goethe once said. This

dictum also fully applies to the case described by engineer Jan Pavlik in his letter to the editor in issue No. 284/1995 of the independent weekly ZMENA. The passage of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic on 1 September 1992 and its coming into effect on 1 October 1992 canceled the validity of the Slovak National Council's Constitutional Law No. 79/1990 on the Oath of Slovak National Council Deputies. In the adopted Constitution of the Slovak Republic, the oath of deputies is regulated by Article 75, Sections 1 and 2, which states, among other things: "Refusing to take the oath or taking it with reservations results in the loss of mandate." In the wake of 1 October 1992, however, deputies did not take their oath until after the 1994 elections. [passage omitted] Hence, Michal Kovac was elected head of state by deputies whose mandates were not in conformity with the highest legislative norm—the Constitution of the Slovak Republic—and were thus invalid.

Because this dilemma cannot be addressed retroactively today, for understandable practical reasons (this would imply the existence of some kind of a legal vacuum between 1 October 1992 and 1 October 1994), the only possibility of setting this right is by means of subsequent confirmation of previously adopted legal norms. The subsequent confirmation of Michal Kovac in the post of president of the Slovak Republic, too, is therefore needed. However, this act took place already—on 5 May 1995, when the National Council of the Slovak Republic passed a resolution on Michal Kovac's loss of its confidence. Only 40 deputies voted against this resolution and, hence, FOR Michal Kovac! From this follows that, ever since 5 May 1995, Michal Kovac is not president of the Slovak Republic! Inasmuch as he remains in this post in defiance of the above facts, he is acting like a self-styled president. In conformity with the highest legislative norm of the Slovak Republic, the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, the government should therefore stop financing the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic with effect from that day! Since its establishment on 1 January 1993, Slovakia has not yet had its first president who would be elected in a legally valid way! Michal Kovac was elected in 1993 only provisionally [nahradne], until his confirmation in this post, which, however, did not happen on 5 May.

In the final analysis, Michal Kovac himself confirmed the meaning of Goethe's sentence by his conduct as temporary president of the Slovak Republic. Michal Kovac was not above party affairs and did not live up to the political and moral criteria expected of the head of state, which he has never been, in fact. Since 5 May, however, he is not even temporary president but

a self-styled one. In this way, he has joined the ranks of politicians known from totalitarian regimes....

Hungarian Organizations: Trianon Unjust, Mistake

LD0206180895 Bratislava Slovak Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 2 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Four Hungarian organizations—the Transylvanian Alliance, the Hunyadi Alliance, the Sub-Carpathian Alliance, and the Rakoczi Alliance—have faxed a statement to our editor on the 75th anniversary of the Trianon Peace Treaty. Among other things it says:

The events of recent years—Yugoslavia's disintegration and the consequent internal war, which does not spare even Hungarians; the series of anti-Hungarian measures in Slovakia following the demise of the Masaryk-Benes Czechoslovakia [the period between the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 by President Tomas Garrigue Masaryk and the resignation in 1948 of President Edvard Benes, linked to a communist takeover]; and the grave situation of the ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania—prove that the redrawing in Trianon of the map of East-Central Europe can be considered not only unjust but also a fateful historical mistake, the consequences of which turned the successor states that were formed 75 years ago into Europe's seat of conflict. It is the conviction of the signatory organizations of this statement that the peoples of Central Europe are dependent upon each other, and it is only in cooperation that they can proceed along the road of progress. In cooperation with the democratically thinking representatives of these countries' majority peoples, the undersigned wish to pave the way of reconciliation in any possible way.

Hungarian Civic Party National Council Meets

LD0306170495 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1500 GMT 3 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Council of the Hungarian Civic Party met in Kovacov, near Sturovo, today. They discussed a bill on ethnic minorities and assessed cooperation within the ethnic Hungarian parties' coalition, the internal political situation in Slovakia, and an antiassimilation program. The discussion made clear that the antiassimilation program is based on the demand for individual and minority rights as, according to the participants in the discussion, Slovak assimilation efforts target above all the Hungarian ethnic minority living in areas with marginal ethnic minority presence [okrajove narodnostne oblasti].

The session stressed the need for cooperation with Slovak opposition parties.

New Political Group Promotes Minority Interests

AU0206135695 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak
30 May 95 p 2

[TASR report: "They Will Promote the Interests of Working People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Presov—The Dukla Democratic Assembly [Podduklianska demokraticka hromada] (PDH) is a new movement on the Slovak political scene. The PDH held its constituent congress in Presov on 27 May. Although it operates throughout the republic, the focal point of its political activity will be in northeastern Slovakia. According to its communique, "none of the current post-November political and governing formations has paid sufficient attention to it to place it on a par with the other regions in Slovakia." According to movement chairman Jan Baco, they want to promote the interests of working people—workers, farmers, the intelligentsia, and also tradesmen—and to contribute to resolving the lingering socioeconomic problems of this ethnically mixed region. One of the PDH's specific tasks will be to unite the splintered spectrum of views on Ruthenian-Ukrainians in Slovakia. The PDH was registered at the Interior Ministry on 6 September last year.

Trade, Cooperation Accords Signed With Bulgaria

AU0306152195 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
1 Jun 95 p 2

[TASR report in the "Briefly" column]

[FBIS Translated Text] A Memorandum on Liberalization of Mutual Trade Relations and an Agreement on Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation were signed by Jan Ducky, Slovak minister of economy, and Kiril Tsochev, Bulgarian deputy prime minister and minister of trade and foreign economic relations, in Bratislava yesterday.

Meciar Wants French Cooperation in Producing Arms

AU0206155395 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
1 Jun 95 p 2

[TASR report: "Cooperation as Mutual Bridge"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"Our cooperation with France could become one of the most important factors of dynamizing the Slovak Republic's foreign trade," Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar said during a meeting with French entrepreneurs yesterday. The prime minister, all economic ministers, the governor of the National Bank of Slovakia, and the director of the Center for Strategic Studies met with representatives of a mission of French entrepreneurs in the Borik Hotel in

Bratislava late yesterday afternoon. The French mission is led by Abel Farnoux, chairman of the S.I.S.I.E. (Services, Industries, Strategies, International & Environment) Supervisory Board. The prime minister briefed the French entrepreneurs on the characteristics of the Slovak industry. The Slovak Republic is establishing an engineering holding company so that foreign investors, including the Renault automobile company, for example, will have a single partner in Slovakia, he said. He also spoke about the possibilities of cooperation in the production of arms. The Slovak Republic currently uses only 8 percent of its arms industry capacity, but is able to produce 5,000 armored vehicles and 1,500 tanks annually. "Slovakia has also made progress in completing the Mochovce nuclear power plant," Vladimir Meciar added. Speaking about cooperation between the Slovak Republic and France, the prime minister said that "the Slovak Republic will become for France a bridge further to the east, and France will be the Slovak Republic's door to the EU."

According to Farnoux, "the French entrepreneurs did not come as a delegation, but as businessmen interested in becoming specific participants in the development of the Slovak economy."

Minister Sitek Discusses UNPROFOR, Army Budget

AU0306152095 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak
30 May 95 p 5

[Interview with Defense Minister Jan Sitek by Marian Hudec; place and date not given: "The Army Is Overcoming Its Problems"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Hudec] You have returned from a visit to our troops in the former Yugoslavia. How does the local command rate our UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] unit?

[Sitek] The Slovak battalion is the only one to have received a letter of recognition from the UNPROFOR commander and the individual commanders, and citizens also rate our troops highly. The battalion builds roads, bridges, and barracks for the UNPROFOR members. It also defuses mines. And, it does this throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia. These are all extremely necessary humanitarian activities.

[Hudec] During your visit to the United States, did you also discuss adopting certain organizational measures that could be implemented in the Slovak Army?

[Sitek] I took part in talks during the conclusion of a treaty between the Slovak Republic and the United States on classifying military information. The former government approved the structure for the Slovak Army

up to the year 2000. The first transformation is under way now; it will be completed by the end of this year. In accordance with the Vienna Convention, by 15 November, the Army will have 47,667 personnel compared with its current "tabular" figure of 52,000. The number of tanks, combat armored personnel carriers, cannon, howitzers, rocket launchers, and combat aircraft and helicopters will also be reduced.

[Hudec] The Slovak Republic should have a numerically small, but well equipped and trained professional army. Are the 12.6 billion korunas from the budget enough for this?

[Sitek] The Army got as much as possible from the budget. It enables us to refurbish some hardware. The Army's professionalization has begun; however, we have to try it out in one unit to catch any mistakes. But, I will return to the subsidies from the state budget. Not all of the funds are always utilized rationally. The issue involves making sure that the korunas the Army is given are utilized precisely and transparently. The Army cannot, at the moment, make money.

[Hudec] If we want to export new, possibly modernized weapons systems, they have to be part of our Army's equipment. When will this be realistic?

[Sitek] First, someone has to manufacture a sufficient number of these weapons systems. This involves, first and foremost, the howitzers from Dubnica; we have, I think, four of them. These are prototypes intended for military experts, possibly businessmen. A holding company is now being planned that will guarantee arms production in the Slovak Republic. We are one of the largest producers of heavy combat hardware, and we will find the solution to this production's recovery in close cooperation between the Defense and Economy Ministries.

[Hudec] I would also like to touch upon hazing in the Army. It is occurring, despite measures to prevent it. How can it be curbed significantly?

[Sitek] In every unit I visit, I ask the soldiers in basic service about these problems. As minister, I am interested in resolving things. We have set up a commission to overcome the negative phenomena in mutual relations between soldiers. In the Army, there are around 800 platoon commanders who are in the best position to put a stop to this. The squad and company commanders, who will be mostly professionals, will also put a stop to hazing.

Horn on Expected Outcome of Talks With IMF

*LD0406204195 Budapest MTV Television Network
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 4 Jun 95*

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn, there will certainly be progress at the talks of representatives of the Hungarian Government and the International Monetary Fund.

Before his visit to the United States, the prime minister said at the airport today he was expecting the IMF to make a so-called statement of approval [egyeterjesi nyilatkozat] regarding the Bokros-package [Hungarian austerity package named after Finance Minister Lajos Bokros]; following this, an agreement could immediately be reached on a standby loan for Hungary.

It has emerged from the prime minister's words that an agreement with the IMF is of vital importance for Hungary. A statement of approval could be the first stage of this.

[Horn] "If the IMF makes such a statement, it will indicate the approval of the measures taken by the Hungarian Government and parliament. This is very important, if for no other reason because it implies that Hungary would again become a reliable partner for the international financial world, as it has been for years. As a result of this, obstacles would be removed from talks and the conclusion of agreements with other international financial institutions and individual countries and governments."

By doing this, the IMF would practically stamp the Bokros-package, figuratively speaking.

[Horn] "Yes, it would be the stamp of trust."

The prime minister also said that they had compiled a list of companies that were to be privatized and that might attract the interest of U.S. investors. Disregarding this fact, Gyula Horn considered it inevitable that the U.S. Government also supported our economic plans.

[Horn] "I count, first and foremost, on support by governments. It is obvious that, after all, business interests determine whether an investor comes to Hungary. However, more government support is necessary; for example, in the way the German Government relates to Hungary and Central and East Europe."

Ship Detained Trying To Break Yugoslav Embargo

*LD0406110895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1000 GMT 4 Jun 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] There has been another attempt to violate the [Yugoslav] embargo at Mohacs. This time

a Ukrainian ship was detained on the Danube. Laszlo Gungl reports from Pecs:

[Gungl] The Ukrainian ship wanted to leave Hungary at Mohacs, but an inspection revealed that the containers held a lot more fuel than the documents indicated. The captain was then asked to leave the ship so that clarification could be sought on dry land. The captain refused to do this and, what is more, he called on the crew to resist. Luckily there wasn't any serious incident because the police had been informed. Members of the intervention subdepartment, the commandos, went from Pecs to the scene, where they arrested 18 persons, including the captain. Penal proceedings have been launched against him for embargo violation. The Ukrainian ship is now lying up at Mohacs.

Foreign Ministry's Gyarmati on Regional Issues

*AU0206152795 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 30 May 95 p 11*

[Interview with Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, head of the Security Policy and European Cooperation Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, by Zoltan Gyulay in Budapest; date not given: "We Do Not Want Conflicts"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Gyulay] From the very beginning, the United Nations and NATO hesitated on the Yugoslav issue. In addition to self-restraint by the sides involved, what other solutions could yet emerge?

[Gyarmati] Not many. One could probably have found a solution at the very beginning. Today, the world is trying to apply political and economic pressure, and military pressure to a certain extent. As for the results that this will bring, and when, that is another question.

[Gyulay] Could one describe your job as a traveling envoy?

[Gyarmati] Not really, because the department I head is here; moreover, many people criticize me for traveling a lot, but that is closely associated with my work. [passage omitted]

[Gyulay] As OSCE commissioner in charge of Chechnya affairs, you must negotiate with both sides, including Dudayev, in the course of your mediation. How do you get from one side to the other? Do they try to exert secrets from you?

[Gyarmati] This is not a problem at all. This is a strange conflict, but conflicts are generally strange. The two sides in the conflict are on speaking terms with each other. Dudayev always had a representative in Moscow; earlier he had an official representative, and now only

an informal one, so it is easy to organize meetings. Of course, they are trying to find out secrets, but they will not succeed. Fortunately, the Russians know me quite well and they know that they are trying in vain. I fought a lot earlier with the Russian and Soviet-Russian delegations at various meetings, and I think my files in Moscow are quite thick. [passage omitted]

[Gyulay] To what extent can we determine the shaping of Europe when, although we are an organic part of Europe, we are only now knocking at the doors of the European integration organizations?

[Gyarmati] We cannot determine the shape of Europe. Obviously, as a result of the balance of forces, and I mean here primarily the political and economic balance of forces, rather than the military one. We are aware of this when we sit at the negotiating table. However, compared with our objective possibilities, we make better use of this scope for maneuvering that derives from the recent dramatic changes in Europe. Of course, it is not necessary for us to play a determining role in the whole of Europe. If we can find our own place and we can develop normal relations here in our region, and if we can contribute to the adequate development of European relations, we will have done everything that can be expected from us. Hungarian diplomacy started to be active as early as in the second half of the eighties, and made use of the changing opportunities.

[Gyulay] How justified is the Western concern that Hungary could easily come into conflict with its neighbors over the national minority issue, although its diplomatic activity radically contradicts this possibility?

[Gyarmati] I think it is quite understandable and a human thing that, when someone refuses to do something he can bring hundreds of counterarguments to support his alleged truth. Those who, for some reason, would not be happy to see Hungary as a full EU member in the near future welcome the arguments according to which Hungary is not yet really ripe for EU membership. However, these people are not lucky, because they failed to prove their claims. The way I see it, Western Europe is becoming increasingly aware of the fact that precisely the opposite of the accusations against us is correct. They are becoming aware of the fact that the situation here in Central Europe is relatively stable, and this thanks to the fact that Hungarian, and also Romanian and Slovak diplomacy are also interested in this. I think it is not at all a problem if we are asked not to have conflicts because, on the one hand, we do not want conflicts and, on the other hand, this demand can force others to conduct a sober policy. When the expansion of the EU becomes a real issue, this will not be a problem. [passage omitted]

Kovacs Says Bucharest Has Become More Flexible
AU0306153095 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 2 Jun 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by Otto Neumann; place and date not given: "Bucharest's Position Has Become More Flexible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Neumann] Mr. Kovacs! Together with representatives of several East-Central European countries, you also held talks on joining NATO with the U.S. secretary of state in Noordwijk on 31 May. In an interview published in MAGYAR HIRLAP on 1 June, Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu said in connection with this that it would be preferable for our two countries to join NATO simultaneously. What is Hungary's position on this issue?

[Kovacs] Both countries equally strive to join the Euro-Atlantic structures. According to our concept, this is a drive coming from within, an essential condition for the country's security, stability, and economic-social modernization. Therefore, Hungary's joining will be the result of an integral development. Actually, the economic-social modernization program can also be interpreted as a program for joining the EU. Thus, Hungary is far from being interested in hindering others to join NATO or the EU, or delaying others' membership in these organizations. On the contrary: It is in our interest to see as many countries in the region as possible fulfilling the conditions of membership and becoming members of these organizations. We would not only welcome the fact that we can be members of an integration system, but we would also rejoice at the fact that we fulfilled the conditions of joining these organizations, namely the political, economic, and social requirements, including the democratization of the society and the assertion of national minority rights, requirements that are essential conditions for such membership. If I examine the issue this way, I think it is understandable that, in seeking the opportunities of joining as soon as possible, Hungary does not strive to overtake Romania. We think that no one can be expected to delay this membership because of others. We do not expect anyone to wait for us; nor do we intend to wait for others.

[Neumann] You also held a private discussion with Teodor Melescanu on the issue of the basic treaty. Did any progress emerge in this respect?

[Kovacs] Prior to the European Stability Conference in Paris, four open questions hindered the signing of the almost finished treaty. We failed to agree on including Council of Europe Proposal No. 1201 in the treaty, on formulating the right to use one's mother tongue, on the

right of national minorities to form political parties, and on monitoring the treaty. In the meetings of experts and the foreign ministerial talks held since then, we have noticed a certain change in the Romanian position. The fact that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reinforced the validity of Proposal No. 1201 led to a different situation, so the Romanian foreign minister did not even try to argue in favor of discarding this document. We originally urged that, together with two other international documents, this proposal should become a legal obligation. We thought that, instead of providing a list of several pages, the inclusion of these documents in the basic treaty would be more practical. The Romanian side proposed to literally quote some important parts of this document, but not the entire document. On 31 May, Melescanu was no longer arguing against the document; instead, he was trying to clarify the reference method. As for the other three issues, I think Bucharest has become more flexible. We agreed with Teodor Melescanu to hold a new meeting of experts at the beginning of June, and to seek a solution by taking into consideration the lessons of our latest talks.

[Neumann] Obviously, certain extremist anti-Hungarian manifestations in Romania do not contribute to the cause of rapprochement....

[Kovacs] It is the responsibility of both governments to halt the spread of extremist manifestations that can disturb the relations between the two countries and the two nations. It is a positive thing that, in Hungary, the forces that based their election campaign on this to a certain extent did not make it into Parliament. Unfortunately, the situation is different in Romania, where extremist forces are also to be found in the government. This could disturb the development of Hungarian-Romanian relations in the future too.

[Neumann] Teodor Melescanu said that the development of bilateral economic relations was promising. Do you share this opinion?

[Kovacs] I also think that, as a whole, Hungarian-Romanian relations show an improving trend, and our relations are not only characterized by the signing or delaying of the basic treaty. For our part, as a whole, we are satisfied with the broadening of trade relations and the increasing number of joint ventures. I am convinced that, in addition to their direct advantages, the economic relations are also important for strengthening confidence. The connection between economic and political relations is also true the other way around, because the improvement of political relations and the strengthening of confidence have a favorable effect on economic cooperation. One cannot imagine a really

serious economic cooperation without an adequate level of confidence. Until the signing of the basic treaty, and also after that, the aide-memoire signed by the two foreign ministers, a document that covers all the areas of contact development, represents a program of concrete action.

[Neumann] The Romanian foreign minister expressed his regret over the fact that the highest-level contacts between the two countries are not regular enough....

[Kovacs] The activation of high-level meetings is on the agenda. The concept of the Hungarian Government is that such meetings do not represent the crowning of relations already developed to perfection; instead, these meetings serve as a means of improving relations. There were opportunities for high-level meetings in 1994, for example, at the OSCE summit in Budapest, or at the European stability conference in Paris recently. I meet Mr Melescanu more than half a dozen times annually on various international conferences. We make use of every such opportunity to exchange views on certain topical issues in our bilateral relations.

High Cost of NATO Membership Emphasized
95CH0228A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 18 Mar 95 p 94

[Article by HETI VILAGGAZDASAG staff member Peter Magyar: "Expensive NATO!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to paragraph 5, which is the key to the North Atlantic agreement, "an armed attack against one or more member states is considered an attack against the entire alliance," and will be retaliated against accordingly. This paragraph is given significance by NATO's unique and combined war machinery, and is a guarantee for security that is sought after by countries aspiring to become members. Officials of the Horn administration, led by the prime minister, keep insisting publicly that it will be possible to attain this guarantee "perhaps next year," but for sure by the end of the decade.

According to supporters of our becoming members, a "security vacuum" exists in our region. Ethnic conflicts are blazing, weapons are rumbling near and far around us, and we can expect help from no one if needed, while—as the Americans put it—our army "cannot even subdue a paper bag." How much more security we would have under NATO protection! Although we are not threatened at present, and Hungary's security can be provided through political means, things may change in Russia, and chaos and anarchy may take over, whereupon order may be restored through tough military action, coupled by an awakening of (dormant) imperial ambitions.

In another scenario (God forbid, it should ever happen!), (the issues of) Hungarian minorities deteriorate our relations with the leadership of neighboring Serbia or Romania to the point where we need protection. Even in its ruins, Russia is still a formidable military power, and should its appetite again turn from the Caucasus and Central Asia to Central Europe, the principle of "Russia first" may again prevail in American diplomacy. In other words, Yeltsin or his successors would indeed have a say in NATO's eastern expansion. And should Hungary be threatened by its neighbors, this danger would be preceded by an increase of tension, which would automatically bar us from becoming a member. That is to say: It is a paradox that we will be admitted to NATO only if we do not need to be admitted; if we need to be admitted, our admission would be much more difficult.

But be that as it may. Let us accept the justification for our leadership's efforts to make Hungary a member as soon as possible. However, the Hungarian public should also be told—clearly and understandably, instead of with mere hints and allusions—that the cost will be very high. NATO protection is not free.

First of all, our existing Soviet-made weapons would have to be replaced with military equipment that is compatible with that of NATO. The stranger/friendly aircraft detection system would be only the first step. We would have to purchase a multitude of expensive weapons and equipment during the coming years from American and other Western manufacturers (who, for this reason, presumably support our membership). It is even more important that we would have to restructure our Army's system of command to make it compatible with, and operate under, the unified NATO commands. This is not a question of language courses. It is a much more complex matter. And then, we would have to hold military exercises that cost several hundred millions of forints, and we would have to regularly participate in such exercises abroad. No one else would pay for these. NATO bases, air defense, warehouses, surplus stocks, nuclear weapons (unless expressly forbidden by our government), and many other things would have to be provided on Hungarian soil for the expected military forces. These would need supply routes and transportation and communication capability (which, incidentally, would be difficult to build through neutral Austria).

All this would cost many times more than 50 to 170 billion forints, a figure nonchalantly given by the minister of defense. NATO members spend 3 to 4 percent of their GDP—which is much higher than ours—on joint defense annually. We would be protected by this war machinery only if we became eligible

through enormous expenditures. Experts are well aware of this, I think. But then the question is: Have the expected costs already been calculated but are being kept secret, or have they not yet been calculated? If the latter is true, then it would be good to get it done.

(The author is on the staff of HETI VILAGGAZDASAG.)

Justice Minister on Legislation, Judiciary

95CH0253A Budapest MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 31 Mar 95 p 7

[Interview with Justice Minister Pal Vastagh by Szilvia Zimmer; place and date not given: "Results of Legislation Not Spectacular"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The legislative leadership had a special role in the change of regime in Hungary. It is of incalculable significance that the greatest role in creating a pluralistic parliamentary democracy in Hungary was played not by weapons and violence but by the law. Pal Vastagh, the Socialist justice minister of the coalition led by the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party], does not miss any opportunity to emphasize that the road to the developed countries of Europe leads through the reform of the law; and in his opinion, the harmonization of the law, i.e., the adjustment of the law to European norms, is one of the most important tasks on the agenda. What is the justice ministry's present role in the government? Can it fulfill its tasks as stipulated in the government's program? These are the topics we are discussing with Justice Minister Pal Vastagh.*

[Zimmer] The justice minister is supposed to be as cunning as a lawyer, as precise as a notary, as circumspect and just as a judge, and as aggressive as a collector. You are a university professor. How does the scholar feel in the role of head of the justice ministry?

[Vastagh] Good. The witty saying you quoted has some truth to it, because even someone who has not tried out all these professions can have the necessary qualities. However, it is not a disadvantage if the justice minister is versed in the law—especially because the ministry's primary task is codification, the preparation of laws on a high professional level. So far, my career has been in legislation, and this is an advantage in performing my current tasks. Of course, reality and practice are always more complicated; thus, the first half year was a period of gaining experience. In my opinion, the government's ideas on justice and legislation are achievable, but not without difficulty. This is a portfolio in which one cannot demonstrate spectacular results from one day to the next. Here, one needs persistent, diligent work.

[Zimber] Certain colleagues left the portfolio with the change of regime; others were transferred to a different office or a different position when the ministry was reorganized—and even among the leaders, there are some who remained and there are new people. To what extent do you trust your colleagues? Do you respect their opinion?

[Vastagh] I have not dismissed anyone for political reasons. I am prepared to listen to everyone—even directly, not just through the State Secretary for Administration. My workday today corroborates this fact. I will personally attend meetings at three of our major departments. In September, and later in December, I will present my ideas and our tasks to the ministry's entire staff. Because I do not presume that I know everything about every issue—and this is not even possible—before making a decision I ask experts for their advice, input, and opinion. Unfortunately, financial recognition of the work of public servants is limited; therefore, I place great emphasis on personal and professional appreciation. I know how important success is for my colleagues. For instance, I recently invited colleagues whose performance in last year's codification work was outstanding. I have little opportunity to give financial rewards, but I do not hold back words of gratitude from those who deserve it. It is well known how great the competition is in the legal professions. Good legal professionals can be paid better in business or financial positions, or even in the courts of law. On the other hand, the ministry's staff can acquire practice in legislation. They can pursue their ambitions in this field, and a legal career has stages when this is necessary.

[Zimber] The previous government assigned an outstanding role to the Ministry of Justice. What is the portfolio's current position within the government?

[Vastagh] This is difficult to determine from the inside. The consistent representation of the demands of constitutionality and legality is not a very comfortable task, but we know no compromise. My experience is that our opinion is accepted, and not only in the cabinet meetings, but also in the course of broad administrative mediation. The government accepted a grandiose legislative plan, which must be accommodated to reality. Even so, in the first half of this year, we set the goal to pass eight laws that have serious economic and social implications, and at the same time result from the requirements of legal harmonization within Europe. Let me mention only a few examples: On the agenda are the laws on environmental protection, water management, public purchases, and the reorganization of tariff laws.

[Zimber] In the course of the preparation of this year's budget, law enforcement fought great battles with the finance ministry, and the idea was broached that the situation of law enforcement and its agencies, as well as the possibilities for their development, should be examined in a larger context on the government level.

[Vastagh] Yes. In April we are going to present the government with a comprehensive report on the situation of that area and its reorganization. If the government accepts our ideas, it will have to reckon with the financial consequences in planning next year's budget. The bill on the organization and legal position of law enforcement will be submitted to the government in May. When the cabinet can discuss the proposal on the service relations of the Armed Forces depends on the other portfolios, not on us. Negotiations are under way regarding the economic situation of the law enforcement agencies, and the improvement of their conditions.

[Vastagh] It seems that while you are attempting to establish the best possible relationship with the Supreme Court, you consider a good relationship with local courts and county justices less important. You also abolished the judiciary authority. A major department was established to oversee the organization of courts; it is chaired not by the state secretary, but by the assistant state secretary for public administration.

[Zimber] We have a very proper working relationship with the chief justice of the Supreme Court, as well as with the chief prosecutor and the chief justice of the Constitutional Court. They participate in one of our most important tasks: constitutional legislation. I am consciously striving for a constructive and correct relationship with the organizations and representatives of the legal profession, such as the Association of Legal Professionals, the Association of Judges, the chamber of notaries, the professional organization of registry courts and parole officers, the trade unions—and I could go on and on. Judiciary policy is unimaginable without the cooperation of the legal profession, as I emphasized at the second national assembly of legal professionals in Siofok. I will attend the days of legal professionals in Szeged, Kecskemet, Miskolc, and perhaps elsewhere as well.

Within half a year I met presiding county judges three times, and before the middle of December I visited the county courts of Bekes, Csongrad, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplen, Komárom-Esztergom, Zala, and Veszprém counties, and I met with judges. I visited the Central District Court of Pest and I will visit the Central District Court of Buda. On 23 January I will attend the meeting of judges in Kaposvár; and on 30 January, in Budapest. Do these facts indicate that I do not

consider a good relationship with judges of supreme importance? The law on the organization of courts guarantees the independence of judges to the utmost, and I respect that. However, this independence involves great responsibility, and the judges must accept that. The reorganization of the ministry made the work more expedient, and made the determination of tasks more accurate. In no way does this indicate that the ministry considers courts less important than before.

[Zimber] The budget had no room for maintaining the salaries of judges. Consequently, the National Council of Judges [OBT] did not give its consent to the budget; and according to the law, this hinders the passing of the budget. Nevertheless, the budget was passed.

[Vastagh] The portfolio had no possibility of changing the budget proposal. We were unable to fulfill the demands of the OBT and the presiding county judges. The government knew that the OBT was maintaining its position—but, beyond the duties stemming from the law on the organization of courts, we also have duties stemming from the law on the budget. The parliament passed the law; not one suggestion for an amendment was submitted, not even by opposition representatives. Under the circumstances, this is a small achievement but a significant one that in the future we will be able to finance benefits, which until now had to be budgeted from the reward fund, from a separate fund of 600 million forints. I do not think that it was a good idea to grant the OBT a consensual right in the law.

[Zimber] The package of amendments in preparation aimed at speeding up the administration of justice suggests that you are not content with the way the courts work.

[Vastagh] This is not the issue. What happens within the courts, how work is done there, is the realm and the responsibility of the presiding judges. The codification committee that prepared the amendment of 40 to 50 sections of the law was attended by representatives of the county courts as well. The goal is to make speeding up the administration of justice possible, because there is a great demand by citizens.

[Zimber] The government wrote fighting corruption on its banner. Your proposal, in this vein, to discipline presiding judges stirred a fairly large controversy. Are you planning other steps to fight corruption?

[Vastagh] The matter of disciplinary measures belongs under the aegis of the Disciplinary Court, and I have already publicly stated my opinion in this matter. The fight against corruption must not be abandoned, no matter how difficult it is. The law on public purchases puts a serious obstruction to certain kinds of corruption by prescribing open bids for orders by state and local governments. The steps planned by the Finance Ministry to tighten financial and tax supervision are also important. Representative Peter Zwack came to see me and we discussed how his parliamentary proposal, which has the primary intent of establishing a concentrated organizational structure utilizing international experiences, could be formulated as law. Negotiations on this matter are also under way with the chief prosecutor. I am certain that if we do not accept the current situation as unchangeable, we will be able to restrict corruption to a minimal level in a few years.

Allies Accuse U.S. of Promoting Muslim Cause

MS0206124395 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
in English 2 Jun 95 pp 1-2

[Article by George Jones and Suzanne Lowry in Paris:
"Allies Suspect US Hawks of Increasing Risk of War"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Concern is growing in European capitals that pro-Muslim factions in Washington, including CIA elements, are promoting the Muslim cause in Bosnia even at the risk of all-out war. The CIA is accused of "blatantly distorting" intelligence summaries to further Muslim interests and US military advisory links with the Bosnian government are said to be much stronger than has been publicly disclosed.

Doubts and suspicions over Washington's real intentions are hampering efforts to achieve an effective Western response to the crisis, caused by the seizure of some 350 United Nations hostages.

According to authoritative diplomatic sources in Europe, "chaos, divisions and suspicions" prevail behind the scenes in London, Paris and Washington as the three governments face up to the prospect of deeper involvement in the three-year conflict in former Yugoslavia.

There is no evidence of a coherent administration policy disclosed to European governments and a fierce factional struggle appears to be taking place in Washington about how the Clinton administration should act.

President Clinton's offer of the "temporary use" of US troops in Bosnia has failed to reassure European leaders. They were not given advance notice of his apparent policy shift in favour of committing ground forces to help UN peacekeeping forces regroup into safer territory.

There is said to be considerable scepticism in London and Paris over whether any US troops will be sent to Bosnia, particularly as Mr Clinton is already facing strong opposition in Congress.

The French government appeared unmoved and unimpressed by Mr Clinton's speech. Yesterday it was more concerned with the reality of burying the two soldiers killed in a clash with Bosnian Serb forces at the bridge at Vrbjana last Saturday than with what French officials saw as vague American half-promises. However, there are fears that, despite France's recent tough stance, its recent casualties have increased the likelihood of withdrawal unless there is progress towards a political settlement.

Relations between Washington and Europe have been strained throughout the Clinton presidency, largely because the EU has blocked the President's attempts to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims.

They have been undermined further by indications that factions within the White House and US State Department are now openly backing the predominantly Muslim Bosnian government in Sarajevo.

Some ministers fear that elements in the US administration are threatening any hopes of compromise in Bosnia by covertly promoting Muslim interests—without informing their European allies—to force the Bosnian Serbs to give up territory they have seized.

This would increase the risk that Britain, France and other contributors to the UN Protection Force would become actively involved in fighting the Bosnian Serbs—a course Mr Major has repeatedly sought to rule out.

A leading US analyst, Prof Norman Cigar, argued yesterday that allowing the Bosnian government to re-arm would speed a solution.

In a report published by the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies in London he said the arms embargo had prevented the Bosnian authorities acquiring the weapons to which they were entitled under international law.

Prof Cigar added that, if the Bosnian government could overcome its inferiority in weaponry and if it could develop effective cooperation with Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs could be expected to stop the conflict and finally negotiate.

Tensions persist within the British Government over the extent to which Britain is being drawn into the conflict. The Prime Minister is said by colleagues to feel a "dogged" determination to maintain Britain's presence in Bosnia, the policy that he himself initiated.

He is said to be deeply concerned that Muslims currently surrounded in the safe havens may be massacred if the UN pulls out. He told the Commons on Wednesday that Bosnia had been on the brink of "genocide" before the troops were sent.

Other British military and diplomatic authorities argue that Downing Street overestimates the threat of massacres, while accepting that many people would be driven from their homes if the safe havens were overrun.

Mr Major reiterated his concern yesterday when he defended the decision to deploy 6,500 more troops—Britain's biggest military build-up since the Gulf war.

He said that the peacekeeping forces were preventing a "wider Balkan war" and that Britain could not wash its hands of the conflict. "If we took those troops out and that humanitarian work ended, hundreds alive today would die," he said.

But Malcolm Rifkind, the Defence Secretary, is said to be a "waverer," concerned that Britain risks becoming bogged down in a long-term civil war. Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary, favours a hardline response in the short term to force the Serbs to seek a political settlement.

But he is worried about committing British troops to a fourth winter in Bosnia.

Military chiefs want to stay in Bosnia, arguing that the troops are still performing a useful humanitarian role. Nor do they want to pull out before the 34 British hostages are released—though they acknowledge there would be great difficulties in launching an SAS-style rescue.

Even here there is scepticism: some politicians believe that the Service view is influenced by its enthusiasm to maintain its high profile role.

Although Mr Major has said that the troop reinforcements are to give more protection to the soldiers already there, the main aim is to widen the options of the peacekeeping force. The Government considers that the reinforcement was essential to cover the contingency either of exerting leverage on the Serbs or to cover a withdrawal.

Joint Staff of Bosnian Army, HVO Review Work
LD0306195695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 3 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the state presidency and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, today received representatives of the joint staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], led by Brigadier [name indistinct] and General Zivko Budimir.

Their talks focused on the work and work conditions of the joint staff, the results achieved so far, as well as a debate on future tasks and a new work program.

The conclusion reached was that the joint staff was well acquainted with the situation on the ground and that it successfully realized the tasks outlined in the present agreement, contributing to the stabilization of the situation on the ground, and that it outperformed the civil department.

The debate on work conditions and the performance of the joint staff showed, however, that it was necessary to make further improvements in work conditions. To this aim a joint meeting was proposed with the president and the vice president of the Federation, and with Generals Delic and Blaskic.

The visit and ideas of U.S. Gen. [name indistinct] were also discussed, as were the latest events in connection with the UN Protection Force and the arrival of fresh troops. Ganic laid emphasis on the importance of the joint staff and its role both in the future (?partnership) between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO and in the development of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and its institutions.

Future Presidential Selection Discussed

AU0306143395 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 29 May 95 p 7

[Article by S. Luckin: "The Legalization of Political Will"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The initiative taken by the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] with the aim to change the part of the Constitution that regulates the procedure for the election of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was, surprisingly, not accompanied by much commentary in the public, although it was published more than 10 days ago. This silence, especially of the opposition parties, is understandable, although their influence on the control of the state could be seriously affected if the changes are accepted. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has deteriorated during the past years, and it is only natural that the attention of politicians is now drawn toward problems much more important for the state. A quick poll conducted by BH PRES only a day after the SDA announced that it would require a change of the Constitution, showed, however, that if times were quieter, such an event would cause a political tumult.

Let us remind that the SDA insists on the regulation that in case of the death of the present chairman of the Presidency, the election of a new one should be carried out in the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this regulation would be applicable only in a state of war. It is regulated by the present Constitution that the chairman of the Presidency is elected by the Presidency members themselves. The personnel changes made in the Presidency during the war, and there were many of them, were more or less made in the way that a parting member of the Presidency was replaced by the next one from the list of the nation in question. We say more or less, because in case of Miro Lasic and Tatjana Ljubic-Mijatovic this rule was evaded, for two different reasons, however. Regardless of the reasons of these two changes, the legalization of exceptions like these can be a justification for the present SDA intentions. Apart from that, it can gag the opposition, since the opposition did not moralize too much when Tatjana Ljubic-Mijatovic became one of the

members of the Presidency, although she was only a member of the legislature of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Formally, the SDA Has a Minority

All these changes have resulted in a new balance of forces in the Presidency. Formally speaking, the SDA has a minority there now, because only Alija Izetbegovic and Ejup Ganic are the representatives of the ruling party in the Presidency. It is, however, true that the power of the Presidency is concentrated more or less in their hands, so that the influence of other Presidency members is really minor.

Still, in case of Alija Izetbegovic's death, this relation could change. The election machine within the Presidency, in which the opposition—let us repeat this once again—has five members, could easily impose its will if it is allowed to decide on Izetbegovic's successor. And this means that the influence of the SDA would be neutralized.

Candidates From Abroad

Edham Bicakcic, the SDA vice chairman, said in the parliament that this party would not allow that its position in the Presidency is affected. The SDA considers that the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be in charge of the election of new presidents. And it is well known that the SDA has a majority there.

Bicakcic also said that it would not be allowed that "various candidates auction off for the position in the Presidency." Although his name was not directly mentioned, the message was probably addressed to Nazif Gljiva, a singer, who announced that he would be ready to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to become a member of the Presidency.

This could happen only under the condition that future members of the Presidency are elected by means of an election list. Even under these conditions, Gljiva would not, however, be the first candidate. According to the election results from 1991, Durakovic, who was already member of the Presidency, obtained the most votes. There followed Djemal Sokolic, the candidate of the then Association of Reformist Forces. Gljiva ranked third.

It is interesting to be reminded of other candidates who were on the list of Muslim candidates for Presidency. The list included the following candidates according to the number of votes they obtained: Dzevad Haznadar (Association of Reformist Forces), Fejsal Hrustanovic (Social Democratic Party), Bahrudin Bijedic (independent candidate), and Adil Zulfikarpasic (Muslim

Bosniak Organization). All of them have something in common—they live abroad now. Some of them left the country before the war started, some of them at the beginning of the war, and some during the war.

Their present residence deprives them of moral credibility to run for membership in the Presidency. This could be to the advantage to the SDA. On the other hand, when Presidency members were elected, voting was for individuals, not for parties. This fact denies the right of any party to count on its permanent seat in the Presidency. The places belong to the candidates who obtained the most votes.

Who Replaces Whom

The opposition could respond to the announced SDA move by opening the issue of a new general election, because in November 1995 there will be four years that the previous election was held. It is almost impossible to make such a thing during a war, but even if it is organized, it can hardly be imagined that the SDA position would be shaken. On the contrary, there are estimations that its victory would be even more convincing than in 1991, which is also true of new Presidency members. Therefore it is more probable that, because of a state of war, the mandate of the present Presidency will be renewed.

The chronology in the appointment of candidates to the position of members of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the motive for which they were elected, is the best proof of the theory that the SDA might win in the end. Before the aggression started, Nikola Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic had left the Presidency. They were replaced by the next candidates from the election list: Mirko Pejanovic and Nenad Kecmanovic. When Kecmanovic left, the law was changed and Tatjana Ljubic-Mijatovic, a member of the parliament, was appointed member of the Presidency, since the "Serbian list" had already been exhausted.

Not less tumultuous was the situation with the "Croatian personnel." Upon insistence of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] and for the sake of normal relations, a political rather than lawful decision was adopted at the end of the first war year according to which Stjepan Kljuic, a member of the Presidency, was replaced by Miro Lasic. After Boban's wing in the HDZ abandoned the concept of a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stjepan Kljuic and Ivo Komsic reentered the Presidency instead of Lasic and Franjo Boras. In a series of changes, Nijaz Durakovic replaced Fikret Abdic too. The Presidency has been almost completely reshuffled during the war. The only two members who have retained their positions up to date are Alija Izetbegovic and Ejup Ganic.

In all these cases a way was found to legalize new relations of political powers. And the SDA has enough power to force the legislature into adopting its latest intention too.

Karadzic Views Contact Group, Unification

AU0306182795 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija
in Serbo-Croatian 1910 GMT 2 Jun 95

[Interview with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic by Dragan Bozanic in Sarajevo—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Bozanic] In your interview for DER SPIEGEL, you demanded that Germany be expelled from the Contact Group. Why? Do you not think that better relations between Germany and the Serbs—the Bosnian Serbs, in particular—could help prevent the conflict from further escalating?

[Karadzic] It would be very good, and in the interest of Europe as well, to improve German-Serb relations. We have always had good cultural and economic relations. Our technology—the technology of the former Yugoslavia and the Serb lands, in particular—mostly hinged on Germany. However, Germany became a member of the Contact Group exclusively as the chairman of the European Union. It is no longer its chairman, but unfortunately it did not stop being strongly biased in favor of the Muslim side—that is, against the Serb side. If Germany were to become unbiased, if it did not have a vested interest in the region, like other major powers that are involved, we would then welcome Germany's participation in finding a solution to this crisis, just as we would welcome Italy and other neighboring countries that are affected by this crisis.

Unfortunately, we cannot say how many parties are involved in the conflict. Here we have the Serb side, the Muslim side, and the Croat side in the conflict. Furthermore, we have the United Nations, which has its own goals. Then we have the Contact Group as a whole, as well as every member of the Contact Group, who also have their own interests, which are not identical to the interests of the Contact Group. On the whole, it is very difficult to solve this problem because there are so many sides involved. Nobody except the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims should be interested in the outcome of the crisis. They should all be absolutely indifferent and unbiased, and their only interest should be to help us find a political solution to the crisis.

If Germany should take an unbiased course and consider Serb interests—at least to the extent it considers those of the Croats and the Muslims—then we would welcome the presence of Germany. However, if Germany were to leave, the Contact Group would be purer, for it would no longer have a biased member.

[Bozanic] Mr. President, let us stay on the foreign political scene. The deadlock in the Contact Group activities has obviously helped bring about this escalation of the war. Much more room has probably been left for the hawks who are responsible for the latest developments who encouraged those who do not want peace. Could you please tell us once again what the Serbs specifically said about the proposal of the Contact Group, about the proposal of the international community. Under what terms will they return to the negotiation table and how do they think this crisis can be overcome?

[Karadzic] Basically, the Contact Group was not a real contact group. It did not contact us. It had two general and informal meetings—as they themselves put it—with our officials, and then, the way they always do, they put on the table that which we did not take part in drafting—that is, maps, percentages, constitutional principles, and indications of constitutional principles—and told us to either take it or leave it.

Of course, they did their best, especially U.S. representative Redman, that we leave it—that is, that they make it so bad that the Serbs could not accept it. And thus, they made sure the crisis was prolonged, that the Balkans is destroyed as a region, as an economic region, that Serbia is destroyed, and that they paved the way for further destruction of Serbia from Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandzak. In a word, they made sure to stir up the entire region, including Europe—and, of course, under the dictate of the United States.

Afterwards, the Contact Group had futile meetings, both with us and with other warring sides, as well as meetings of its own members, so we do not know whether the Contact Group wants to have contacts with us or with its own members. I think the Contact Group should either be disbanded at once and find a good mediator, an unbiased one, or it should finally start doing something. What the entire Serb nation made clear at the referendum is that we reject the maps as defined and unchangeable. We did not reject the entire plan, we merely rejected the maps. And the referendum refers only to the rejection of the maps.

Essentially, we find the principle of demarcation of two or three states—entities as they call them—acceptable. We believe that is the only just outcome. It would not be good if we took all of Bosnia, nor will we allow the others to do so, for that would guarantee long-lasting guerrilla wars and dissatisfaction of the defeated, subjugated side. In other words, the main principle of defining and redefining Bosnia as two or three states—and I think even the Muslims and the Croats want three states, not two—would be the only acceptable element from the work of the Contact Group. Everything else

must be changed, and everything else is not so very different from what they proposed.

What the Serbs could accept is not so different from what the Contact Group proposes. Our question is why the Contact Group does not want to help us find a solution? That means that the Contact Group wants to prolong the crisis. To that effect, we presented our views to many governments as to what could be done. We think the war could end in three to five weeks, that what we find acceptable is not so radically different from the plan of the Contact Group. We said we were prepared to accept the Contact Group plan as the basis for negotiations, to treat it as a basis for negotiations. However, we feel that we would be tricked into accepting it, after which there would be no more negotiations, nor would there be anything to negotiate about.

It is evident that the international community does not want to find a solution to the crisis just yet. When it wants to solve the crisis, the international community knows where the Serbs are. Serb leaders are in Pale or in Banja Luka or elsewhere in the republic, in Zvornik or elsewhere. We could meet with them anywhere. When they are ready for a solution, we will be ready to meet with them. [passage omitted]

[Bozanic] Mr. President, correspondents who are perhaps not totally against us tell us that maybe you—the Serbs—want to draw the Muslim state into Europe indirectly because your leaders practically stated that you do not care whether Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided into two or three parts. Indeed, you said that we do not mind a solely Muslim state.

[Karadzic] Unfortunately, those Muslims are actually Serbs, ethnically they are Serbs. But religions drew us apart so much that we are now enemies, and so did the interests of others, of course. We are not at all against Islam as a religion. There is no anti-Islamic animosity on our part. We are not against our Muslims either. We are against their domination over the Serbs. Europe should fear an independent Muslim state that could be a stronghold for terrorism. Even the Muslim communist Durakovic said that the Bosnian and Slovene Muslims would be successful terrorists because they look like Europeans, while they are actually carrying Islamic, or rather Arabic, bombs.

Consequently, Europe should be afraid of that. And that is why Europe is trying to put the Muslims under the protectorate of the Croats. We are not against a separate Muslim state, a separate Croat state, or that the Croats and the Muslims are together. What we will not allow is the possibility that we are the national minority in those states, under those hostile regimes, that from our

country—in which we settled the national question by uniting in 1918, that on the basis of communist borders that were made absolutely arbitrarily, without any legitimacy whatsoever—we become part of someone else's national state. This is out of the question.

We must reiterate that we are probably better friends of the Muslims than all those from the West who are pushing them into total destruction and into a war against Christians. [passage omitted]

[Bozanic] Milo Djukanovic stated that the FRY is ready to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina. When will that happen and with what consequences for the Serb Republic? One of the most painful questions is on our unification with....

[Karadzic] Yes. I do not think it will come to the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was no basis for the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April of 1992, before the war either. What basis is there for its recognition after three years of war and bloodshed? Much less. And its chances are much slimmer now. The entire world recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that does not mean anything, because we did not recognize it. It is of paramount importance that Yugoslavia—the mother country of Bosnia-Herzegovina—does not recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that President Milosevic and the FRY work on a global political solution rather than on the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Emotionally, it would be very painful for us. However, it would not have an effect on our soldiers' morale. They would only be very sad and wonder why Serbia relinquishes unification in that way, for if it recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, then it relinquishes unification for a long time or for good. Nobody has a right to do that. We are one nation and we believe that nobody has a right to expel us from Yugoslavia.

What I heard was the possibility that we are striving toward a solution, to recognize two states and two governments and a possible link between them and to determine the borders, etc. However, that is very vague. We are against every recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, against any recognition before the nations of that former state. It would only lead to an escalation of fighting, for the Muslims would think that they have more right to conquer all of Bosnia. The Serbs would believe that they have more of a right not to allow them to do that. The recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the international community led to the war. The recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Yugoslavia would lead to escalation of that war. Consequently, it is not in the interest of peace to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina. If we want peace, we must find a political solution as soon as possible, and that solution is not far off.

Let me repeat that the international community is prolonging this war because it does not want to realize what the real situation is on the ground. It does not want to understand that the Serbs are flexible, that they are ready to compromise, and that the solution is close at hand. The solution can be found in several weeks. If Yugoslavia recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina, that will first of all be a problem for Yugoslavia—why it was not recognized in 1991, or rather 1992, if there is a basis for its recognition.

Furthermore, we should ask who is responsible for this war. All the responsibility lies with Alija Izetbegovic, who demanded recognition and secession in violation of our constitutional right to veto, who mobilized all of Bosnia-Herzegovina—the Muslim and the Croat part—on 4 April, and threatened to make us extinct. For the time being, he is the one responsible for this war. He cannot avoid being held responsible. However, it would not make any sense for anyone in Yugoslavia to take responsibility for the war. Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be recognized as a country or an integral whole because there is no basis for that. It is not a state; it does not have a government, territory, nation, or efficient authorities. It is divided into two or three parts. [passage omitted]

[Bozanic] Mr. President, if such a recognition were to be realized, does that mean that some foreign troops would be deployed along the border at the Drina?

[Karadzic] I do not believe that anybody in Yugoslavia or in Serbia can allow further humiliation of Serbia with the presence of foreigners at the Drina. There are enough foreigners there as it is. The border is firm enough. [passage omitted]

I do not see why it should be made any firmer. I do not know what the international community wants. What does it want us to do? To surrender? We will not do that. To capitulate? We will not do that. To accept Bosnia-Herzegovina? We will not accept it as a state. They cannot put that much pressure on 1.5 million Serbs. We endured 500 years under the Turks with many rebellions and insurrections. We endured four years against Austria-Hungary, fighting in the woods. We endured for four years against Hitler, without our state territory, without much help and we will—especially now that we have our own state and territory, our own resources and economy—endure for much longer, that is certain. But the question is why should we. Why does the international community not realize the fact that we did not come to conquer Bosnia, that this land is ours? That we have been here for centuries and that this belongs to us. And that we should be granted the same rights as the Croats and the Muslims: to our own

state, our own identity, and our own self-determination. We have the same right.

Consequently, any further attempts to seal up the Bosnian Serbs would only result in more suffering to us as well as to the Croats and to the Muslims. You see, we will not sit idly watching them seal our every pore, not letting us breathe. We will seal the pores of the Muslims. That is our legitimate right. Nobody can ask us to be tolerant and correct, while treating us like wild animals in a cage. We, if we are treated like that, will treat others like that.

[Bozanic] Mr. Karadzic, the number one topic on TV stations throughout the world is again the battlefields of former Bosnia-Herzegovina. One of the main topics was the downing of the U.S. F-16, if I remember well. And they say it was shot down somewhere near Bihac. This seems to be the information released by AFP and other foreign agencies. Serb military sources have not confirmed that yet. Do you have any information as to who did it, where it happened?

[Karadzic] I still did not get a full report about what happened there, but if the plane was downed in the Petrovac area, then it was downed over Serb territory. My question is what was the F-16 doing over Serb territory? Was it downed over the United States or over the Serb Republic? We are the masters of our own sky. Those who fly over our heads and drop bombs are not legitimate. They are committing a crime. We are small indeed, but even small nations have a right to our own sky and to sovereignty. The sooner the planes get out of our sky, the fewer will be downed. [passage omitted]

[Bozanic] Let me ask you a question, Mr. President. They say that the U.S. aircraft fell somewhere on this mountain, somewhere there, they say. The media were very specific today talking about punishing the Serbs for something they did. They refer to the fact that we detained, we can put it like that, members of the Blue Helmets. They say the Serbs will budge under the force of threats. Mr. President, could you please comment on that once more?

[Karadzic] We have never succumbed before, we only made compromises, sometimes due to the influence of Russia, sometimes due to the influence of Serbia, and we do not rule out the possibility of compromising again, mostly to the benefit of Serbia and at the request of Serbia. Whatever concessions we made to the major powers, we got nothing in return except momentary praise. We do not need to be praised, we need solutions. And Serbia is important to us and therefore we do not reject a possibility of making further concessions at the initiative of Serbia and at the request of Serbia.

However, regarding prisoners of war, I must say they are real prisoners of war. You see, their commander is General Smith. Their commander ordered air strikes against our positions. At the same time he gives orders to them and to NATO. Consequently, their commander got them involved in the war. Those are two irreconcilable functions: commander of peace forces and commander of military bombers. His function comprises the two functions that make UN members responsible for the actions of their commander.

On the other hand, we cannot afford to have anyone here targeting our positions, frightening our children, our old men and women, wounding, killing. They must know we will respond. We shot down a plane when they bombed Gorazde. When they bombed an old, deserted tank, we blocked UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force]. When they bombed targets in Pale with consequences, both material and other, we captured their members.

The next time they bomb us, they should know that our response will be even more fierce. We do not want that. We want peace. We want a solution. We offer a solution. We offer peace, we offer peace now. We offer UNPROFOR, if it wants to pull out, that it does that across the Serb territory. We do not want UNPROFOR to leave. But UNPROFOR has done nothing good for us so far. It merely saved the Muslims from a defeat. If UNPROFOR and the United Nations want to leave Bosnia, they do not need NATO to help them. We will help them cross over our territory, provided they take their weapons along, that they do not leave them to the Muslims.

If UNPROFOR wants to stay, it must immediately become unbiased. In other words, it must treat all three sides equally. The United Nations, as the political boss of UNPROFOR, must accept us, just as they accepted the Muslims and the Croats. They must lift sanctions at the Drina, they must lift sanctions against the FRY. Croatia does not have sanctions! Muslim Bosnia does not have sanctions either! Why were sanctions imposed on Serbia? Croatia is involved in this war. Croatian regular forces fought us even today. Serbian troops, Yugoslav troops are not present on this territory. Consequently, UNPROFOR's political boss is responsible for this crisis, for it prolongs the crisis by not treating us equally.

The United Nations should either leave or become unbiased. If we are approaching a political solution, it would perhaps be good if UNPROFOR stayed, because it could supervise that political solution, guarantee the borders, etc. If the international community opted for a military outcome and for helping the Muslims win, then

we must treat all Muslim allies as our enemy, for they are indeed our enemy.

[Bozanic] Mr. President, let us try to comment on this dark scenario that some say will happen. They say if and when the Serbs free the Blue Helmets, a fierce response will follow, because NATO and UNPROFOR have already concentrated large forces in the Adriatic and on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some even talk about commando units and mention a figure of some 20,000 commandos.

[Karadzic] We are not impressed by that, we are not intimidated by that, for we have no other choice. If they gave us one fair way out and another way that is implied in their threats, we would of course opt for the way out that is safe both for them and for us. However, they did not leave us any other option. They cornered us and now they wonder why we defend ourselves. We are defending ourselves because we have no other choice. NATO can come here and bomb the Serbs. That will not be the first time. We suffered under Austria, under Germany. We will still defend ourselves, we simply must defend ourselves.

Show us a just outcome, a fair solution and we will accept it at once. We will be flexible about that. Not because we are afraid but because we think the war should end. This war will end, all wars in the history of mankind ended. Some lasted 30 years, others 100 years. This one has lasted for four years, like World War I and World War II. But it must end. If they think the war should end in our destruction, the question is who has the moral right, whether the West can stand the moral burden of attacking a small nation that has a right to life. It is as if somebody decided to make a plant species extinct. That is genocide. The West, in fact, threatens to commit genocide, to kill the Serb nation. They do not have the right to do that and to tell us how to defend ourselves. If they attack us ruthlessly, we will ruthlessly defend ourselves.

All hostages—they are not hostages, they are prisoners of war—all prisoners of war were set free in one way or the other. We do not believe we will hold them for decades. We know that there will be some kind of solution. But nobody has a right to punish us for something we have not done. NATO came to our homes to bomb us! This is not a territory we seized from somebody. This is our territory. I hope the conscience of mankind will prevail. That the public opinion and political circumstances in those countries will ask Kohl and the prime ministers of other countries, one day: Why did you lead this anti-Serb policy, this genocidal policy, this policy which denied the rights of one small nation and provoked a war? Nobody should count on

intimidating us, because we have no other option. Our only option is to defend ourselves and that is our response. [passage omitted]

[Bozanic] Will we finally unite with our brothers in the Republic of Serb Krajina? We must obviously defend ourselves together, because the planes first fly over Knin and then reach Sarajevo.

[Karadzic] You see, we are one nation. Basically, we already share quite a few things, for there is no border between us, except for smugglers. We chase them because they smuggled without paying taxes. But that will stop once we have a joint budget. We opted for unification mostly for defense reasons. We can no longer afford anything like western Slavonia. The Serb nation as a whole cannot allow that. Western Slavonia will remain a scar in our history, it will be a Serb problem, our shame, not only of the western Slavonia Serbs, or the Serbs in the Krajina, in the Serb Republic, but of all the Serbs, of Serbs all over the world. This is the first Croat victory over the Serbs in history.

But this is not a real victory, because we were tricked, because they abused the economic agreement and the opening of the highway. UNPROFOR was abused. Croatian officers used the reconnaissance services of UNPROFOR. They even went on reconnaissance missions themselves wearing UN uniforms. And this led to this unfortunate case where we could not react promptly, for all that happened too quickly, it was planned all too carefully.

However, we can no longer afford that. We must defend ourselves as a whole. We began this process. We have the basis for the process, we have referendums and we will proceed, depending on the circumstances, by passing laws and by preparing the constitution, or we will even speed all that up, if we are forced to. But, we will follow a regular procedure if the circumstances allow that, to have the necessary legislature and to painlessly transform into a union. [passage omitted]

[Bozanic] Why was this not done earlier with UNPROFOR?

[Karadzic] We tried not to spoil relations with UNPROFOR. The relations with UNPROFOR froze on several occasions and that was solely their fault. They cannot be peacekeeping forces and forces which provoke war at the same time, or forces that side with or shoot at one warring party. However, we improved those relations hoping that the international community would strive toward finding a political solution. You know that we did not receive their generals and their civilian officials for a while.

This time, NATO displayed immense brutality. It targeted our buildings and some depots in the immediate proximity of a hospital and damaged it. A school is also close by; it was also damaged. Children were frightened; old men and women that happened to be in the vicinity were hurt. That is impermissible and we did this only to warn the world and to put an end to something that their commander ordered.

We must point out that this command was issued by UNPROFOR command, i.e. the same command that is in charge of those boys. Of course, we were not glad to resort to that measure and it is not our pleasure to use such measures in the future, but we must defend ourselves in proportion to the means with which we are attacked.

Those boys retained their dignity. Many of them, almost all of them kept their side arms and communications systems. We simply captured them because of what their commander did and because of what they represent, but the Serb nation respects the army, soldiers of any nation and treats them correctly. The officers of the Serb Army are highly professional and Serb soldiers have a military ethic and nothing will happen to them unless, of course, there are more attacks. If more attacks follow, all of us will die. We will not kill anyone, but if NATO kills, it will kill us all together.

[Bozanic] Mr. President, I have always wanted to ask you this question regarding the behavior of Serb soldiers and the Serbs in general. Why is it that, even when we are suffering, when we are killed and wounded, why do we say: "It is not that bad, everything is all right, everything is so..." You see, perhaps our enemies managed to win over the international public by saying: "We do not have food, we are killed, maltreated, raped, etc."

[Karadzic] I think there is something we can call the Serb ethic. The Serb ethic exists for sure. Of course, it is mostly Christian and Orthodox, but it is Serb as well. We do not complain, we do not make demands. When we are attacked, we defend ourselves.

[Bozanic] In the most difficult moments, when 1,000-kg bombs were dropped on us—you see people are calling from London, Belgrade—they call us and ask: "What are you doing?" And we say: "Nothing, we are waiting for more planes to come."

[Karadzic] Yes, yes. Only children ran scared and that is a great shame for the West, that they frightened our children. However, even those children stayed here. You see, when the Muslims launch an offensive, they celebrate initial successes, they tell the whole world. However, when we launch a counteroffensive and put

the screws on them, they start whining right away. From a fake triumphant behavior, they turn to wailing to which we never resorted.

Our towns are bombed today: Brcko, Teslic, Grahovo, Glamoc, Srbobran. Doboj is shelled on a daily basis with terrible consequences, but we are not wailing. We are warning the international community that this is happening, that civilian targets are bombed, but we are not wailing. We respond by hitting military targets.

There is something that is really the Serb ethic. You can see that our soldiers are not filled with hatred. They are happy, they are smiling. Our soldiers dislike corrupt cease-fires, they perk up as soon as they can act like soldiers, as soon as they can launch a counteroffensive. You see, the morale in our army has been boosted, not because we found a way to pay our soldiers, nor because we will continue to pay them with checks that now have a significant function, but because they are allowed to be soldiers, not sit idly during provocations without responding because we observe the cease-fire. [sentence as heard] There is no cease-fire now and our soldiers are cheerful, upbeat, very efficient, they do not complain. After all, we have fewer casualties now that we took the initiative, launched a counteroffensive.

But even now our soldiers desire a political solution and do not hate their enemy. Foreigners could see that, too, and I am really happy to see that our people preserved their basic trait, that they are still a chivalrous nation. [passage omitted]

We do not want to pick a fight, we do not want an escalation of the conflict. But what can we do against such an enormous force? We must defend ourselves. You see, small animals would not survive if they did not defend themselves. We have a natural right to defend ourselves. How can anyone have a moral right to accuse us of anything when they fly across our sky, when they drop bombs on our children, and when they do not choose the means, when they frighten. You see, no nation in the world has ever been terrorized this much. All news, the first 10, 15 minutes of all news is devoted to the Serbs, to the Bosnian Serbs, as they call us. It does not occur to them when they call us Bosnian Serbs that we have a right to our part of Bosnia and that we should be granted this right as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

[Bozanic] Why do we not finish the war? The longer the war lasts, the better off the Muslims are.

[Karadzic] That is true, but you see, whenever we reply in an efficient manner, the entire international community pounces on us. Humanitarian workers, UNPROFOR, a whole host of those who refer to various in-

ternational rights, to the international humanitarian law, international military law—they get involved, stand in our way, preventing the Serbs from ending the war in an efficient manner. You see what happened when we launched a counteroffensive at Gorazde, or at Bihac. After all, they invented protected zones that are not in keeping with the international military law in order to save the Muslims. Protected zones must be absolutely demilitarized and they must be controlled by a third force, i.e. UNPROFOR. In other words, we should not have an army around protected zones. They are not protected as far as we are concerned. They are, as Butrus-Ghali said, strongholds, military strongholds of the Muslim Army and we should treat them accordingly.

[Bozanic] The Muslims say: "They are attacking the demilitarized zone of Gorazde."

[Karadzic] Yes.

[Bozanic] That is their information. How can something that is demilitarized be attacked? Why should anyone attack something that...?

[Karadzic] That is illogical. Actually, this is a mistake the international community is aware of and Butrus-Ghali pointed that out. We do not want to destroy the Muslims or the Croats. We want to defend ourselves. Our defense can be active, too. After all, the major powers came as far as Berlin in order to end the war. If we are pushed, we will really have to go as far as Zenica and central Bosnia.

[Bozanic] I thought for a moment you would go as far as Berlin. [chuckles]

[Karadzic] [laughing] Yes. If Germany gets involved in the war, we will probably go as far as Berlin. But, let me again say that the international community tries to stop that with all available means and they even praise us or exert pressure, get in with convoys, disrupt our efforts to end the war. [passage omitted]

[Bozanic] What would happen to the people of the Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina if President Milosevic recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Karadzic] The people will keep fighting until a just political solution is found; there is no doubt about that. Of course, it would be very painful for us if that happens. I think it would be more of a problem for Yugoslavia though. I also think it would be a problem for our nation, for they do not expect such an outcome. I think the Serb Republic should be recognized. Our mother country must recognize us and take us in, unite with us, one way or the other. However, there is no doubt that we will continue to defend ourselves as we have so far and that the recognition of Bosnia does not

mean anything to us until we recognize it ourselves. I often tell journalists a story about Caligula, a crazy Roman emperor who appointed his horse senator. I usually tell foreign journalists: That horse could sooner be a senator than Bosnia a state. Bosnia is not a state at all, while that horse could, perhaps, be a senator. [laughs]

[Bozanic] [Passage omitted] In view of the unification of the Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina and Milosevic's recognition of two entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, would that also mean that the Republic of Serb Krajina would be recognized in Croatia?

[Karadzic] No, no. I do not think anybody is talking about Croatia yet. I do not know in what form they discussed the recognition of Bosnia. U.S. sources say that they want this recognition, but I do not know what they expect from that. The war will simply not end. One recognition of Bosnia lead to this war, and the second recognition of Bosnia—possible recognition by Yugoslavia—would only escalate the fighting. But I do not believe Yugoslavia or anybody in Yugoslavia will recognize Bosnia. [passage omitted]

[Bozanic] According to the military agreement between the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Serb Republic—although we have not formally completed our political unification—the attack on the Republic of Serb Krajina would be an attack on the Serb Republic.

[Karadzic] We took it as an attack on us. Unfortunately, some mistakes were made and we did not have enough time to collect and redeploy forces. We were absolutely determined to defend western Slavonia and we do not recognize the result of that aggression. We contend that western Slavonia belongs to the Republic of Serb Krajina. However, economic collaboration with the enemy turned out to be a grave mistake. You see, even in war times, countries sometimes cooperate, but only segments of the state cooperate on humanitarian problems. However, such a broad economic cooperation with Croatia is disastrous. Croatia never said it would relinquish the use of force and forceful occupying or, as they say, reintegration of Krajina into Croatia. When Croatia relinquishes the forceful reintegration of Krajina, only then can we talk about economic cooperation. Economic cooperation and the opening of the highway have actually resulted in the loss of western Slavonia, although we hope to do something about it.

[Bozanic] [Passage omitted] What is in store for German soldiers if they behave like UNPROFOR members?

[Karadzic] The question of German participation in the Contact Group is one thing, but the participation of the German forces here is a completely different matter. I

think it is morally improper for Germany to get involved in the Balkans in any way—even to provide satellite services or air lifts, not to mention the appearance of German soldiers in this region. I think the Germans should forbid their government to send soldiers here, for that would definitely lead to a large-scale war because German soldiers never came here in peace, nor did they ever leave in peace. I think Europe must realize what it is doing. Germany will do much evil here. [passage omitted]

[Bozanic] And now a question that I do not like, but let me read it to you anyway. Why do we not return to an eye for an eye to the Croats in the Serb Republic in retaliation for what they did to the Serbs in western Slavonia?

[Karadzic] The Serbs would not be Serbs if they were Croats. We are a chivalrous nation, we cannot attack and kill civilians. This war will show—once all this is over—that the Serbs have the least to be ashamed about in this war. They are the side that violated human and God's laws the least. Consequently, we cannot do that. We gave food to Muslim civilians, especially to Croat civilians, a large number of them, and we let them pass through our territory. God can see that. I am never sorry to do somebody a favor. I think the Serb nation will be rewarded for that and will find their place in heaven. It is very important not to commit a sin. We sinned against our own nation, not against other nations. [passage omitted] We will never be cruel, that is our Serb and Orthodox nature and a chivalrous character trait. [passage omitted]

I do not want to create an impression that we restricted ourselves in a way. We always launched counteroffensives, except in the case of Gorazde, but we were prevented by resolutions, etc. But we will no longer respect those resolutions. Our Supreme Command declared them invalid because they are not based on international law. However, we will still accept only that which we find acceptable, never that which is good for our enemy. [passage omitted]

[Bozanic] Let us just take a minute to reveal some news that we just received, even though there are still many questions to ask. I hope we will not spoil anything if we answer those questions after this report. My colleagues have just handed me the news of which you were aware of even before you came to the studio. They say that Belgrade Radio Television has reported that the UNPROFOR members have been released. Could you please comment on that? Let us first take a look at the report. Is the report ready? No? Should we wait until after the report for your comment? [passage omitted] At any rate, my information is that 126 members of the

peace forces were released tonight. We are now waiting for the report on that. [passage omitted]

As we have seen, Mr. President, this was an encouraging event. That means that the crisis between the authorities of the Serb Republic, the Serb Republic Army, and the members of the international peace forces will be overcome in a peaceful manner.

[Karadzic] I have already expressed my satisfaction that many international institutions made it clear that they want peace, and thus indirectly told us they did not opt for war against the Serbs. Furthermore, we accepted President Milosevic's appeal and his initiative to show goodwill, and that resulted in the release of such a large number of UNPROFOR soldiers and their extradition to their countries because governments and families were very worried. Naturally, we took good care of them. They were not stripped of their dignity and they were able to keep their side arms. Yugoslavia, Serbia, will probably extradite them to their commands or their governments.

With this act, we want to show to the international community that we do not want to fight against them. We hope there will be no further air strikes and that the international community will finally take an unbiased course in the crisis.

[Bozanic] Mr. President, could you tell us when the others will be released. How many of them are we still holding? About 200?

[Karadzic] I believe we released one-third of them. I cannot tell you at this point about the rate of their release. This act was designed to show them our orientation. Of course, we expect to see goodwill on the other side as well.

Karadzic: Former B-H 'Cannot Be Recognized'

LD0306081195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0039 GMT 3 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 2 May (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, stated today that the Serbian people "will never agree to remain in a foreign state on the basis of borders drawn by the communists."

Taking part in the Bosnian Serb television broadcast, "Ask the President," Karadzic expresses the conviction that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will not recognize the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and "accept responsibility for the war," which is now being borne by Alija Izetbegovic, leader of some of the Muslims. The president of the Bosnian Serb Republic says that "the former Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be recognized as a state because it is not a state," and that "recognition of

this former Yugoslav republic is the thing which led to the war."

"If the FRY had made the same mistake as made by the international community, the war would have escalated to an unprecedented extent," Karadzic says, and points out that Belgrade should in fact be recognizing the Bosnian Serb Republic.

Asked what would happen if the FRY nevertheless recognizes the former Bosnia-Herzegovina within its communist borders, President Karadzic says that the people "in the Bosnian Serb Republic will continue to fight until a just solution is achieved, but that the act of the unification of the western Serb lands with the homeland would probably be postponed for a long time."

Replying to accusations from some Belgrade officials that the Serbs do not have the right to 70 percent of the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Karadzic says that "the Bosnian Serb Republic will retain all its territories if the international community continues to support the Muslims and aims for a military solution to the conflict."

"If a solution were to be achieved by peaceful means, we would be prepared to exchange some territory, which over the past 10 years has been less Serb [as received], for the Neretva Valley, Kupres, and other areas which we are vitally interested in," President Karadzic says.

Serb 'Foreign Minister' Views Hostage Crisis

AU0406195895 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 2 Jun 95 p 18

[Interview with Aleksa Buha, "foreign minister of the Serb Republic," by Jovan Janjic; place and date not given: "Sacrificing the Innocent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What are the results and consequences of the NATO bombardment of Pale, and why was it responded to with the taking of hostages? These are the questions we posed to Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the Serb Republic.

[Janjic] What was hit in the latest NATO action?

[Buha] NATO forces bombarded ammunition dumps near Pale in two strikes. Their intention was to hit some installations on Ravna Planina that are used for carrying signals. There was also a danger of other military installations being hit; had they been hit, a disaster could have ensued.

[Janjic] Why was this attack in fact carried out? What was it provoked by?

[Buha] According to the interpretation of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], we were attacked because we did not return four artillery pieces from the area from which, according to the agreement, both sides had to withdraw their weapons. However, this had been preceded by a Muslim offensive on our positions from Sarajevo in the middle of May. UNPROFOR has itself confirmed that the Muslims had started the offensive. Moreover, UNPROFOR has also confirmed that, in addition to our four pieces, the Muslims also had several dozen pieces. If this was the reason for bombardment, then it would have been normal to bomb the other side, too. However, as usual, this was only done against the Serbs—twice. The second strike took place one and a half hours before the expiration of the ultimatum. This means that NATO was very impatient.

[Janjic] What do you expect to happen next?

[Buha] UNPROFOR members have been taken prisoner so that we can protect ourselves from further bombardment. I said that all of Pale was facing a disaster if the bombardment had continued there. What were they trying to achieve? If the Serb civilian casualties do not mean anything to the international community, then we had to confront them in a drastic way with some other facts. In western Slavonia, before the very eyes of the international community and UNPROFOR, the civilian population was being killed for days. The latest reports speak of several thousand casualties. Even three UNPROFOR members were wounded. UNPROFOR forces were also treated in an improper manner; they were either routed or shifted from one place to another. However, UNPROFOR did not do anything in Slavonia.

Here in Pale, UNPROFOR is a protagonist in the murder of civilians. This is why we wanted to put UNPROFOR members, whom we consider innocent, in the same position in which our innocent people are. Perhaps the international community would admit that they are equally worthy as people. If UNPROFOR disregards the fact that the innocent men from its own ranks are now involved in this, and if it continues with the bombardment, then this would then mark the beginning of insanity, and there would no end to the ensuing catastrophe in sight. Nothing will happen to these prisoners. They are being treated correctly, unless UNPROFOR hires NATO again and decides to continue the bombardment. If it decides to do that, our only defense, therefore, is to put the innocent members of UNPROFOR in the same position in which our innocent people are.

[Janjic] The television pictures of captured UNPROFOR members have gone around the world and have caused

indignation, especially the pictures of the "Blue Helmets" being tied to posts. Was this really necessary?

[Buha] I do not know in what other way we could have let it be known that things could not proceed in that way any more. I know that this is not a popular method, but we did not have any other choice. We have pleaded to the UNPROFOR Command at many of our meetings to give up bombing. They knew very well what their relations with the Serb Republic were like, how safe they had been on our territory. Between the beginning and the latest clash on Vrbanja Bridge, there had been not a single case of an UNPROFOR member being killed by our side, although, according to some information, nearly 150 of them have lost their lives so far. Therefore, it was high time for something to be done, and prevention is certainly better than cure.

[Janjic] The world media report that the Serbs are holding UNPROFOR members as hostages. However, the General Staff of the Serb Republic Army has denied that, stressing that they are prisoners and not hostages....

[Buha] NATO has come to carry out bombing raids at UNPROFOR's request. In this way, UNPROFOR has directly taken part via NATO, whom it had hired, in the military operations of our enemy. If this is the case, then our response had to be such. We had to treat someone who has taken sides with our enemy as an enemy. This is why they are not considered hostages but war prisoners. After all, they are being treated as war prisoners, which means that all international conventions on that are being observed.

[Janjic] Do the political and military leaderships have the same view on all these events?

[Buha] Yes. The complete leadership is unanimous on everything that has been done and what has been announced as our stand toward international organizations.

[Janjic] What is your view as foreign minister on the indications that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could soon recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina within its AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders?

[Buha] One should first raise the question of what this would achieve if official Belgrade decides on that. They are surely not going to recognize a fiction called Bosnia-Herzegovina and make the same mistake the international community has made, which it has admitted it made. Surely, Yugoslavia is not going to join this absurd practice. I believe that this recognition must not take place. From a national-historical and moral point of view, this would be a major shock, a major blow for our nation. On the other hand, this act would

not change anything in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that this would even make things worse.

[Janjic] Would the Serb Republic continue to function as an independent [samostalan] state?

[Buha] Of course, we would continue to function as an independent state, but as far as fighting is concerned, I think that things would take a turn for the worse.

[Janjic] Have there recently been any contacts with official Belgrade in that respect?

[Buha] No. This was also confirmed by [Yugoslav Foreign Minister] Vladislav Jovanovic himself.

Koljevic Calls For New Peace Conference

*LD0406224595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
2131 GMT 4 Jun 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 4 Jun (SRNA)—Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Serb Republic, said this evening that the attitude toward the war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina is changing in the international arena, stressing that even Muslim sponsors in the world no longer believed in the military option as the correct solution to the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis.

"Even the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] has confirmed that it was the Muslims who launched the latest offensive on Serb positions. It has become evident that the offensive was not sensible for both military and diplomatic reasons," Koljevic said in a Serb TV program called "In Defense of the Homeland."

He said that the Muslims were losing on the military front, but "there may be an even bigger catastrophe for them on the diplomatic front, because their international support is waning."

"Every sponsor is ready to offer support as long as there is no danger of being dragged into a conflict. When

war escalates, they are less and less ready to remain sponsors," Koljevic explained adding that U.S. military doctrine is now based on "a contained war."

The Serb Republic vice president assessed NATO air strikes on Serb territory as "a hasty move," recalling that this action was condemned by Russia and Japan, and even by some Western "hawks" who advocated military options before.

"NATO overstepped its authority in this action," Koljevic said, adding: "The former Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a member of NATO, which is an organization for the defense of its members. This is obviously a political move made by those who have no respect for treaties."

The Serb Republic vice president recalled that by launching anti-Serb air strikes, NATO violated international military law and the UNPROFOR mandate.

According to Koljevic, two absurdities caused incidents between Serbs and UNPROFOR that escalated following NATO air strikes:

"First, a lesser absurdity is that UNPROFOR has put itself at the service of defending a peace that does not exist, and second, the bigger absurdity is that UNPROFOR has tied itself to NATO—peacekeeping forces have tied themselves to armed forces."

The Serb Republic vice president stressed that if the international community really wanted a just peace based on realities, it should strike an equal balance between interests that are conducive to negotiations and offer maps that will be acceptable to all sides.

"It is clear that a new peace conference could help to avoid a new crisis, if it were based on equality of all the warring sides," Koljevic stressed.

Defense Minister Views Army, Situation in Bosnia
AU0506110095 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 27 May 95 pp 8-9

["Exclusive" interview with Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak by Branko Tudjen and Predrag Oreskovic; place and date not given: "I Am Proud of Our Army"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In the nearly four years he has been defense minister, Gojko Susak has given only five interviews to newspapers. The reason for this is certainly not because he is not interesting to the public. On the contrary.

"The quieter we are in our ministry and the less we talk—that means that we do the right things," he explains succinctly.

Susak is a good interlocutor. No matter how delicate a topic is, he will not try to avoid being straightforward, specific, and concise, without too much small talk. [passage omitted]

[VECERNJI LIST] Can you tell us something about the Croatian military industry and how much the Croatian emigration helped constitute the army?

[Susak] I would not talk about our own military industry now. Everything will be shown at the parade [Statehood Day military parade] and the exhibition that I will open on Wednesday [31 May] at the Velesajam [Zagreb Interprotex Fair]. I believe that, through that, we will refute all the criticism that we have encountered, even from the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia. That exhibition will contradict the rumors that we have not sufficiently used the potentials and possibilities Croatia possesses and that we have not developed the military industry sufficiently.

When it comes to our diaspora, it is hard to measure exactly, it is hard to say exactly how much the emigres, in comparison with us, have contributed to the constitution of the Croatian Army. From here, it seems to us that our diaspora is one organization that functions. But actually, it consists of hundreds of people who try to organize themselves on a voluntary basis and to act within their communities. When I was a minister in charge of emigration, the government representatives of the time did not show enough acumen to turn to the emigration.

There is a good example of this: When I said that if we turned to the emigres, we could get 20 million German marks in a short time, I was almost ridiculed at the highest level, apart from the president, who always understood the potential of the emigres. And indeed, we surpassed that sum several times, in a short period of time, and not only in money! That is immeasurable.

I believe that one cannot realistically judge the diaspora today. There are no such records; everybody tried to help the region where they came from. At that time, Croatia, unfortunately, did not function. Only historians will be able to comprehend everything thoroughly.

[VECERNJI LIST] You, personally, have never spoken about your own contribution to equipping the army....

[Susak] Had I spoken about it, I never would have made a deal. The less is said in our ministry, the more is done. You have to be aware that, in 1991 and 1992, nobody had any understanding of what we were doing. A concrete example: Germany is our friend and, as it seems, including the Vatican and the United States, it is one of the countries that did most for the international recognition of Croatia. However, the first consignment that was confiscated abroad—it contained 10,000 pairs of boots—was confiscated by Germany, because, allegedly, they were army boots. That happened in 1991, at the peak of the battle for Vukovar. Those were the conditions in which we functioned at that time. It was not 10,000 guns that were confiscated from us, but 10,000 pairs of boots because they were judged to be army boots. It is no different today, and that example is the best illustration of how it was.

[VECERNJI LIST] The "Flash" [Bljesak] operation was astonishing because of three facts, at least. First, maximum surprise was achieved; second, the action was carried out in the shortest possible time; third, the behavior of the liberators was thoroughly professional. How do you explain that?

[Susak] Well, I was among those who supported the idea, together with the president, that, besides the regular army, a professional army should be organized. Some ridiculed this. I believe that the action in western Slavonia showed that the Croatian guard brigades [gardijske brigade] are a professional army that behaves with professionalism both during the action and after it. That is our pride, of those of us who organized it and of the Croatian people.

[VECERNJI LIST] However, there are some circles, first of all abroad and particularly on the Serbian side in Belgrade, who would like to present Croatia in a different light. What is the background to that?

[Susak] We cannot be naive, after all we do not have the right to be naive, and deny that at the height of the aggression against Croatia there was no retaliation from the Croatian side as well. But it is hard to talk about an army in that case, because, at that time, villages and towns organized themselves, nearly alone, to resist the aggressor. In those units, there were people from

all backgrounds. Those were not selected groups, but people who defended their homes and who, out of frustration, did things that are done in every war.

Now, some would like to equate the behavior of that army with the behavior of this present army, which is impossible. Croatian soldiers managed to fight their way through the former 27-km long Sector West in 31 hours. Now, if you try to put the 30 kg of military gear on and walk for 30 hours, you will see what that means. Their behavior after the action was as admirable as the action itself.

Precisely because of those factors that I have mentioned before and because of the animosity of a part of the international community towards us, the Serbs have managed to present us as though we were nearly the same in behavior as they; we in liberating a territory, and they in occupying a territory. The action in western Slavonia denied everything that they managed to sell the world and that the world bought.

The majority of world factors do not want to get upset. The easiest thing for them to do was to say we were all the same and to declare that we are all equal and that we do not really know what we want. They feel that when, as they say, when dictators appear on both sides and start to fight each other, the best thing would be if both bled to death and then the world factors would make the decisions. [passage omitted]

[VECERNJI LIST] How great is the danger that the Serbs will try to break the Croatian defense somewhere?

[Susak] I believe that this is the third surprising factor. Already, 10-15 days after the action in the western sector, there was nothing else they could do, they knew that they could not advance in any of the sectors. On the contrary, had they shelled Zagreb again, today there would no longer be northern and southern sectors any more. Therefore, they tried to take the Orasje pocket.

They spread rather wise propaganda, which some of our people believed as well, thinking that Croatia and Serbia had a deal to swap the Orasje pocket for western Slavonia. However, the action in the Orasje pocket was commanded by General Mladic himself, who spent several days in that area. That means that they gave priority to that action. And, a few days before, Karadzic and Krajisnik were there to raise the morale of the army.

War reporters could see for themselves what sort of battles have been going on there. The Serb army has advanced not one millimeter, and the action has been going on since 5 May. According to our assessment, the Serbs would have to face more than 10,000 dead in order to take the Orasje pocket, and they would have to put another 150 tanks into the battle in order to advance.

Can they afford that? The Croatian defense has been dug in there; it is firm, with enough tanks, weapons....

[VECERNJI LIST] Belgrade media write about \$5.5 billion that Croatia is going to invest into the army, about Israeli criteria in the army, and so on. How do you judge the situation in our army, and its further development? We are convinced that final peace in this region can be reached only when those on the other side are convinced of the strength of our army.

[Susak] The budget of the Croatian Army is publicly known. You know how big it is, the parliament discussed it, and there is no other budget. Moreover, the economic situation is such that not even what was decided in the parliament can be carried out by the Ministry of Finance. Therefore we have many debts to the economy.

When it comes to comparison with the Israeli Army, if there is anything that I have incorporated into the Croatian Army, then it is an attempt to use the experience of those armies in the world that have shown results in this century. I did not hesitate to bring people from different parts of the world here, both expatriate Croats and foreign experts, to give us advice, including people from the country you have just mentioned. Not one of those armies can be a model for the Croatian Army, but their experience can help us a lot in finding out what exactly the Croatian Army needs. I believe that we are able to adjust their experience to our conditions.

[VECERNJI LIST] When it comes to the liberation of the occupied territories, a considerable part of the public believes that we are able to do it in the northern and southern sectors, but that, when it comes to Baranja and eastern Slavonia, there would be a risk of a conflict with Serbia, and that the liberation would be very difficult.

[Susak] Croatia will not act thoughtlessly. When I say that, I mean that we have to evaluate how the most important international factors will react during the action and after it. None of our experts, not in the Ministry of Defense or in the General Staff of the Croatian Army, believe that the liberation of Baranja and eastern Slavonia would be more dangerous than an attack on Knin. I believe that the Serbs would defend Knin more fiercely than Baranja or Vukovar, for the simple reason that mostly the local population lives in Knin, whereas in eastern Croatia there are mostly Serb newcomers. Just recently, some more of them arrived there from western Slavonia.

[Susak] The possibility that Serbia would become involved in the conflict exists in all versions and, in eastern Croatia, that possibility might be greater because that area lies on the border with Serbia. My

assessment is that, for the time being, with this mandate of the UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia], we will have no tacit blessing from the main factors of the international community to solve the situation militarily. They insist that we have to try to solve it through negotiations.

However, I do not believe that Serbia will become involved in the war against Croatia. I see no potentials with which they might do so. In 1991, Serbia was powerful, not so much because they had an organized army, but because they had means that we could only dream about. We had no means, no organization, nothing. I think that they have exhausted their reserves to a great degree. After all, you know yourself how they spent them. The Serbs fired thousands of shells on Mala Sunja, not to mention any of the bigger cities. And those were not unlimited sources.

I believe that they are weaker every day, that Croatia is stronger every day, and that if we have to liberate eastern Slavonia militarily, Serbia will not be in a position to enter that war.

When it comes to our potential, we do not have as many tanks as they do, but this war has shown that that does not mean anything. We have a good counterdefense; tanks are not effective weapons. Until only recently, their aviation was a great threat to us, in particular when flying at high altitude. At the Statehood Day parade, you will be able to see that that problem has also been solved. Croatia can defend itself in all areas, so Serbia will not dream of stopping, for example, the liberation of Baranja and Vukovar by shelling Zagreb.

[VECERNJI LIST] Does that mean that we could respond to them?

[Susak] Even a little bit more than that!

[VECERNJI LIST] How do you feel things will develop further in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the political sense? Milosevic is still maneuvering, trying to get as much as he can for himself, and Karadzic and Martić are threatening a unification. What is the strategic goal of Croatia at this moment?

[Susak] The final strategic goal is to liberate Croatia and strengthen and secure the survival of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the Washington Agreements. We have the support of the most important world factors in that, which is important for Croatia. As I have already said, as long as this UNCRO mandate lasts—and it expires at the end of the year—I expect no military action in Croatia, except in the case of some provocations. Regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is very hard to foresee. It will greatly depend on the behavior of the Bosniak side, I mean the Bosniaks and

Muslims, more than anybody else. For us Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the most important thing at this moment is to work on improving the organization, the arms, the preparedness to protect, in every version, those areas that belong to the Croats, and at the same time, in cooperation with the Bosniaks and Muslims, to use the help of the United States and Germany to the utmost, and they have both been quite engaged in bringing the federation to life. But, as I said, that will greatly depend on the behavior, and everything else, of the Bosniak-Muslim side. If I am an optimist? I am, more than ever—when it comes to the question of whether Croats will be able to protect the areas they are on—sure that that will come about quickly.

[VECERNJI LIST] Can a withdrawal of the UN forces and the arrival of NATO troops be expected?

[Susak] The arrival of NATO experts, who will observe the situation and help the army of the federation—I mean the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina—organize themselves better, is something that could be expected if the Serbs go on behaving in this way. A stronger NATO presence in Croatia, not because of Croatia but because of Bosnia-Herzegovina—because only there can they intervene in all possible ways, not only militarily but also professionally—that will happen. Direct talks with us here have already been announced, and they are also looking for premises for several hundred of their experts, who would come, but it is by no means realistic to expect NATO ground forces. I believe that the U.S. attitude is more than clear.

[VECERNJI LIST] Do you expect UN troops to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Susak] There might come to a withdrawal of some of the troops, maybe, but, in that case, NATO would probably take on greater responsibility regarding air strike threats. We will see what happens about this recent bombing. I believe that these are the first warning steps to see if Serbs understand those messages. I believe that if 3,000 UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] soldiers are taken out of Bosnia, it will not change the situation on the ground significantly because, if the parties to the conflict do not want to cooperate with them, then they are helpless there.

Mikelic Denounces 'Extremists' in Krajina
AU0406155795 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI
in Serbo-Croatian 2 Jun 95 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Unification as Personal Interest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "By trying to oust me, Milan Babic has in fact ousted himself, because he has

abandoned the policy that the RSK [Republic of Serb Krajina] Government has been conducting for a year. He now wants to be prime minister designate and then prime minister and have all the logistics provided to him, and yet only 14 days earlier he was not interested in the views of Yugoslavia or the Serbian leadership on the unification."

This is how former RSK Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic described the situation following the Krajina Parliament's decision to relieve him of his duty.

"Perhaps Babic has profited from his political negotiations with Martic, having gotten rid of a few of Milan Martic's extremists and a few prominent members of his own party, the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina, but as regards a serious state policy, he has lost everything," Mikelic says.

"He has joined two gunmen, Martic and Karadzic, both of whom want to have two pistols each to shoot at anyone whenever they please and to have ammunition supplied by Serbia. But when they run out of ammunition, they will blame the Serbian leadership for betraying national interests. You see, this is not a policy that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia can accept. I also assure you that the Serb people in both Krajinas [Bosnian and Croatian] do not accept this policy either.

"Pinning all hopes on Minister Peric entering the Ministry of Internal Affairs and on him having a definite say in the decisionmaking in the RSK Ministry of Internal Affairs, which seems to be his obsession, Babic has decided to offer my head to the extremists of Milan Martic and Radovan Karadzic. In this way he has confirmed that he is a small-time politician and that one cannot reach any agreements with him.

"Instead of us determining at our assembly session in Borovo Selo the reasons why western Slavonia had fallen and instead of finding out whether Radovan Karadzic and Milan Martic were behind it, the RSK president decided to blame the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to seek his survival in new pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its engagement in the war," Mikelic said.

My ousting was unconstitutional, Mikelic stressed. I have initiated a procedure for this decision to be annulled, not because I want this post but because a considerable number of citizens need protection.

I hope this is the right time to clear everything up. Messrs. Martic, Babic, and Lezajic are very interested in what is happening with the refugees from western Slavonia. [sentence as published] The military and the police have not been punished, as decided by

the assembly in its conclusions. What happened to the conclusion that Martic's hawks, who appear at various rallies as paramilitaries, should be arrested? They also held a rally in Knin and Benkovac before coming to the last assembly session. They now want to arrest municipal leaderships in eastern Slavonia, western Srem, and Baranja because they do not agree with Martic and Babic. The will not be able to do that, Mikelic said.

Cavoski Accuses Milosevic of 'Greatest Betrayal'

AU0306150395 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jun 95 p 8

[Report by Zeljko Luburovic on interview with Kosta Cavoski, Serbian Liberal Party leader, carried on Knin television: "Serbs Across Drina River Left in Lurch"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Kosta Cavoski, professor of constitutional law at Belgrade University, founder of the Democratic Party of Serbia, and now one of the leaders of the Serbian Liberal Party, had an opportunity to promote his book *On the Edge of Serbianship* in a two-hour interview on rebel Knin television.

Instead of promoting his book, Cavoski used his time on the air to promote radical Greater Serbian stands which, judging by questions, puzzled his viewers, too. The confusion was obviously caused by the harsh criticism directed at Slobodan Milosevic and his current policy which Cavoski named "the greatest betrayal in the history of Serbian nation."

Admitting that he himself once supported Milosevic, Cavoski today takes a step further than the creator of contemporary Serbian imperialism, so he calls all the territories under Serb occupation—the Serb lands—that only because of "fainthearted Milosevic" have not joined Serbia, that is "FRY," yet. Moreover, Cavoski also considers Montenegro to be a Serbian land which—again because of Milosevic's bad policy—has united with Serbia through dual federation. He holds that "FRY" should be a unitary state, and he suggests the same model of establishment should be used for all the creations arising from the occupation of Croatia and BiH [Bosnia-Herzegovina]. "We are one nation, and if we, as such, want to form a state, there is no reason to constitute it as a federation," said Cavoski. Therefore he has a recipe how and why they should unite occupied Serb creations in Croatia and BiH.

Threatening and Interpreting

According to him, since both so-called Serb assemblies accepted possible unification, Martic and Karadzic should just proclaim it by declaration. That state should

be unitary, according to Cavoski, for many reasons, particularly for defense reasons. And that is because, as the champion of Serbian liberals told viewers of Knin television in the occupied part of Croatia, "the Serbs in Croatia and BiH have no other choice but to fight for their state until the end. The alternatives are either to move out or to surrender and be slaughtered by the Croats or the Muslims." In that context he said that the action of western Slavonia liberation was "proof that the Croats want only territories, but not the Serbs," adding also that Milosevic's stand regarding that event equaled betrayal. According to Cavoski, the whole case of western Slavonia was put in the context of a Tudjman-Milosevic agreement "according to which the destiny of Baranja and eastern Slavonia has already been decided." Cavoski states that Croatia will get Baranja and the town of Vukovar, while Serbia gets the town of Ilok and the region surrounding it. He explains that in this way he holds that Milosevic will not accept annexing Baranja, which objectively will then not be able to join "the future united Serb state."

Krajina Serbs Against Everybody

Moreover, Cavoski was giving assurances on Knin television that Martić and Celeketić had requested the "FRY" army attack Croatian positions in eastern Slavonia during the action in western Slavonia, but Milosevic prevented it. Cavoski asserted that Milosevic's regime renounced the Serbs across the river Drina, whose only salvation is in unification and in the war until the end. "Because, the world will get used to that state after some time, and, in the end, recognize it," said Cavoski. In order to succeed, Cavoski suggests that all the nation's confidence should be placed in Martić and Karadžić, and in no way in Mikelic, who "instead of being in Knin, sits in Belgrade and does not share the fate of the Serbs from Krajina."

The Belgrade professor said that Croatia had achieved military and diplomatic success by the latest action in western Slavonia, and that "therefore new Croatian actions should be expected, especially because the stand of Milosevic, who is so impudent, that even though high church dignitaries interceded with him, he did not lift a finger to help the Serbs across the Drina. Moreover, he had the refugees from western Slavonia conducted through Serbia into eastern Slavonia as if they were lepers." At the conclusion of his litanies, Cavoski stated that Z-4 plan, offered by the international community "represents a fraud for Krajina" which would get "a status similar to that of South Tyrol in Italy, and that means only paper autonomy, since all the important decisions would be made by the Supreme Court in Zagreb."

"So, let me conclude: The Serbs across the river Drina must unite into a unitary state and fight for their rights until the end—despite Milosevic's betrayal, despite being left by the Serbs from Serbia. The Croats have never and would never do such a thing to their fellow countrymen from Herzeg-Bosnia." Kosta Cavoski's theses formulated this way can be interpreted in many ways. One of the interpretations can be that Milosevic has really ceased to be enough of "a Greater Serb" so that he should be replaced in Serbia by those "Greatest Serbs." A second interpretation could be that Cavoski with his theses was only doing a bit of self-promotion in Knin in fact. The third interpretation could be, "if something goes wrong," the following: Gentlemen, the Serbs across the Drina, there are only two solutions for you—either war or surrender! Milosevic and FRY have given you up, so it is up to you to see whether you are strong and crazy enough to plot against the whole world, left to the discretion of Martić and Karadžić.

Interview With Split Corps District Commander
95BA0253D Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR
in Serbo-Croatian 8 May 95 pp 38-39

[Article by Major General Ante Gotovina, commander of the Split Corps District, by Ivica Marijacić in Split; date not given: "The Legionnaire Who Liberated Maslenica"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the office of Major General Ante Gotovina, commander of the Split Corps District, newsmen are welcome and honored guests, but not as professionals who will do their job well with the commander, but as persons with whom he will converse informally. Gen. Gotovina has been avoiding statements in the media from the very beginning of the Homeland War, and that has become part of his image. "I am a soldier, and I have no reason to make public statements. There are people who will take care of that!" he says, adding that this is the rule in all modern Western armies, where officers are not allowed to make judgments in public, bypassing the responsible departments, because otherwise they would be removed on the spot.

The commander of the Split Corps District nevertheless did respond to our persistent requests and agreed to an interview for HRVATSKI OBZOR with the knowledge of his superiors in the Croatian Army (HV). Even on this occasion, he was less interested in statements and answers to our questions than in showing the results of the everyday work of the Croatian Army in the Zadar area. That is why he took us to the Center for Specialized Training of Guards Brigades and Landing Troops. He said that this is certainly the only center on

the territory of the former Yugoslavia in which a high-risk exercise ground had been created according to the system and rules of NATO. Officers and men go through spartan training in this exercise ground and come out of it mentally and physically strong individuals ready to perform any war mission. It is simply a system of obstacles on land, in the air, and under the sea where only one mistake is possible, where, as they say, everything in the exercises is real, there is no maneuver or illusion, and afterward the Croatian people has a mentally strong and physically able soldier. He says that he himself went through all those obstacles at the age of 19 in the Foreign Legion. In short, this is a school for elite units of the Croatian Army such as exists nowhere else in Croatia and indeed nowhere in a much larger space. Gen. Gotovina demonstrated for us on the spot some of the methods that he personally brought into the training of the Croatian Army, just enough to take away our breath. The celebration to promote that center in the Zadar area will take place in mid-June, when they finish laying the thick slab of the runway and when they expect high-level guests from the top Croatian military and political leadership. This popular officer of the Croatian Army answered our questions briefly and pithily.

[Marijagic] You are one of the rare high-level officers of the HV who almost never gives an interview to the newspapers. A certain mysteriousness has therefore been formed about your person. Why did you decide on that kind of media isolation?

[Gotovina] I came to this position to do the responsible job of a soldier, and my thoughts were turned toward that task. As for interviews, I believe that there are those who must do them. In my opinion, even one interview is too many for soldiers. I have not been mysterious; I have presented my intentions and messages regularly in front of the formation of soldiers, but also on other occasions.

[Marijagic] You were abroad, so that you could certainly have chosen a different career, and need not have come to wage war in Croatia. What tipped the scale in your deliberation in the early 1990's?

[Gotovina] I am not one of those who are fond of saying that they knew everything and foresaw everything at the age of 18. By a combination of circumstances, I became a soldier abroad at the age of 18. I would most gladly say that my motivation was adventure, as in fact suits young men of that age. It is true that my career might well have been different. But in the early 1990's this was the only right way for me; this was both my reflection and my commitment.

[Marijagic] Could you briefly describe to us your career from your native Pakostani via France to a battlefield in Croatia?

[Gotovina] I was born on the island Pasman, but I spent my childhood in Pakostani. Like many other people from my region, at the age of 16 I went out into the world—I went on a ship. At that time, this was altogether commonplace for our coastal regions, and to some extent it was even the normal way. At the age of 18, I was already in the Foreign Legion, and everything after that was the career of a professional soldier. It was that career that brought me to the battlefields in Croatia.

[Marijagic] How do you assess the contribution in the Homeland War of Croats who had military experience acquired in foreign armies?

[Gotovina] I have always been in favor of people who have experience, and in the case of experience of war, this carries particular weight. Military knowledge and experience of war are not the same thing. In the course of the war, Croatia has had both. Their contribution in the war was certainly significant, but others will evaluate how great it was under other conditions.

[Marijagic] The public is convinced that defense of the Zadar region was poorly organized at the beginning of the Homeland War. In your opinion, could more and should more have been achieved?

[Gotovina] The public has the right to its opinion and its judgment. I also have the right to be cautious and discreet, [not] to make assessments of situations with which I am not sufficiently familiar; at that time I was stationed in Slavonia, although the Zadar region and southern Croatia have been a subject of my interest. On this occasion, I will answer that every beginning is difficult and uncertain and is full of obstacles, uncertainties, and inexperience. I would be unfair if I were to summarize everything in terms of a failure when it is clear that Zadar defended itself with the determination of the Croatian people. The essential thing for me is that the initial military units of the Zadar region, which were expressly defensive in nature, were very quickly given the capability of offensive units.

[Marijagic] Today, now that the Homeland War has lasted four years, how do you assess the strength and capability of the HV?

[Gotovina] There is an immense difference between what there was at the beginning and what we have now. We have progressed in all respects. The circumstances of war compel people to learn faster and to do what they never did before, so that in four years of war it is possible to learn far more than during the same time in peace. The right step was taken in the right direction.

Analogously, I conclude that the strength and capability of the HV have grown.

[Marijagic] Is the HV capable of performing every mission assigned it?

[Gotovina] The HV is well-equipped, well-trained, ready and agile to perform any mission ordered by the commander of the armed forces. We undertake every mission, even the most difficult one, thoroughly, altogether as soldiers, and responsibly. The results are indicative of our strength.

[Marijagic] You certainly have some idea of the occupying army and its strength. How do you see that army on the other side—as a respectable military force or do you believe that their constant heroic posing has nothing behind it?

[Gotovina] I always look at an adversary realistically and attempt to separate emotions from reality. Even in what I am going to say, I am not emotional, but realistic. And it is realistic to say that the rebellious Serbs in the Republic of Croatia and the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] are not what they formerly appeared to be. Their arguments and trump cards have largely been spent. The parabola of their "success" is falling more and more every day. This does not mean that we have no one in front of us, but the HV can and must conquer what we have in front of us.

[Marijagic] You have had occasion to meet officers of the Serbian Army. Is it possible to use arguments in discussion with them?

[Gotovina] I have never cared whether one could talk with them in any particular way and how they would take my arguments in a discussion. That is their problem. I had my own objective in the talks. At that moment, it was in the interest of the HV and the Croatian state, and I did it.

[Marijagic] Although you are only a soldier who obeys policy, are you sometimes annoyed by the excessive laxity of Croatian policy?

[Gotovina] I follow the day-to-day politics and long-term policy of the Croatian state; that is my right as an individual. But as a soldier, I do what I am ordered to do as part of my military tasks. I have no inclination to make an assessment of the political decisions of the Croatian Supreme Command. I only know that political decisions have never interfered with my work up to this point. I have always understood and carried them out like a soldier. I would make a distinction here between laxity and flexibility. I do not believe there is laxity in Croatian policy.

[Marijagic] What are the advantages of the Croatian Army today vis-a-vis the aggressor?

[Gotovina] I do not answer such questions as a matter of principle, because I would risk revealing something of what we call military secrets. I will reply by saying that their numerous weaknesses are at the same time our advantages, which we must know how to utilize appropriately. But we have never founded our strength and our successes solely on the enemy's weaknesses; that would not be enough.

[Marijagic] What has been demonstrated by the liberation operations undertaken to date by the HV?

[Gotovina] As I have already said, the important thing for me was that the HV have offensive possibilities and capabilities. This has been most convincingly demonstrated with each succeeding year of the war. All operations have been well prepared, skillfully conducted, and they had their result.

[Marijagic] In the end, do you believe that Operation Maslenica, which you commanded, was successful?

[Gotovina] In Operation Maslenica I was the field commander under the direct command of the chief of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. This was a successful operation of the HV in which the objective was achieved. If it could have been more successful at that moment, it would have been. A combination of circumstances of an international character has always been hanging over our head, and that was also the case in Operation Maslenica. President Tudjman has spoken about this several times in the recent past.

[Marijagic] President Tudjman has great confidence in you. I noted that during his visits you talked apart. Can you tell us the tenor of those conversations, and why does the president take a personal interest?

[Gotovina] The commander of the armed forces has confidence in every commander whom he appoints by his decision. That goes without saying. The very feeling and knowledge that I am under the direct attention of the president is pleasant, but also demanding. Our conversations are to the point, depending on the situation. They concern tasks, plans, and judgments. All of that can be obtained, as they say, firsthand. The president takes advantage of such an occasion. He also does this when he is in the zone of responsibility of other commanders.

[Marijagic] For a time there was talk that you would go to Zagreb to a higher post.

[Gotovina] I am hearing that for the first time from you.

[Marijadic] You have promised a resolution this year. Do you stick with that promise?

[Gotovina] Everyone knows who is in command in the HV. If such commands arise, I promise that I will carry it out and there will be a resolution.

[Marijadic] When the Homeland War comes to an end, do you see your future in the HV?

[Gotovina] I will think about that when the time comes.

5 June 1995

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

45

Crvenkovski Discusses Economy, Albania

AU0506082495 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian
3 Jun 95 p 7

[Interview with FYROM Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski by Fiqiri Sejdiaj in Skopje on 31 May: "Maybe the Lake Is To Blame"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sejdiaj] There is increasing talk of a crisis in your country today. Is this the case? If so, how is it apparent?

[Crvenkovski] If you are talking about an economic crisis, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is indeed undergoing a crisis. You know that Macedonia was once part of the Yugoslav federation. This was a socialist federation, with a system that generated crises. Now all these countries are undergoing a transition period and, therefore, they are experiencing common difficulties. Of course, such problems as privatization, rise in unemployment, decline in production, and social tensions are only some of the problems Macedonia is encountering. What is worth emphasizing is that Macedonia is overcoming these difficulties under adverse conditions. Of the four borders of this republic, two are closed. You know that the northern border with Serbia and Montenegro [as published] is closed because of the UN-imposed sanctions and embargo. The southern border has also been closed unilaterally by the Greek Government. This further complicates relations and the situation in our country. Macedonia has suffered damages to the tune of 4 million dollars from the embargo alone. This is no small sum for a small economy. Nevertheless, we are not abandoning the reform that we have begun, even though some people are of the opinion that it should be left for better days. Experience shows that better days never come. The opposite happens. Every situation that arises is more complicated than the last, and the price for delay is very high.

[Sejdiaj] A small state has every chance of being governed easily. Nevertheless, the opposite may also be the case, and a false step by the government may plunge the country into the deepest misery.

[Crvenkovski] I do not agree with the notion that a large country has large problems and a small state has small problems. The opposite is often the case. Solving the problems of small states is more complicated. But let us return to your question. The danger exists, and the question would be better phrased to ask what steps will avoid plunging the country into misery. If one looks at the markets of Europe, for we are a European country, we see processes of integration that one may join, if one competes on terms of quality. This rule is even clearer

for small states. The chances of small states are even smaller if they pursue a policy of isolationism. It is precisely such a policy that would plunge the state into misery. We must, without fail, go out into the world's markets and find our place. This is the sole alternative.

[Sejdiaj] How has the international aid your republic has received been used?

[Crvenkovski] So far, we have had agreements with the World Bank, the IMF, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. All the aid and credit that has been obtained from these banks has been used for reorganizing our payments. We now have various specific projects for the infrastructure. For example, work is proceeding on the Tetovo-Gostivar highway, which is part of the East-West corridor. An agrarian project is in progress for private farms, and work is in progress on the hydroelectric system and on Skopje Airport. Work has concentrated, therefore, on the infrastructure. This will improve the climate for the successful development of the Republic of Macedonia.

[Sejdiaj] Can you say what the levels of unemployment and inflation are?

[Crvenkovski] According to official figures, the number of unemployed is about 200,000. This is indeed an alarming figure.

As for inflation, I can say that it was 54 percent last year. This year, we are aiming to bring it down to 18 percent, no more. For the first five months of this year, we have had inflation under 14 percent, which is good.

[Sejdiaj] How do you consider the demand of the opposition in Macedonia for early elections?

[Crvenkovski] This is the stand of the opposition, isn't it? I am very sorry that some parties boycotted the parliamentary elections. This threatened the construction of democracy in our country. It would have been better for the general situation in Macedonia if these parties had taken part. However, this was their viewpoint. Apart from the harm they did to the general situation, they did the greatest harm to themselves.

[Sejdiaj] Are you satisfied with the work of the Albanian ministers who are taking part in your cabinet?

[Crvenkovski] I have been pleased with the work of all the ministers that have taken part in the cabinet that I head and, therefore, also with the work of the Albanian ministers. In the last analysis, I, as prime minister, carry responsibility for the everyday work of each one. If there is a proposal to restructure the government, that is a different matter; however, I myself am satisfied with the work of this government.

[Sejdiaj] The Albanian population in FYROM believes that they should assume a greater role in state institutions, and especially in the Army, the Police, the Foreign Ministry, the justice organs, etc. What do you think of such a demand?

[Crvenkovski] Such a demand is understandable. It is clear that, in some ministries, there is a low level of participation of the Albanians living in Macedonia. However, this is not only true of the Albanians, but also of other nationalities, and I think that our efforts must go toward improving this general structure. However, this involves improving the quality of cadres and not national character. The participation of the nationalities in administrative structures must be achieved on the basis of professional caliber.

[Sejdiaj] The Party for Democratic Prosperity has criticized you for returning people who served in the previous regime to leading positions. As an example, they cite the return of the chief of the Albanian-language editorial board of Skopje Television. If this is true, how would you justify this step?

[Crvenkovski] Appointments at Skopje Radio-Television are not made by the government or any political body.

I, for example, am 33 years old, and if the old cadres are returning to their old jobs, I would be the first person who would have to move. In other words, to go back to where I came from. As for the example you mentioned, it has no connection with the attitude of the government, because the government has no responsibility in this sector. Radio-Television conducts its own personnel policy. All the managers at Skopje Radio-Television are new. It is a mistake if we take a single instance and generalize from it, considering it to be a tendency of the government.

[Sejdiaj] How do you consider relations between our two countries?

[Crvenkovski] If we compare relations between Albania and Macedonia in the last four decades with those in the last four years, we notice an astounding development in these relations. It is no secret if we say that, for 40 years, the Albanian-Macedonian border was one of the tightest in Europe. Now any foreign traveler arriving at the Albanian-Macedonian border will be amazed at the heavy traffic of travelers, goods, and vehicles. There is good political, economic, and social cooperation. Personally, I do not think that this is enough or at the level our two countries and peoples demand. There are still fields in which we must cooperate more and which we must exploit to the utmost. In the last analysis, we have many common interests. The problems that

we confront are almost identical: economic reform, transition, privatization, finding a place in the EU, security, etc. We have a large market in the East-West corridor that is acquiring a special priority for the EU. This corridor is in the interests of Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Italy, and Turkey. It is our destiny to find ourselves halfway along this corridor. With common efforts, I think that we can acquire more support from the international community. For instance, no railroad or highway links our two states. Until yesterday, we did not even have any communication links. Our hydroelectric systems were not connected, etc. Do you see how much remains for us to do?

[Sejdiaj] How then do you explain the fact that neither Berisha nor Gligorov, neither Meksi nor Crvenkovski has crossed Lake Ohrid? None of them have paid visits to Tirana and Skopje respectively.

[Crvenkovski] I had the good fortune to visit Tirana before I became prime minister. As for the question, perhaps Lake Ohrid is to blame. It is a very lovely lake, and therefore meetings have been held in Ohrid or Pogradec. They were high-level meetings, and were very fruitful. There is no reason why we should not make official visits to Tirana and Skopje. If your question is an encouragement to these visits, then I am in agreement with it. Let it be an encouragement to both sides.

[Sejdiaj] How do you explain the fact that few agreements have been signed between Albania and FYROM?

[Crvenkovski] I do not know. Indeed, I do not know where we must look for the reason why this has happened. Common sense tells us that the two sides have common interests. Let us set aside Balkan complexes. It is not worth raking over history, as I said; let us look to the future. For example, I do not accept the logic whereby Albanians recognize Macedonia under another name, I would say a ridiculous one, the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." When we bear in mind Albania's relations with the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], Albania must be perhaps the first state to understand that we do not deserve that prefix.

The failure to sign some of these documents can be ascribed precisely to the use of this title.

[Sejdiaj] What do you think that Macedonia must correct in its relations with Albania, and, vice versa, what must Albania correct in its relations with Macedonia, in order to enable both these neighboring states to further increase their cooperation and to look toward the future?

[Crvenkovski] I will reply to only one half of the question, the part regarding Macedonia. Ask Tirana

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about the other half. Common sense says that it is in Albania's interest for her neighbor to be stable. This stability is in the interest of the entire region. We have the interest, inclination, and goodwill to increasingly develop relations with Albania, even beyond bilateral cooperation. We wish, for instance, to make joint approaches to the international community over such issues as those connected with the East-West corridor.

A large percentage of the population in Macedonia is Albanian, and, for me, Albania's attitude toward the status of the Albanian population living here is very much justified, just as is our concern for the Macedonians living in Albania. The important thing is for us to rely on international norms and principles, so that we will not exceed our responsibilities, i.e. not interfere in the affairs of the other state. This is an attitude that both sides must cultivate. The Albanians in Macedonia are citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. It is, first of all, the Albanians living in Macedonia themselves who will decide their own destiny and future, and not somebody else outside Macedonia. It is on these principles that good relations of cooperation between our two states may be established.

Refugees Begin Repatriation to Bosnia

*LD0206181295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1727 GMT 2 Jun 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 2 Jun (TANJUG)—
Some 750 Muslim refugees left The Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] for Bosnia last night, but "a part of the route is being kept secret for security reasons," local media report.

Several refugees told journalists before their departure last night that they were returning to Bosnia "freely" and with the knowledge and approval of the Macedonian Ministries of Labor, Social Issues, and Police.

It was specified in Skopje today that an unnamed, private company from Vienna was paying for the organized repatriation of this group of Muslim refugees back to Bosnia by 15 buses.

The repatriation of this group of Muslim refugees to Bosnia is being carried out under the supervision of the El Halil humanitarian organization and with the approval of the UNHCR.

Judging by information provided by the organizers, the refugees most likely would be transferred to Sarajevo and Zenica via Albanian ports.

Walesa Addresses Katyn Forest Ceremony

LD0406123195 Warsaw TV Polonia Network
in Polish 1002 GMT 4 Jun 95

[Speech by Polish President Lech Walesa to a ceremony at the Katyn forest—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Esteemed gathering, rulers and systems come and go, but the truth remains. The truth wins as freedom breaks the chains. We wanted very much to come here. We wanted to respond to this silent cry of Katyn, to respond with our prayers and the assurance that we remember, to bury the remains with dignity, to find a way to forgiveness in our hearts.

We want to look into the future with hope, to build on the truth and reconciliation. We wanted this. It was hard to believe that it would happen, but we are here. We owe this to freedom. Katyn was a terrible thorn hurting the Polish-Russian neighborhood and the relations between our nations. Years of lies inflamed this wound, and great imagination and responsibility was needed to bravely remove this thorn.

Polish officers were not the only victims of the totalitarian system. After 17 September 1939, about 2 million Poles suffered from Stalinist repressions. This inhuman system also struck the Russians. It killed about 10 million humans. This entire boundless land became a land of pain and suffering. The Russians and the Poles, suffering in camps, had been united by this tragic brotherhood in martyrdom. We bow our heads in tribute to all victims of totalitarian crimes. Apart from Poles, here in Katyn itself, 9,000 people of different nationalities were killed and buried. We want to promise to all the victims that we will remember them, that we will do everything so that their suffering becomes a warning to the world and an imperative to build a better future.

When in May of 1992 I stood here, at the foot of the Katyn cross, I said what every Christian felt while looking at the cross, that this most sacred sign had a double symbolic meaning. It means humiliation and suffering, but also resurrection and hope. Today we feel that hope is growing here and getting stronger for reconciliation of our nations and for neighborly friendship, so that a free and democratic Poland and a free and democratic Russia will overcome the bad past, so that we do not rest in establishing the truth and correcting the wrongs, so that we set an example to Europe of building bridges between peoples. We are able to face the challenge set before our Slavonic nations by the third millennium. [passage omitted]

Further on Walesa Speech

LD0406153595 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1105 GMT 4 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Katyn, 4 Jun (PAP)—Speaking today at the graves of Polish soldiers murdered by the NKVD in Katyn, President Lech Walesa said that in spite of years of a conspiracy of silence around this crime, the Poles heard its "silent cry," which for us "was a remainder and obligation, a guide which helps distinguish good from bad, honor from servility, truth from a cynical manipulation."

The president said that the Katyn crime also remains a "painful signal to any human conscience and a universal and timeless warning sounding in a dramatic cry for justice." Walesa recalled that Polish soldiers, taken prisoner as a result of the perfidious Soviet aggression in 1939, had been promised that nothing would happen to them. "On 5 March 1940, several signatures under a short document condemned over 20,000 innocent people to death," the president went on, adding that this document by NKVD head Beriia, which decided that Polish soldiers were to be shot without investigation, was accepted by Stalin, Voroshilov, Molotov, and Mikoyan, and supported by Kalinin and Kaganovich.

Speaking about the conspiracy of silence around the Katyn crime, the president recalled that in totalitarian Poland, the word Katyn was an antistate word. "Rulers and systems come and go, but the truth remains, the truth wins as freedom breaks the chains," Walesa said. [passage omitted]

Text of Yeltsin Message at Katyn Ceremony

LD0406131895 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1017 GMT 4 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 4 Jun—Here is the full text of the message from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the participants in the ceremony to lay the foundation stone of the Polish cemetery in Katyn:

"Today we are experiencing a truly historic moment. We are confirming the qualitatively new character of relations between a democratic Russia and a democratic Poland. The fact that the truth about the tragedy in Katyn Forest has triumphed, after decades of lies and concealment of the crimes of the totalitarian regime, is convincing evidence of that.

"Much has already been done to clear away the obstacles of the past. The investigation in the Katyn case is nearing an end. Material has been gathered concerning this crime, the names of the murderers, and the process for making the criminal decision has been revealed. The presidents of Poland and Russia have condemned the

crime, which brought countless suffering to the nations of our countries.

"We understand well the Poles' feelings connected with Katyn. The totalitarian terror affected not only Polish citizens but, in the first place, the citizens of the former Soviet Union. According to incomplete data, more than 10,000 victims of political repression, people of the most varied nationalities, are buried in Katyn forest alone. We see this forest, therefore, as a place of remembrance of the victims of totalitarianism, where a monument should be erected to all those innocent sufferers.

"I fully share the opinion of the president of the Polish Republic that this tragic page in our common history should finally be closed, but that its memory should serve the cause of better mutual understanding between the peoples of our countries, the removal from Russian-Polish relations of the elements of suspicion and prejudice left by the past. The Katyn tragedy must not be allowed to divide our nations and be the subject of political games.

"The truth about the Katyn tragedy, the truth that triumphed, makes us believe that the joint actions that we have undertaken will contribute to the further positive development of relations between our countries and nations."

Minister Demands 'Effective Actions' on Hostages

LD0206154395 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1426 GMT 2 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw, 2 Jun (PAP)—Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski sent a letter this afternoon to the chairman of the UN Security Council and to the UN secretary general, in which he fully supports the Security Council's actions regarding the peacekeeping troops being held hostage in Bosnia by the Bosnian Serbs, and he demands that the Security Council take "more effective actions" in the matter.

The minister recalls in the letter that Poland, like other countries, sent its officers to the former Yugoslavia at the Security Council's request; it turned out, however, that the Bosnian Serbs ignore Security Council decisions and the actions of UN observers. The Serbs went as far as brutal actions such as holding nearly 400 UN officers and soldiers hostage. The direct threat to the lives of the soldiers caused by these lawless acts arouses our profound opposition and outrage, the minister said.

In the letter, he also demands that vital actions be taken aimed at ensuring proper protection of the life and health of the UNPROFOR soldiers, Deputy Foreign Minister Eugeniusz Wyzner reported today. [passage omitted]

UN Envoy on Status of Hostages

LD0306152495 Warsaw Third Program Radio
Network in Polish 1400 GMT 3 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] After returning from his latest mission to the former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, special envoy of the UN High Commission on Human Rights [UNHCHR], said that the possibility influencing the situation (of hostages being held by the Serbs) are minimal.

[Begin correspondent Dorota Wysocka recording] Tadeusz Mazowiecki believes that the holding of soldiers of the UN Peacekeeping Forces by the Serbs can be called barbarism or an outright act of terror worthy of the greatest condemnation. According to Mazowiecki's information, the two Poles, Janusz Kalbarczyk and Wieslaw Wojtasiak, are not in the group of 126 soldiers that were set free, and are still being held by the Serbs. There is no possibility of communicating with them.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki gave the assurance that all possible steps are being taken to get the hostages released. He added that in this kind of situation, one does not negotiate with terrorists, but demands an unconditional release. In the opinion of the UNHCHR special envoy, the so-called military observers, the men who were chained to stakes as living shields, are in the most difficult situation; being chained like that is humiliating for an officer. [end recording]

Solidarity Ends Protest Week With Demonstration

LD0206144795 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1336 GMT 2 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 2 Jun—Just under 1,000 trade unionists from the Lodz and Plock regions' Solidarity demonstrated in front of the ministries of Labor and Ownership Transformations [Privatization] in Warsaw today, the last day of Solidarity's national protest week. Delegations of the demonstrators handed in petitions to Minister of Labor Leszek Miller and the leading officials of the privatization ministry.

Miller received a petition concerning the restructuring of light industry in Lodz and saving one of the textile factories from closure, and also a letter describing privatization in the Plock region and the unemployment linked with it. The labor minister declared readiness for talks with the trade unionists in Lodz, and also offered to mediate in the case of a dispute between the Solidarity region and the provincial governor.

At the privatization ministry, the trade unionists handed in a petition concerning the property enfranchisement

of society. Krzysztof Zywer, the chairman of Plock region's Solidarity, said that the leading officials of the ministry had promised talks on ownership transformations.

The demonstration began at Warsaw's Torwar. The trade unionists set off for the Office of the Council of Ministers, which they passed without stopping, chanting the slogans: "Red dogs," "Down with the commies," and "Solidarity."

In front of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, the demonstrators demanded that the minister come out to meet them. They shouted "An empty cell for Miller," and "Lodz is dying because of Miller." They sang the Solidarity anthem and the Rota [patriotic hymn].

At the entrance to the privatization ministry, employees of the Chelmek shoe factory left a 1-meter-long shoe and unfurled a banner saying "Privatization Ministry digs the grave of the Chelmek shoe factory." The Lodz trade unionists scattered old rags. The demonstrators shouted "thieving privatization" and "Settle accounts with the commies."

SLD Leader Condemns Solidarity Demonstrations

LD0206194195 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 2 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview for Radio Kielce, Aleksander Kwasniewski [leader of the Democratic Left Alliance, SLD]), said with regard to the recent Solidarity protests that social protests consisting in aggressive street demonstrations cannot be tolerated in a democratic state.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] In 1993, Solidarity first of all brought about the fall of Miss Suchocha's government, and then lost the elections totally, not even getting five percent of the vote. I interpret what Solidarity is doing today as a desire to return to the political stage, and of course it wants to return primarily by putting itself in such aggressive opposition to the current government lineup, as well as, on the other hand, using by no means democratic methods.

Therefore I am not afraid of Solidarity, but I express the belief that changes in Poland can only take place by democratic methods and not in the street, not by street rioting or by aggressive actions, not by throwing various explosive and nonexplosive objects at state buildings. [end recording]

The SLD leader did not agree with the accusations by a section of the left wing that, when in charge of the work of the National Assembly's Constitutional Commission, he is too submissive toward the Church.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] I would ask for consistency, because many of my critics have their own private compromise with the Church; that is to say, they go to church, they baptize their children, have church weddings, have a priest conduct funerals, but at home they heap abuse on the men in black and say various things. So, since there is this sort of compromise, that one can honor tradition fully, and at the same time be critical toward the actions not so much of the Church as an institution as of the church hierarchy, then all right, let us transfer this to normality in the state. This should involve rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and rendering unto God what is God's. If we reforge that principle into specific constitutional regulations, then we will be normal. I see no problems in my contacts with the bishops; they too, when they talk to me in smaller groups, appreciate me simply for having views which I do not change every minute. And I do not want to pretend in church that I am a profound believer, and among people who criticize the Church that I am anticlerical. I simply think that there is a wide field for achieving a very necessary compromise, in which—as I say—the Church will do what it should, that is carry out a religious and social mission, and the state will be free from ideological influences, from the Church as well. [end recording]

Aleksander Kwasniewski, SLD candidate in the presidential elections, began his election campaign with a visit to Kielce.

Walesa Confirms Support for Solidarity

95EP0107A Krakow TYGODNIK MALOPOLSKA in Polish 6 Apr 95 No 14, pp 1, 4

[Interview with President Lech Walesa by Piotr Walaszczyk; place and date not given: "I Shall Never Be Indifferent to Solidarity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Walaszczyk] Do you consider yourself a Solidarity man? How would you define your present-day relations with NSZZ Solidarity?

[Walesa] I shall never be indifferent to Solidarity.... There is much that links me to it. We were one, united by common goals and faith in victory. Once we achieved victory the great movement called Solidarity was naturally bound to change: There is a time for struggling and a time for building, and they are not the same. I believed that one monopoly, Communist, cannot be replaced with another, that of Solidarity. That would conflict with its ideals, with the struggle for pluralism, for democracy. I am saying this because some are accusing me of having caused the breakup of that movement.

Thus, the present-day Solidarity is different. In my opinion it still is looking for an identity of its own: Should it be a classic trade union or more like a political party? I think that so far it has not resolved this dilemma conclusively.

[Walaszczyk] What is nowadays the relationship between President Lech Walesa and Solidarity?

[Walesa] Of a certainty it has its ups and downs. But that is normal. The president is no longer the leader of Solidarity. He is the head of state and responsible for the state as a whole. His decisions or actions cannot always coincide with the expectations of the trade unionists. But we still have a great deal in common. We have common roots. Our views on many fundamental national issues coincide. We share the values we profess and a vision of this country with regard to matters fundamental to its—let me put it this way—spiritual identity. I meet with Solidarity and, if I can, I support its just initiatives by availing myself of my vested power to initiate legislation. For example, recently I thus sponsored Solidarity's draft law on the Polish State Railroads.

Let me say that my relationship with Solidarity is probably like that between long-married spouses; some days are good, on others there are quarrels, and others still are quiet, but it is difficult to erase the sensations of initial tenderness, the years spent together, even when the spouses temporarily distance themselves from one another.

[Walaszczyk] At the National Congress of Delegates in 1994 you declared that you would disclose secrets about politicians and parties active in our country. Could you, sir, by now reveal at least some of these secrets, and if not, when the time comes to tell the truth about the years 1988-91 (the "roundtable" accords, Magdalena)?

[Walesa] I will make no new revelations, say nothing sensational. In those years we had to choose between the roads of evolution and revolution. From the outset, Solidarity has been a peaceloving movement; I am a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. This placed us under an obligation; that is why we opted for the road of evolution, with all its consequences, both good and bad. The Communists could have lost power either the Polish way or the Romanian way. I firmly believe that at the time we chose the right road, although of course we did not avoid mistakes.

Let me make it clear once more that I held no secret talks and made no secret agreements so far as the "roundtable" is concerned. I am aware that from time to time some "revelations," guesses which it is difficult to continually rectify, are being published.

[Walaszczyk] What do you think should be workable ways of counteracting the spread of destitution and incivility in Poland?

[Walesa] You worded this question as if implying that present-day Poland is merely some black hole. True, society is paying a very high price for the transformations and the government acts only to a limited extent as the provider of welfare and social services, with many Poles living in poverty and in uncertainty of tomorrow. But that is not the only truth about present-day Poland. After all, you cannot deny that manufacturing output is rising and last year we led the entire Europe in the growth rate of our GDP. You cannot deny either that we halted inflation compared with the 1980's, developed a strong currency, and created instruments of economic growth. So it is not all gloom and doom. Still, at the same time I am aware that even the best economic indicators will be no consolation to those who right now are losing their jobs or unemployment benefits, to those who, following the disbanding of state farms, are vegetating because no jobs for them are available in the vicinity, to those whose retirement pensions do not suffice for them to survive until the month end. These are human dramas with which the government is unable to cope at this stage. At the same time, the public is witnessing the amassing, sometimes dishonestly, of huge fortunes and a profligate waste of resources.

It is true that the beneficiaries of the reforms at present are rather small social groups and that many Poles feel disappointed. It has turned out that the cost of change is very high and the operation painful. From the vantage point of time it can also be seen that we made many mistakes as the first on the road which we chose in 1989. From the vantage point of experience it can also be seen that many things could have been done more rapidly or differently. For example, I have long been trying to spread the sense of private ownership among society, to make a majority of Poles feel and recognize that the reforms are for their sake rather than for the sake of tiny elites alone, and good for them in one way or another. Of a certainty, legislative changes are needed in order to at least eliminate the mistakes about which we already know. We certainly should draw conclusions from the mistakes made as for example in privatizing state enterprises, necessary as it is. We certainly have not been energetic enough in combatting the extensive underground economy, which I view as a potential provider of substantial financial reserves for the state budget. Changes are needed in many domains of everyday life and the economy. It would be difficult to enumerate them here. In general, the crux of the matter is public finance, which is

incapable of meeting all the needs of the society. But that is not a question of money alone.... After all, for example, we are making huge outlays on social security, yet in about 15 years or so the social security system may become bankrupt. Here wise laws, a reform of the system, are needed. This also applies to health care. In every domain there is a need for honest and wise laws that would afford opportunities for growth and protect against abuses such as the exploitation of legal loopholes. Thus, wisdom and perceptivity are needed at every level of governance—national, local, regional, and township. Many old structures which nowadays no longer pass the test have to be updated.

Of a certainty, given all this, the human element should not be forgotten, especially the people who cannot or are unable to bear up under the burden of the transformations affecting them. Here I am thinking of the weakest social groups and of the protection they need. I wish to state clearly here that earlier I referred to those good economic growth indicators also because a general improvement in the state of this country is ultimately bound to improve the living standards of the people, though, to be sure, not all at once....

Unemployment and the related pauperization of the society are proving to be a major problem. I believe that here, too, more can be accomplished. I once spoke about Balcerowicz's twin brother [Balcerowicz, the author of Poland's economic shock therapy] who walks in his footsteps and erects new structures while the former demolishes old ones so that it would not look like we are merely destroying without giving people something in return. I think that this concept holds true at present as well. I also think that we are inadequately utilizing the foreign funds granted us for restructuring and growth.

The list of partial solutions could be multiplied, but that is not my point now. But not everything depends on the main directions of the government's socioeconomic policy. Much also depends on the people themselves and on their proactivism, whether joint or individual. Examples of this do exist. That is indeed so, even though I am aware that here many people will grimace in disbelief.

[Walaszczyk] Do you think that as the Polish president you will be able to act effectively within the scope of the powers envisaged in the civic draft of the constitution?

[Walesa] The civic draft of the constitution, proposed by Solidarity, for which I declared my support as regards its ethical aspect, so to speak, is not identical with the draft put forward by the Office of the President of the Polish Republic, which differs from it especially as regards institutional issues. In my opinion, as reflected in the latter draft, a constitution vesting stronger powers in

the presidency would be more appropriate in Poland. This does not mean, of course, any desire to rein in democracy, as demonstrated, for example, by the presidential system mandatory in the United States or France. And it is precisely to the French system that the draft of the constitution proposed by the Office of the President of the Polish Republic is linked.

I believe that Poland cannot afford a figurehead president, good only for pinning medals. Too many important issues await us to be resolved for such a model of the presidency to be needed in Poland. A president elected through popular vote must exert influence on vital national decisions, including personnel decisions. I believe that in general the executive branch should be strengthened so that it may be more effective and efficient in exercising its duties. There are many instances in which vital issues could not be resolved owing to excessively protracted procedures.

Solidarity's draft of the constitution, which proposes a parliamentary-cabinet system, reduces presidential powers even more than does the Interim Constitution. Under that draft, real power would be in the hands of the parliamentary majority and the government it forms, with the president also being deprived of the power to influence appointments to the heads of ministries of defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs. What is more, it also deprives the president of oversight of foreign policy and national security. I believe that while the parliamentary-cabinet system may work in deeply rooted and strong democracies, in our country a presidential-cabinet system would be better. For then important issues could be resolved more rapidly and effectively while at the same time retaining the balance among the principal power centers emerging on the basis of popular elections.

However, as I stated before, immediately after so many signatures for Solidarity's civic draft of the constitution had been collected, I do support many points of that draft. It refers to the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, which are so close to me, and it is based on respect for civil liberties, which I also cherish. All this also is the reason why the civic draft has met with such popular approval.

Speaking in general, before being submitted to a national referendum, the draft of the new constitution is certain to reconcile in itself the various versions offered by various political and social forces. I believe that its final version will be in accord with the values cherished by Poles for centuries, and that it also will not lack safeguards vital to the growth of democracy and to civil rights and liberties and the rights of man.

[Walaszczyk] How do you view the prospects for putting a halt to the *nomenklatura*'s self-enrichment through private enterprise, a process initiated by Rakowski [Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the last Communist prime minister of Poland], and for repairing the damage caused by that process?

[Walesa] This is a hugely complex problem. Nowadays a complete 180-degree turnabout does not seem possible to me. As I mentioned before, in those years we had a choice between revolution, which could have ended as in Romania, and evolution—a gradual assumption of power through compromises. The Communists had the time and the possibilities for securing their rear. They realized the historical inevitability of the events and therefore attended to feathering their own nests while relinquishing political power. Nowadays many of them are the best capitalists. This "concession," which they gained in return for giving up power, had also helped. I don't think that we can copy nowadays the methods they had applied 50 years ago when, in the name of an ideology, they prosecuted "kulaks," expropriated owners, fired them, etc., etc. The only resort nowadays can be the law—a legal investigation as to whether the current managerial positions held by these individuals is consonant with the law, whether their operations are honest, and whether they are legally entitled to the ownership of their assets. That too is difficult to accomplish in view of the complexity of the issue and the scarcity of time and resources.

The whole situation is additionally complicated because many members of the former *nomenklatura* have also returned to the political scene.

[Walaszczyk] You have admitted that supporting the "left leg" [i.e., the postcommunist leftists, as opposed to the "right leg" or the rightists] was a mistake. How do you intend to repair it?

[Walesa] I already told you that at the beginning of Solidarity governance I was opposed to any monopoly on power. I believed that power should rest on a democratic and pluralist system, that being after all the one we had wanted to build, on even affording some opportunities to the losers. I also believed that accounts should be settled with criminals, but that should be a matter for courts of law, and this should not mean that masses of ordinary people who used to carry red [Communist party membership] cards should be penalized, provided that they did nothing to break the law. After all, the then opposition also included some former Communist party members. I also was aware that excessive triumphalism after the victory could distort our lofty idea. That is why, to redress the balance somewhat, I used to support the "left leg," in the belief

that leftists, too, should be given an opportunity to join in building a new Poland. Especially because many of them had declared such a wish out of loyalty to the new Polish reality. Unfortunately, especially following September [the 1993 parliamentary elections], it turned out that, once they regained power, many people from the left side of the political scene had quickly forgotten that something important has been happening in Poland and Europe since 1989, and they began to adopt an increasingly strident tone. Their former arrogance and resentments returned. Worse even, this began to bear fruit in the form of disturbing new trends of state policy, such as the leaning toward centralism, the impeding of reforms, ploys to secure appointments to high office for "their" people, and disturbing signals on foreign policy, let alone such at least morally important issues as, e.g., the vote on the martial law, etc., etc. It is as if these people fail to understand that Poland nowadays is a totally different country. It turns out that some people interpret our goodwill as a weakness.

I have been observing these trends, actions, and comments, and I shall continue to react to them. The crisis of the Pawlak government and the relation between the Office of the President and the parliament as regards legislation demonstrate this clearly. I am attentively watching the current government as well, and I reserve to myself the right to evaluate and react should matters proceed in a bad direction. We cannot allow forfeiting the achievements we made thanks to our revolution and thanks to the effort of the entire society. I shall watch this and take countermeasures in accord with the law.

[Walaszczyk] How do you intend to ensure honest ownership empowerment and privatization?

[Walesa] In the current legal situation I can do little other than urge, remind, and appeal. You are surely aware of the fate of my idea (to award 100 million old zlotys in stock vouchers to every citizen) which has been derided by some people. Yet that was a way of achieving ownership empowerment and giving money away was not the point. Unfortunately, I lack the legal power to force the Sejm to put on its agenda discussion of laws introducing ownership empowerment. I can only avail myself of my powers of legislative initiative, as I am doing in this case.

I believe that Solidarity can accomplish a great deal on this matter by lobbying the parliament.

As regards reprivatization [restitution of nationalized property], that matter also is complicated. It turns out that none of the successive parliaments so far has found the political courage to settle this admittedly controversial issue. Sure, new laws were proposed, but no compromise could be achieved. This is an unusually

complicated matter. You are perfectly aware of the attendant huge financial burden on the government, which it unfortunately would be unable to bear it. All the same, I believe that some kind of a reprivatization law should be passed, one that would allow for the possibilities of the government, the interests of former owners, and also the interests of the individuals who, naturally and through no fault of their own, would have to bear the cost of such an operation—consider for example people living in homes which had once been expropriated from their owners. This is indeed a Gordian knot, and if it becomes finally cut, I think that no one will be completely satisfied. Still, the present situation cannot continue. The wronged original owners are owed at least a partial compensation. This is possible. Other postcommunist countries have resolved this issue. Hiding one's head in the sand is no way of solving difficult problems.

[Walaszczyk] Who has been helping you and who hurting in translating the electoral program into reality?

[Walesa] Above all, the constitutional powers of my office have been an obstacle. They are defined in the small constitution and I must act in accordance with them. The president has no political base of his own, no political party of his own that could promote his program. I have the legislative initiative and the right of veto. But that is too little to implement a specific program of action. As you may recall, I have repeatedly tried to bring certain issues to a conclusion. For example, as under my program, the resolution of financial scandals. What ultimately happened, was that I begged, nudged, and made demands on public prosecutors general but little if nothing came of it. Were presidential, executive powers stronger, I could have accomplished more. In the present situation this is indeed difficult. My powers are not those of a Communist First Secretary, contrary to what some imagine about the head of state. I cannot compel others or mandate and execute orders inconsonant with the constitution.

[Walaszczyk] What do you consider your biggest success and what your biggest failure?

[Walesa] My successes are Poland's successes. This also applies to my failures, which also occurred, though in my opinion they are outnumbered by the successes. Most importantly, after years of the totalitarian system, thanks to our revolution Poland has become a free, sovereign, and democratic country with a market economy, a law-ruled country with civil liberties, a country which makes its own decisions and chooses its own road.

[Walaszczyk] What do you consider the greatest peril to democracy and national security?

[Walesa] You are asking about national security. If you have in mind external security, Poland has its own priorities in that respect, clearly defined at the inception of the Third Polish Republic. We adopted the pro-Western option. Our fundamental goal is to have Poland participate in European security and economic structures—NATO and the European Union, and we are trying to achieve this. We also want to maintain the best possible relations with our neighbors and other countries, and we cooperate with the international organizations serving to strengthen the stability of the continent.

As regards domestic security, especially the safety of citizens, the situation is not good. The underinvested, underequipped police can hardly cope with the challenges posed to them by, for example, organized crime. There was that push-and-shove affair with the Police Commander, and the discussion of the so-called police laws has been underway much too long. These are the principal shortcomings, which must be remedied speedily before it is too late. I want to believe that the Security and Safety Taskforce appointed by the prime minister will expedite measures to improve the safety of Poles and implement them consistently.

Generally speaking, the security and stability of the democratic system are also linked to the reforms which we are introducing. If we succeed, people will live better and democracy and stability will be increasingly strengthened. That will determine both the national mood and our standing abroad.

[Walaszczyk] What steps do you intend to take in order to bring about the indictment and punishment of the individuals guilty of political crimes in the years 1944-89? How do you explain in that context the vetoing of the law on war veterans?

[Walesa] I have many times stated publicly that crimes from that period must be punished. There should be no statute of limitations on them. Fair trials are needed and the guilty must be brought to justice and punished. I expect that the new legislation will bar the statute of limitations. The victims of that period are owed compensation and moral satisfaction. But such matters are very difficult. This is illustrated by, for example, the Humer trial or the preparations for the trial relating to the Gdansk events of 1970.

I support the related draft law, in whose preparation Solidarity took part, among others, as I had already formally declared.

As regards the so-called law on war veterans, you know what my position is, as spelled out in the veto of the law granting war-veteran privileges to employees of the apparatus of oppression in the former Polish People's Republic. I do not share the position of Sejm, which has passed that bill. Ultimately, my presidential veto has not been overturned.

[Walaszczyk] Are you using Solidarity press as a source of valuable information?

[Walesa] I avail myself of many information sources, one of them being the press. Each day I scan all the national dailies and excerpts from provincial press. Then also there are the weeklies, monthlies, and other publications. This includes as well the trade union press, which I view as a valuable source of information on the mood of the people, on what is being thought and happening at the workplaces, on the attempts of trade unions to counteract bad trends so far as the material well-being of employees and their situation at workplaces are concerned.

[Walaszczyk] Thank you for the interview.

President's Amendments to Defense Law Rejected
WS0206123695 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 2 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by Pawel Wronski: "Deputies Do Not Want the President's Amendments; Non-Belweder Army?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sejm Subcommittee for Competent Laws has rejected each of the presidential amendments to the draft law on the office of the minister of national defense.

"Such a decision violates the Constitution," said head of the National Security Office Henryk Goryszewski, and left the assembly hall.

He told journalists that if the law is passed in its current form he will try to convince the president to veto it.

Deputies began drafting the law on the national defense minister's office immediately after the Drawsko affair. It was designed to prevent the General Staff and the military from becoming too independent from the civilian part of the Defense Ministry.

The president has submitted an entirely different draft to the Sejm. New Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski has repeatedly said he sees a compromise solution. In the end, he suggested provisions guaranteeing presidential control over the Armed Forces and "freezing the Belweder draft." That solution was rejected by the sub-commission yesterday.

In reality, Goryszewski's suggestions were aimed not only at strengthening the authority of the president, but also securing the sovereignty of the Armed Forces and increasing the role of the head of General Staff. Goryszewski suggested that the president approve defense assumptions and assign tasks to the minister of defense. He wanted all organizational changes in the Armed Forces and the General Staff to be carried out at the motion of the head of the General Staff and approved by the president.

"Civilians think they know everything, but the military also know something about the Armed Forces," said Goryszewski, explaining the need to separate the military and civilian parts of the Ministry of National Defense. The deputies wanted the law to define the General Staff as part of the ministry. "I believe the minister must also have some knowledge. The government and the president would not appoint an ignoramus," said Subcommittee Chairman Tomasz Nalecz (Union of Labor).

"Do you not understand, gentlemen, that the entire issue of 'civilian control' over the Armed Forces is aimed at establishing party tutelage," Goryszewski dramatically appealed to the opposition deputies who were in the majority.

The law on the Office of the Minister of National Defense is currently on the very threshold of the legislative process, but converging solutions are already being suggested by all major parliamentary groupings.

Draft Law on Army, Defense Criticized
95EP0108A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
20 Apr 95 p 6

[Article by Longin Szczerba: "An Imprecise System: Controversy About the Draft Laws on the Military and Defense"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first draft of the law, the draft called presidential, bears the label, "On the Powers of Government Agencies in the Defense System of the Polish Republic," and the Committee for National Defense, now called the Committee for the Defense of the State, has declared itself in favor of its speedy presentation to Sejm for debate. Exactly three weeks later (on 24 November 1994) another draft law, this one on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, was transmitted to the Speaker of Sejm.

Both drafts, unusually important from the standpoint of the interests of the military and defense, were recently evaluated by our colleagues from the ZBZZ [Union of Former Professional Soldiers] at the AON [Academy of National Defense]. Their assessment was

rigorous and critical, but based on the hope that, as always, the opinions of military theorists and former commanders will be taken into consideration by the framers of the laws when making emendations. Such is the hope of the chairman of the ZBZZ circle, Col. Leszek Janicki, and of the officers and generals, who while no longer wearing uniforms, continue to devote the greatest attention to national defense.

Substantive Errors and Imprecision

In the absence of a Constitution, enacting lower-ranking laws appears premature. But since these laws have been drafted and presented for consultation, they have to be discussed. The military is to be apolitical, and that is very good. But what does that mean in practice? It would be more precise to define the military as being nonpartisan and under explicitly specified civilian control, whose scope also should be precisely defined.

Both draft laws have the same shortcoming of failing to define who shall assume the duties of the supreme commander or commander in chief in the event of war or a war peril. Could it be that in a time of supreme ordeal we might be threatened by a revolution within the cadres?

One does not dig wells in a time of conflagration. The draft laws, especially the presidential one, lack professional terminology, which may or will lead to certain consequences. "The armed forces include, as their branches, the army, the air force, and the Navy." But forces cannot include forces, as General Edwin Rozlubirski pointed out. Many other vague generalizations are contained in the draft laws as well, some of them even undermining the command system. The superior does not consult his subordinates but orders them; many other instances of imprecise language of this kind could be mentioned.

The Military Wants To Know

"What are the guidelines for the chain of command at the defense ministry and for the armed forces," Col. Marian Anysz asked.

The Committee for the Defense of the State, a structure that suits better the democratic changes, has the most important responsibilities according to the draft law (as specified in several points). Yet at the same time we read that the National Security Bureau "organizes the activities of the Committee for the Defense of the State, and prepares, processes, and presents material on the state of national security and proposals for solutions." Everything seems clear, except the question of which agency is the superior.

"A strong military is built by generations. That is why, while accepting civilian control of the military, it is necessary to define clearly who is to command it in time of war, and the creation of the staff of the supreme commander at such time appears a controversial idea," commented Commodore Zbigniew Cieckowski.

"At present there is a conflict between two systems for commanding the military, the presidential, and the parliamentary-cabinet ones," according to Stefan Korycki, professor of law at the Academy of National Defense. "The former seems very incohesive and its acceptance would require amending the [provisional] Little Constitution. It is a fact that it strengthens the position of the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army. Does the minister of national defense command the armed forces, or does he implement the decisions of the prime minister and the government?" asked the professor.

"It is possible to wield a maximum of power and to bear a minimum of responsibility. Such is the conclusion I reached upon reading both draft laws," said Col. Zdzislaw Lustyk. "The most important question, that of the powers of the minister of defense vis a vis the other ministries, was left unanswered. And yet these ministries too are to fulfill very precisely defined functions in times of peace and war. But since these are left unmentioned in those draft laws, the head of the [defense] ministry, who is responsible for the most vital affairs of the country, may become at best a petitioner in his relations with his fellow ministers. Likewise, the linkages between the economic aspects of national defense and the infrastructure of the state are imprecisely defined." In Col. Lustyk's opinion, the individual competencies of the agencies handling defense objectives (the Committee for the Defense of the State, the Office of the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of National Defense) and the command of the armed forces should be more clearly distinguished.

The notion that for decades to come our military may not regain sufficient defense autonomy sounds bitter but is to some extent true. The former coalition alliances are over, and entry into new NATO structures is progressing very sluggishly. To be sure, there is no acute military peril given the current geopolitical realities, but safeguards of national security have to be unceasingly explored.

The draft laws contain a provision stating that the minister is the official superior of the cadres [professional soldiers]. In the opinion of Gen. Tadeusz Pioro, that provision, too, is, to put it diplomatically, causing a great deal of confusion, for if a regimental commander is responsible for the combat readiness of his unit, then in

the nature of things it should follow that he should have a say on staffing important posts in his regiment.

The two drafts echo too glaringly the dispute over who is to exercise actual power over the military—the purpose of civilian control is obvious and not subject to any doubt. According to the Sejm draft, the minister of national defense exercises his duties with the assistance of his office. The Ministry of National Defense includes the General Staff of the Polish Army as the organ for commanding the armed forces.

"Whenever changes are made, we build new structures with a persistence deserving of a better cause. The structures described in both drafts are in a sense pointless in the absence of the Constitution," was the reminder offered by Gen. Antoni Jasinski.

The opinions on both draft laws were recorded in their entirety on the reporter's audio tape. They are to be compiled on paper and transmitted to the Sejm National Defense Committee, which should of a certainty take into consideration the views of our senior military colleagues.

VAT Rise Predicted To Cause Higher Inflation

WS0506112595 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY
in Polish 3 Jun 95 p 1

[Article by "MF" and "NIKA": "VAT Will Cause Prices and Inflation To Go Up"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The raising of the VAT at the beginning of 1996 will cause electricity prices to go up, which will most probably produce a ripple effect and increase other prices. As a result, inflation would go up as well.

At the end of this December, the period of paying lower VAT on a few dozen goods and services, including books (zero rate) and construction materials, will end. It also covers tax on wheelchairs, as well as orthopedic and rehabilitation equipment.

The VAT will go up because the validity of all the lists of goods and services that were taxed at the preferential 0- and 7-percent VAT level will expire on 1 January and 7 July respectively. The preferential tax rates currently also cover water and legal, financial, and funeral services. People detained in drying-out tanks will also pay a higher VAT.

The establishment that can prolong the preferential tax rates is the Sejm. However, judging by the signals that have recently come from the Finance Ministry, the government is in no hurry to prepare an appropriate draft law. For example, Deputy Finance Minister Witold Modzelewski is fiercely defending the idea of imposing

a 22-percent VAT on construction materials and services.

When asked by ZYCIE WARSZAWY about the issue, entrepreneurs, including publishers, express fears that as a result of higher VAT rates they will be forced to raise the prices of their products and services. They are also worried that the ripple event of price increases will fuel higher inflation.

Finance Minister Discusses Aid to Companies

WS0206131695 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 2 Jun 95 p 7

[Article by Antoni Kowalik: "Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko on Aid to Companies; Submit Projects, Not Complaints"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The deficit of the state budget reached 47 trillion old zlotys after five months of the year, which means that its growth has been slowed down," Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko said at a conference on 1 June. He emphasized that the budget would be implemented regardless of any pressures. The Finance Ministry presented information on the state's participation in the restructuring of companies; the ministry also announced, as the deputy prime minister stressed, very positive news: Poland's ability to pay off its loans [wiarygodnosc kredytowa] was evaluated very favorably.

Companies and banks receive considerable assistance from the state; the assistance is provided in various forms. Such programs as financial restructuring, sale of debts, settlement procedures, guarantees, or annulment of taxes are a burden for tax payers, both now and for an extended period. This assistance cannot be granted to companies which go on strikes and cannot take advantage of it.

It would be "squandering tax payers' money," said the deputy prime minister, and added that a condition for receiving such assistance must be a company's credible program. Credible means confirmed by work, not by strikes.

According to the deputy prime minister, information on the government's activities and assistance programs to companies does not always reach the work forces of the companies which have actually taken advantage of them.

One such program is financial restructuring of companies and banks; the firms received additional capital in 1993 and 1994. Ten banks received 40 trillion old zlotys' worth of bonds to carry out restructuring processes.

A widely used form was the sale of debts. As a result of the implementation of this program, bank settlement procedures were applied in as many as approximately 600 big and small indebted companies. The greatest number of such settlements were concluded in the arms industry, the shipbuilding industry, metallurgy, and in the machine and electrical engineering industry.

Another program involved (court) agreement procedures. It made it possible to reduce taxpayers' debts by several trillion old zlotys. This form of debt-reduction procedure was applied in such companies as the Stalowa Wola, Katowice, and Silesia steel works, the Gdansk Shipyard, coal companies, as well as the Ursus Tractor Factory, whose agreement entered into force this year. Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko said that the taxes which had been annulled in this manner limit the state budget's expenditures.

As a result of reducing companies' debts (collection of some of the companies' debts to the budget was abandoned), 10.3 trillion old zlotys remained in companies, and as much as 9.6 trillion old zlotys is to be paid in installments.

The budget's losses caused by compensations, in the form of debt reduction, for debts that resulted from losses caused by the export embargo in the arms industry, are estimated at 700 trillion old zlotys.

Some 1.8 trillion old zlotys of the EFSAL [expansion unknown] loan for speeding up privatization or liquidation of companies have already been distributed. The loan is being paid off from budget money. The money was sent to such companies as the Star truck factory, Chelm cement mill, Podhale food factory, and Przy-sucha ceramics factory. The remaining money from this loan (\$125 million) will be used this year.

The budget makes it possible to use guarantees to repay bank loans from the budget's money. Last year approximately 20 trillion old zlotys were used; it is expected that this year the sum earmarked for guarantees will amount to approximately 40 trillion old zlotys, including 30 trillion old zlotys for foreign credits.

The list of methods of providing assistance also includes the following: export insurance program, regional restructuring program, expenditures for infrastructure in regions threatened by high unemployment, budget money for restructuring industry, and programs for branches, such as restructuring the metallurgy or hard coal mining. The deputy prime minister said that the assistance that companies have received in recent years totaled a few dozen trillion old zlotys, or approximately \$3 trillion.

Companies which are going through difficulties should submit credible programs to the government, not file complaints and say that they cannot work them out. "All pressures which also destabilize the political system are not needed, and they will not be effective," the deputy prime minister said.

Arms Industry Converts to Civilian Production

*WS0206123095 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA
in Polish 30 May 95 pp 1, 3*

[Article by Ryszard Choroszy: "The Arms Industry Can Make It; Courage Is Needed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the basic aims of restructuring the arms industry is converting special production to civilian needs. The process is very costly as it requires money for purchases of new technology and equipment as well as for training. The barriers are insurmountable for plants with poor financial standing.

Roman Lukaszewski, president of the Industrial Board at the Industrial Optical Center [PCO] in Warsaw may consider himself lucky. He has acquired German technology for the production of computer cash registers complete with software, and has obtained a loan from Powszechny Bank Kredytowy in the amount of 7 million German marks. As a result, sought-after products will appear on the market in one month. Most of them will consist in large part of Polish subassemblies, such as monitors manufactured by Unimor in Gdansk.

The Arms Industry Goes Civilian

The launching of a new product requires money, but most expensive of all—as Lukaszewski stresses—is finding enough enthusiasts.

PCO has longstanding cooperation with the Military Technical Academy and other scientific institutions in the production of optoelectronic devices for the military. It boasts a modern production base and experienced workers.

Until recently, the entire output was directed to satisfy the needs of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Products that are sought after on the market have to be produced now. The production of, for example, laser control devices for steering equipment used in construction, melioration, geodesy, and cartography, as well as the aforesaid computer cash registers is being considered.

PCO plans to manufacture and sell approximately 2,000 cash registers per month for small and big shops. Market demand is twice as large. The company plans to employ a target work force of 250 people, thus raising participation in civilian production to 60-70 percent.

Conversion Without Any Money

According to Deputy Minister of Industry and Commerce Roman Czerwinski, plants which produce no more than 30 percent of goods for military purposes are doing best, providing that the remaining potential is fully used for civilian needs.

In practice, arms industry plants work for civilian production at only half of their capacities. Over the last three years, special production has dropped by nearly half. The Central Planning Administration estimates that productivity in the arms industry is approximately twice as low as that of industry as a whole.

Companies must carry the financial burden themselves, without any aid from the state. The 14 trillion old zloty debts owed to banks, partners, and the budget have been reduced. The VAT was lifted. Fees due on stocking military reserves have been unified. Losses resulting from the embargo imposed on trade with Iraq and the former Yugoslavia have been compensated for. Dividends on machinery and equipment used in special production were lifted.

Not Enough Ideas

The state has issued loan guarantees to the transportation equipment plant in Mielec for a cooperation project on the production of doors for Boeing planes, and to Hydral in Wroclaw. Deputy Minister Czerwinski claims "there are not enough ideas."

He admires the Armed Forces for not yielding to pressure and continuing to order top quality equipment and weaponry. This enhances competitiveness in foreign markets.

Despite the measures that have been taken, and the fact that the financial condition of the entire arms industry has improved, the majority of plants cannot afford converting to civilian production on their own. Foreign investors do not seem interested in cooperating with Polish companies.

Exceptions to the rule include—apart from the aforesaid PCO—Unimor in Gdansk, which has launched cooperation with the Swedish company Ericsson, or Radwar in Warsaw, which has established ties with Thomson. The cooperation Bumar-Labedy has launched with such giants as Volvo in truck production or Krupp in the production of welded constructions is running smoothly. The Warsaw-based "Wola," which has launched production of natural gas generators on the basis of T-55 tank engines, very sought-after in—among others—Ukraine, is also quite successful.

Making Technology and Economy Meet

The experience of other countries shows a need to combine the technical potential of a plant with economical production in the process of converting the military industry. The role of the government is practically limited to creating favorable conditions for economic activity. Partial or complete privatization of the plants is very important. It facilitates building up capital and putting owned assets to their best advantage.

"Conversion does not imply the destruction of the arms industry," Deputy Minister Czerwinski stresses. Each state solves its own problems the best it can. There is no use waiting for aid from international organizations.

Privatization Hurts Telecommunications Industry

95EP0116A Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC
in Polish 5 May 95 No 18, pp 1, 11

[Article by Jerzy Pawlas: "The Death of the Telecommunications Industry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Before privatization the ZWUT [Telecommunications Equipment Manufacturing Plant] had 2,200 employees, and after it, 450; the ELWRO [Wroclaw Electronics Plant], 1,200 employees before and 220 after; the Poznan Teletra, 1,200 before and 450 after; and the Warsaw PZT Telecommunications Equipment Plant, 600 before and 200 after.

In October 1992 the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers decided to privatize the electronics industry. The Ministry of Communications restricted to three the number of telecommunications systems. As a consequence, three producers are entering the Polish market and, in the course of capital privatization, they are buying up the leading Polish telecommunications equipment enterprises. What is more, they are obtaining exclusive status as suppliers of telecommunications equipment—on condition that one-half of the supplies be domestically manufactured.

In the late autumn of 1992 the ITT company purchased the Telfa factory in Bydgoszcz. It did so without the trade unions having any input. The factory's employees were treated as a natural addendum to the machinery, one that did not require separate consideration.

A Clause Is Violated

The agreement concluded in February 1992 between the Ministry of Privatization and the trade unions included a clause guaranteeing the participation of trade union in privatization processes: "Trade unions at enterprises privatized by the capital method participate in the negotiations between the potential purchaser of the company as regards the so-called social-protection package.

The form of such participation largely depends on the investor. The Ministry of Privatization will, however, encourage investors to allow as broadly as possible for the participation of trade unions in the negotiations. The social-protection and investments aspects of the final purchase agreement will be presented to employees for consultation before signing the agreement."

In March 1993 capital privatization was extended to the Teletra-Poznan and PZT Warsaw plants. The buyer, Alcatel SESA, guaranteed employment for 18 months in its social-protection package. The trade unionists had no access to information on the new owner's investment plans—these remained a secret of the Ministry of Privatization. In September 1993 Siemens AG purchased the Warsaw ZWUT together with its branch in Wegrow, as well as the Wroclaw ELWRO. This was done in haste, without consulting the trade union organizations.

In both cases, though, the trade unionists were promised that the investors would conclude agreements with trade unions. This did not happen. Nor did the trade unionists gain access to information on investment plans.

"This is a formal violation of the clause," said Walde-mar Janczyk, chairman of the National Section of the Telecommunications Industry. "We had thought that we would be able to negotiate something. This proved to be a fiction."

Output Declines

Nevertheless, the trade unionists did not give up. In the end they succeeded in getting a meeting with the minister of communications in order to discuss the conditions for supervising the fulfillment of investment obligations by the new owners of telecommunications equipment plants. The minister supported the request of trade unionists for monitoring progress in the introduction of new technologies at the privatized plants. But that requires the consent of the privatization ministry, which, however, remains deaf to pleas.

The trade unionists believed that since one-half of the telecommunications equipment will be domestically manufactured, people will have jobs. They realized that their previous demands that, e.g., the ZWUT employ 2,200 persons, were pious wishes. As is known, new technologies downsize the workforce. But the reality exceeded all expectations. At the privatized plants production nearly died down completely. No new products were introduced either. The only thing that could be accomplished was to maintain the manufacturing of old telephone exchanges at the ZWUT and Teletra-Poznan, so that some people could keep their jobs.

In the end, in July 1994, Minister Kaczmarek decided to reply to the trade unionists. He claimed that the social-

protection package is being implemented by foreign investors, as are their investment obligations. Yet the Warsaw PZT, which prior to privatization was to start manufacturing transmission systems (subscriber lines, relay stations, amplifiers), is merely to be the office of the manager of Alcatel SESA, a software manufacturing plant, a technical and service center, and the site of the management.

"The PZT was simply plowed under," declared Walde-mar Janczyk. "Production was shut down and the work-force slashed to the bone. A center for bureaucracy was established there instead. Yet before privatization mention was made of starting the production of up-to-date transmission-system equipment."

Siemens had pledged itself to invest \$57 million within six years. But only \$17 million is encumbered by current penalties. Thus, the buyer may invest \$40 million only in the sixth year and everything will be in order. The trade unionists are unfamiliar with the text of the contract. But they hope that when the privatization ministry sold these plants, it did negotiate the kind and size of output—that is, unless it sold the plants in order to be liquidated or converted into offices. But everything indicates that we are dealing with an improper privatization of the industry, which does not safeguard the interests of the Polish economy and Polish employees.

Voluntary Departures

Minister W. Kaczmarek also assured the trade unionists that the foreign investors guaranteed job security for 18 months, thus protecting employees against groundless layoffs. All the same, since they do not perceive any growth prospects and are tempted by 22-month severance pay, they are quitting their jobs. Such behavior can hardly be termed voluntary, since it is being forced by a situation caused by the investor.

The Wroclaw ELWRO employed 1,200 people before being privatized; in November that number declined to 400, of whom an additional 250 were laid off. Only the Telfa-Bydgoszcz plant continues to employ 1,100 persons even though a year has passed since the deadline for layoffs.

But at the other enterprises no investments have been made. True, an office high rise for white-collar Siemens employees, previously scattered throughout Warsaw, has been erected at the ZWUT, but this is not a manufacturing investment. Of the former workforce of 2,200 only 50 will keep their jobs.

The contract with Siemens stressed that maintaining the workforce on the payroll for 18 months was guaranteed.

But it did not guarantee work. Of course, the company followed this provision, so unfavorable to employees.

50 Percent Domestically

Trying to protect Siemens-plant employees against group layoffs, trade unionists appealed to deputies, members of the government, and Prime Minister Pawlak. They pointed out that one-half of the equipment supplied for the needs of Polish telecommunications was to be domestically manufactured according to the contracts. They demanded fulfilling the contracts, which would assure employment for the workers.

But Minister Kaczmarek did not have the time to meet with the trade unionists. In his farewell address to the Sejm, Prime Minister Pawlak criticized the previous administration and Lewandowski [Janusz, previous minister of privatization] for selling plants, such as the Wroclaw ELWRO, only in order for them to be shut down.

"But what did he himself do while prime minister?" asked Waldemar Janczyk. "If he saw an improperly concluded contract, he could have renegotiated it. Minister [Michal] Strak, the deputy from Wegrow, urged the trade unionists to accuse Minister Lewandowski before the Tribunal of State. But why did he not do anything himself, as the head of the Office of the Council of Ministers, when he noticed these flaws in the contracts?"

2 Million Dollars of Demolitions

Under the contracts concluded, the purchaser is obligated to invest. And such investments are credited to the 50-percent domestic manufacture. At the Wroclaw ELWRO the demolition of one-half of the plant cost about \$2 million. Thus Siemens can argue that it spent that much on investment.

It had been said that a modern cable factory would arise on the demolition site. But ultimately cable manufacturing was located in Slovakia.

At the Warsaw PZT offices were furnished in the grand style (with the proverbial gold door handles). The cost was credited to investment and therefore the contract was being fulfilled. But neither new jobs were created nor new technological lines introduced. Siemens, which besides also makes household appliances, sold one of the ZWUT's bays to Ardo, an Italian company, for a wholesale warehouse.

"We don't know the text of the contracts," said Waldemar Janczyk. "In such a situation it is impossible to act rationally."

The Secret of the Privatization Ministry

It is difficult to understand the sense of the privatization of the telecommunications industry. Its plants made saleable products but needed modernization investments. [Foreign manufacturing] licenses could have been purchased, and credit could have been obtained from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Other possibilities also probably existed. Yet the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers decided in favor of capital privatization. Nowadays it is as plain as a pikestaff that this was an improper decision.

The trade unionists are demanding that the privatized plants operate, so that people would have jobs. But they lack access to information. They do not know what size of output was specified in the contracts. That remains the secret of the privatization ministry.

Yet it turns out that the privatization agreement was signed not with the Siemens concern itself but with its telecommunications equipment enterprise. For this very reason the ELWRO cannot manufacture computers, because that would require a separate agreement with another enterprise of that concern. Yet recently Nixdorf-Siemens (computers) won the bidding for the computerization of customs offices in Poland; however, its contract did not contain any requirement for manufacturing at least part of the equipment in Poland. A producer who both has exclusive rights and is undercutting Polish manufacturing was admitted to our market. Why that is so remains a secret.

As if that were not enough, in the course of privatizing the Wroclaw ELWRO that plant's 5 billion zlotys in social funds somehow got lost.

Employers Sought

In this situation the trade unionists have no resource but to commence a collective bargaining dispute. The problem is, with whom? Properly speaking, it should be the privatization ministry, but it is not an employer. A similar problem exists with concluding a collective bargaining agreement. If foreign investors are to become employers, they should organize themselves and commence subsector wage talks. But they are competitors. If they will not sit down together at the table, and if the labor minister cannot force them to do so, there can be no collective bargaining talks or agreements.

Does the Minister Fear the European Union?

The Polish market is incredibly capacious. Each year about a million new telephone subscribers are gained. In the previous years the related equipment was provided by domestic companies, which moreover, channeled a

substantial part of their output to the CEMA market. But now Siemens has gotten rid of its Polish competitor and took over the latter's Eastern [ex-USSR] customers.

Telekomunikacja Polska SA does not give priority to Polish industry. Yet a single order from the minister of communications instructing that agency to provide subscribers with Polish-produced telephone sets would be enough for hundreds of people to be employed at the Radom WRT plant. However, the ministry believes that this would conflict with the European Treaty, binding since 1 February 1994, which bans discrimination against suppliers from the EU. The ministry is worrying about the European countries while carelessly leaving to their fate employees laid off from Polish plants.

What is more, the board of directors of Telekomunikacja Polska SA adopted in 1993 a resolution banning purchases of equipment from Polish plants. In three years a total of 1.3 million telephone-exchange numbers was imported to this country (duty-free). Since 1990 a ban against shipments of Polish telephone exchanges has also been in force. As a result of ill-conceived decisions, seven different telephone systems were introduced in Poland. This is how Telekomunikacja Polska SA frivolously interprets a free market.

In its letter to Prime Minister Pawlak, the National Committee of NSZZ Solidarity pointed to the perils to the telecommunications equipment industry, a strategic Polish subsector. In that letter, signed by Leszek Szewc, the Committee's deputy chairman, the trade unionists appealed to the prime minister "to assure monitoring the fulfillment of the sale-purchase contracts concluded with foreign companies, especially from the standpoint of the investor's obligations concerning the conditions of employment and labor, not to mention the need to analyze the fulfillment of the obligations relating to investment. Unfortunately, despite many promises, a meeting between [Solidarity's] National Section for the Telecommunications Equipment Industry and the minister of privatization could not be brought about, although such a meeting could promote overcoming conflict situations at enterprises." The appeal remained unanswered.

Thus trade unionists are going to appeal to Oleksy, the new prime minister, and to his government, for vetting the privatization contracts. They will consistently pursue their postulates. One-half of the telecommunications equipment must be domestically produced. The investment plans of foreign owners must be monitored, and above all the plants must keep producing. They were not sold in order to be shut down.

Agricultural Policy in View of EU Requirements

*95EP0109B Warsaw WARSAW VOICE in English
30 Apr 95 p 13*

[Article by Dariusz Styczek: "Food for Review"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] With Poland inching closer to membership in the European Union, the debate about agricultural policy rages on. Many Poles see the topic as the main obstacle to fast integration with the EU and other European structures.

Poland fears an influx of subsidized EU food, while the union, in turn, is in no hurry to freely allow cheap Polish fruit, meat and sugar onto its market.

Poland has insisted on EU membership by the year 2000. If it does join by then, it will likely have to abide by the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a system of agricultural subsidies and production quotas that could hurt a burgeoning economy still unable to go head to head with its stronger Western European cousins.

During his visit to Poland at the beginning of April, EU Commissioner for Agriculture Franz Fischler said that in Poland CAP could only be introduced gradually, and even then with the possibility to change the policy.

The most likely changes would be in CAP's subsidy and compensation systems for farmers. At an early April conference in Warsaw on agribusiness in Central Europe, EU representatives said CAP will not survive EU enlargement.

"Applying the union's agricultural regulations in Poland will be difficult," Fischler says. CAP would introduce production quotas for dairy-meat farms, which are popular in Poland, and define the growing areas and fallow rules for grains and oil-producing crops. That would limit agricultural development and place a huge administrative burden on Polish authorities.

Still, the Polish government says the problem will solve itself. The Agriculture Ministry expects that by 2000 the number of marketable production farms will drop from 2 million to 600,000. If so, new jobs will have to be created for the estimated 1.5 million people who will leave agriculture.

"Central European countries should reform agriculture through privatization and creating new service jobs in the sector, which will speed up integration with the union," Fischler says.

Ironically, says Agriculture Minister Roman Jagielski, in 2000 Poland will be more market-oriented than the EU. "We see Poland's integration with the EU as a historic opportunity," he says, adding that in some

countries agricultural subsidies reach 40 percent of the products' value, while in Poland the figure is only 8-12 percent.

"This means that when it comes to competition Polish farmers start out in a losing position," Jagielinski says. Poland's agricultural lobby agrees. It accuses previous governments of bringing to market agriculture forces too quickly, against the interests of not only farmers, but also of the economy as a whole.

As a result, the opponents of liberalization say, Poland has to import grain for bread while hundreds of thousands hectares lie fallow. Widely opening the country to imports of subsidized foreign products in 1990-91, they charge, was a mistake, changing Poland from an exporter of food to an importer almost overnight.

"We won't allow ourselves to become mere raw-material suppliers," Jagielinski says. "We're opening ourselves to foreign capital, but we (also) want to be partners."

Polish exports of agricultural and food products rose from \$1.646 billion in 1993 to \$2.073 billion last year. Over the same period, imports rose from \$2.256 billion to \$2.375 billion. The trade deficit dropped from about \$600 million to \$300 million.

Agricultural and food trade improved last year. Ryszard Smolarek, secretary of state in the Agriculture Ministry, says Poland is now selling more processed products and fewer raw materials and partly processed products.

The change is due mostly to improved trade with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). While Western Europe, still wary of Polish products' quality, tends to buy raw materials and semiprocessed products, it was increased sales to CIS countries that helped trade numbers. Polish agricultural trade with the EU still runs at a \$110 million deficit.

Agricultural and food products account for about 12 percent of all Polish exports. Leading export products include fruit, nonalcoholic drinks (most of which go to the CIS), vinegar, dairy products, livestock, sugar and processed fruit and vegetable products. Agricultural imports are dominated by condiments, grains, fodder, meat, citrus fruits, fats and tobacco products.

Poland exports about 10 percent of its agricultural products. It plans to increase the number by 200 percent by 2000. That may not be possible. An Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report on Polish agricultural policy of the last two years says that Poland used up all its preferential quotas to the EU for only four products. For 20 others, it filled 10 percent of the quotas or even less.

The OECD believes the fault lies with Polish agriculture, not with EU Association Agreement regulations. Export quotas cover beef, dairy products, sheep and calves. The main problem lies with cattle and sheep. Poland doesn't have enough to fill export quotas.

Smolarek says Polish food is as good as Western products when it comes to quality and packaging. The weak point is promotion. The Agriculture Ministry is currently establishing a new institution that will promote Polish producers on foreign markets.

The best thing for increased food exports would be a kind of trade liberalization that many other countries may not be willing to adopt. Poland would like countries to cut subsidies for sales abroad (Poland doesn't subsidize exports because it can't afford it), ban price-equalizing levies, reduce customs tariffs (since July 1 by an average 37 percent, according to GATT), and abandon quotas. Smolarek says the EU would profit more than Poland from world liberalization of agricultural trade.

Environment Ministry Reports on Water Pollution
WS0206140195 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 2 Jun 95 p 19

[Article by "K.F.": "Water Like a Mirror..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The purity of water in Polish rivers, despite a certain improvement due to economic stagnation, lower production, and—as the Ministry of Environmental Protection claims—establishing new sewage treatment plants, remains disastrous. The Biebrza is the only major river that does not yet qualify as a sewer. The Main Inspectorate of Environmental Protection has presented a report on the quality of water in major Polish rivers in the first quarter of this year.

The report was prepared by the Water Monitoring Department at the Institute of Meteorology and Water Economy. The two largest rivers in Poland do not meet sanitary standards. The water is unfit for drinking (even if it is boiled) or for swimming. Waters reflect the degradation of the natural environment like a mirror.

Pollution

Approximately 10 tonnes of sulfur dioxide fall on 1 sq. m of the territory of Poland (the size of a small city district) each year. The figure is higher for industrialized areas. A huge part of the gas ultimately reaches rivers, lakes, and ground water reservoirs. Water saturated with sulfur dioxide is acidic, slowly killing all organisms living in it, thus hampering self-purifying processes.

Inhabitants of cities produce approximately 8 million tonnes of garbage annually. Industry—180 million

tonnes of waste. Both the garbage and the waste pose a hazard to surface and underground waters. The most dangerous source of pollution, however, are sewers. Several thousand plants do not have legal permission to dispose of waste. They discharge it into rivers illegally and are completely beyond control. There are no sewage treatment plants in 40 percent of the cities and in 50 percent of the industrial plants. The two largest cities, Warsaw and Lodz, discharge untreated waste. A further 11 voivodship capitals have no sewage treatment plants.

Mine pollution is a separate problem. Preventing mines from being flooded requires pumping out approximately 1 cu. km of underground water each year, usually with a very high salt content. When Silesian coal mines were operating at full capacity, 7 thousand tonnes of salt were discharged into rivers daily. The Wisla in its stretch between Oswiecim and Krakow had a higher salt content than the Baltic Sea.

Apart from salt, approximately 1,000 tonnes of sulfur compounds were discharged into the Wisla and the Odra daily.

Agriculture considerably contributes to water pollution. When fertilization is carried out improperly, half of the artificial manure from fields reaches underwater reservoirs, rivers, and lakes. Not only are fertilizers rinsed out, but the even more lethal pesticides. Some 230 thousand tonnes of nitrogen compounds and 18 thousand tonnes of phosphorus compounds reach the Baltic Sea via rivers each year.

The Effects

... of water pollution are most acutely felt by city dwellers. People carrying heavy plastic containers with spring water have become a fixed element of the urban landscape in Poland.

In its upper stretch, as far as Krakow, the Wisla is overpolluted. The presence of mineral substances, biogenic elements, heavy metals, and poor sanitary standards cause pronounced river pollution. Organic substances keep third class standards, which is hardly a consolation.

Upstream toward Warsaw the water quality improves, claim the authors of the report. Sanitary conditions and biogenic pollution still do not meet third class requirements. Organic, mineral, and specific pollution (volatile phenols, heavy metals, and detergents) qualify the water as second class. In the lower stretch of the Wisla (in Kiezmark) the content of organic and biogenic elements meets third class purity criteria, but the sanitary conditions qualify it unfit for everyday use.

The Narew and the Bug—the Wisla's largest tributaries—are heavily polluted. The high *e. coli* count indicates that the water is unsanitary.

Due to the presence of fecal coliform bacteria, water in the Odra is substandard. On the territory of the Czech Republic—up to the border crossing in Chalupki—water is polluted with zinc compounds and biogenic elements (nitrites and phosphorus). It is no better in the vicinity of Wroclaw. Poor sanitary conditions are reported up to Krajnik.

The Nysa Luzycka and the Warta—the largest tributaries of the Odra—are toxic. Scientific research on the Nysa Luzycka in Gubin shows that biogenic elements and sanitary conditions disqualify waters from this river, although its salt content meets first class norms. The Warta in Poznan is no better. It also fails to meet sanitary standards.

Half of the Polish population drink water from surface intakes.

Federal

Kontic's Stand on Various Issues Viewed

Politics, Economics in Balkans

AU0306190995 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 3 Jun 95

[Report by Gordana Buncic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic held a news conference for the participants in the international journalists' convention. The conference was attended by 40 journalists from 25 countries and all Yugoslav media. He spoke about the domestic economic situation and the political situation in the Balkans. Here is a report Gordana Buncic:

[Buncic] Foreign and domestic journalists were first addressed by Dusko Cukic, head of the Yugoslav Journalists' Association. Greeting the foreign and domestic journalists, Federal Information Minister Dragutin Brcin said that the number of journalists attending the press conference confirmed interest in events in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav crisis is obviously still topical, and chances for peace in the former Yugoslavia lie primarily in the lifting of the sanctions.

Foreign and domestic journalists were then addressed by Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic. The influence and power of the media are considerable in the world, Kontic said, and these can contribute to the settlement of the crisis through objective reporting on the situation in Yugoslavia. The internal situation is the most important when seen from the point of view of the earlier political and economic system, which had created antagonism among the republics and provinces, and had not managed to find a way out of that situation.

For this reason Serbia and Montenegro had decided to create a modern state. Other republics opted for secession. Serbia and Montenegro did not mind that, but demanded that this be accomplished in an amicable and consensual way. Unfortunately, Kontic said, war options, which were prompted by foreign factors, prevailed. These factors saw in the secession the realization of their interests in this region. They also supported armed secessions of some republics. The EU brazenly supported secession and recognized these new states.

In doing so, two important principles of the Helsinki Accords were violated, the inviolability of external borders and the people's right to self-determination. The self-determination of people was replaced with the principle of the self-determination of territories. This led to a large section of the Serbian people finding themselves outside their country, outside their mother country. These Serbs had been living in their own

state for over 70 years, which they lost overnight. The states that seceded very quickly turned the Serbs into minorities. The Serbs still remember the genocide that took place in World War II. This is how the tragedy came about.

Radoje Kontic did not accuse anyone for what happened, but did ask a question as to whether the tragedy could have been avoided. Major powers have always shaped the picture of the Balkans according to their needs, and the Balkans has never been left to the Balkan peoples. Since the previous Yugoslavia had been broken, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was created as the only civic state in this region. The other states are national.

Commenting on the sanctions that have been introduced against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Radoje Kontic said:

[Begin Kontic recording] Our national income has been halved with the introduction of sanctions. Before the introduction of the sanctions, it stood at \$25 billion. In 1994, it stood at \$12 billion. Some industrial branches have been totally wiped out. About 1 million people have found themselves without a job. The economy and the population were hit by unprecedented inflation. The population's health has drastically deteriorated as a consequence of not being able to purchase medicines, fuel, and other humanitarian necessities. The transformation of our economy toward a market economy was stopped. The incipient processes of democratization of our society have slowed down, and so forth. [end recording]

[Buncic] Sanctions do not represent a method of resolving international conflicts at all, Kontic said. They in fact demonstrate the inability of the international community to solve international conflicts. The sanctions introduced against Yugoslavia no longer have political, moral, or human justification. The arguments on which the introduction of sanctions rested have been refuted. Even the U.S. administration today admits that the war in Bosnia is a civil war.

Yugoslavia has strongly affirmed itself with its peace-creating policy. No one has demonstrated commitment to peace as much as Yugoslavia has. This is best proved by the break in relations with the Bosnian Serb leadership.

The Federal Government is concerned about the escalation of clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, as this is undermining the peace process. Therefore, the Federal Government has condemned Croatia's aggression on the Republic of Serb Krajina, as well as the shelling of the civilian population in Croatian towns and NATO attacks on Serb positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Federal Government does not agree either with the members of the peace forces being held hostage. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has therefore done everything it could to resolve the current situation. The first group of hostages has already been released following the intervention by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Radoje Kontic insisted on the equal treatment of all parties to the conflict and the recognition of all legitimate interests. The Federal Government is convinced that no issue can be solved with war, but on the basis of the Contact Group's plan in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on the basis of the Vance-Owen plan in Croatia. Kontic appealed to the international community to abandon the methods of pressure as these methods have shown themselves to be totally counterproductive.

Regarding the recognition of the former Yugoslav republics, Radoje Kontic said that the recognition did not have the same significance for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav republics, because these are new states seeking international recognition. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not a new state but a state with continuity. It is important for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that the former republics do not deny it this continuity.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has no pretensions toward other republics. This was also confirmed in the Federal Assembly. The recognition of the new states can take place only after the contentious financial and other issues have been resolved. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognized Slovenia in 1992, but Ljubljana arrogantly rejected this, Kontic said.

Regarding the recognition of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, this could take place after it solves its problems with Greece, provided it does not deny the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the right to continuity. Relations between Knin and Zagreb should be on equal footing [ravnopravan]. The recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina is linked to the sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and negotiations are currently being held on that. There has been some rapprochement in positions and positive results could be expected.

Speaking about the economic situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Radoje Kontic said:

[Begin Kontic recording] What Yugoslavia has done in the economy under the conditions of economic blockade, the international economic blockade, represents a real accomplishment. After the unprecedented hyperinflation in 1993, which was measured in billions of percent, we ended 1994 with a zero inflation. We restruct-

ured the monetary system, we managed to preserve the initial dinar-German mark parity of 1:1 until the end of the year. The economy recovered, and we ended the year with a 6.5 percent rise in the gross national product. While public expenditure in 1993 was financed exclusively from primary sources, in 1994 it was financed exclusively from real sources. Salaries in December last year were almost 10 times higher than in January last year. [end recording]

[Buncic] All this, the federal prime minister concluded, confirms a prudent peaceful policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under very difficult international circumstances.

Recognition of Bosnia

AU0306143895 Paris AFP in English
1353 GMT 3 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 3 (AFP)—The positions of the rump Yugoslavia and Washington have gotten closer on Belgrade's recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H], Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic said Saturday [3 June].

"I can tell you that the positions are closer if one refers to the previous discussions, when they were very confrontational," Kontic told a press conference here.

The federal premier of Serbia and Montenegro was answering questions on the progress in the talks under way last Wednesday in Belgrade between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the U.S. "Contact Group" representative, Robert Frasure.

"If the discussions maintain this course, we can expect positive results," he added. Kontic refused to give any more details on the talks, saying they were still "delicate."

"The question of the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina is very important for us, as it is linked to the lifting of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," Kontic said.

The chances of a successful outcome to the long-running talks increased over the last few days. The United States said it was ready to make further concessions to the Serbian leader, particularly on suspending the sanctions for a longer time than the initial 200-day period which Milosevic had rejected.

In return, Milosevic must recognise Bosnia and publicly abandon the objective of a "Greater Serbia" with the Bosnian Serbs, the relationship with whom has deteriorated in recent months.

Milosevic announced Saturday that all UN peacekeepers being detained by the Bosnian Serbs would be released over the next few days.

Lifting of UN Sanctions

LD0306182095 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1753 GMT 3 Jun 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 3 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Premier Radoje Kontic said in Belgrade Saturday that Yugoslavia had made greater efforts than anyone else to reach a peaceful settlement in this region, and that it consequently expects the lifting of comprehensive and binding U.N. sanctions.

Sanctions encourage supporters of a military solution to the crisis, who are present on all warring sides, even though it has long been clear that a settlement can only be reached by negotiations, Kontic told 40 reporters from 25 countries, participating in the 33rd international journalists' meeting organised by the Yugoslav Journalists' Association.

In answer to reporters' questions, Kontic said that there had been a certain convergence of stands in the latest talks between U.S. envoy Robert Frasure and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Kontic could not give any further details given the delicate nature of the talks, nor say what could be expected in the near future regarding new proposals for the settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

He expressed hope that there would be no new NATO air strikes on targets in the Bosnian Serb Republic and added that U.N. peacekeepers were being released by Bosnian Serbs following an appeal made by President Milosevic.

Pointing to recent events which have dealt a "direct blow to peace efforts," Kontic recalled that Yugoslav Government condemned Croatia's military aggression on the Republic of Serb Krajina in May and constant violations of the ceasefire by Muslim troops in Bosnia.

The Yugoslav Government has also condemned Serb artillery attacks on cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and NATO air raids on Serb targets, as well as the imprisonment of peacekeepers.

Speaking about recognition of the former Yugoslav republics, Kontic said that Yugoslavia would accept all agreements reached by Serb Krajina authorities and Croatia, i.e. agreements which would put an end to the war and ensure equal treatment of the three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Kontic also recalled the big mistake made by the international community when it recklessly recognised the former Yugoslav republics, violating major principles of the Helsinki charter—inviolability of borders and self-determination of nations.

He said that the method of new pressures and blackmail of Yugoslavia regarding sanctions was absolutely unacceptable, stressing that Yugoslavia had long fulfilled all conditions posed in the resolution under which the sanctions were introduced three years ago.

He said that sanctions should be abandoned as a method in international relations because they cannot solve any problem in the world.

Jovanovic Emphasizes Kosovo Belongs to Serbia

LD0306125995 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1230 GMT 3 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, June 3 (TANJUG)—The international community's stand is that Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of Serbia and Yugoslavia and it is not mentioned as a condition for lifting the sanctions, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic said Saturday.

Speaking in a Radio Pristina broadcast, Jovanovic said that the province is part of Serbia and the option of separating it from Serbia and Yugoslavia is reckoning without one's host.

He said that all problems in this field had to be resolved with tolerance and with the participation of ethnic Albanians in the overall life of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

Jovanovic said that even the international factors, like the United States and Germany, who had been the biggest advocates of the toughening and maintaining of the sanctions against Yugoslavia, now became more flexible regarding their suspension, and partial or complete lifting.

'It was finally realized that Yugoslavia is the most stable state, without which problems in the territory of the former Yugoslavia cannot be resolved, and that it most persistently urges peace. Such policy simultaneously raises the question of the lifting of the sanctions,' Jovanovic said and added that the question was primarily raised by Yugoslavia's neighbours.

Ethnic Albanians are the majority population in Kosovo and Metohija, but they are a national minority in Serbia and Yugoslavia.

A strong ethnic Albanian separatist movement is trying to detach the province from Serbia and Yugoslavia and annexe it to neighbouring Albania.

Lifting of Sanctions 'Shortest Way' to Peace*LD0406152995 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1521 GMT 4 Jun 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Athens, June 4 (TANJUG)—High official of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) Oliver Potezica said Sunday that the lifting of international anti-Yugoslav sanctions would constitute the shortest way to peace in the former Yugoslavia as it would discourage all forces favoring the war option.

Yugoslavia has fulfilled all conditions demanded by the international community and made a significant contribution to the peace process, Potezica told the Balkan forum in Athens.

Potezica, member of the main committee of the SPS which is the ruling party in the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, told the representatives of Balkan leftist and progressive parties that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia had flared up due to direct incitement by extremist nationalist forces from some big powers.

Appealing against the use of double standards regarding the Yugoslav crisis, Potezica underlined that a settlement can be found only through negotiations on the basis of full equality and respect of the interests of all peoples of the former Yugoslavia.

SPS condemns all military actions by extremist nationalists who are preventing the continuation of truce and negotiations, as well as all unilateral military actions by foreign factors, including NATO, he added.

All military actions have deadly consequences for the Balkans, Potezica said, giving the example of the latest crisis in Bosnia following NATO air strikes on the Serbs.

Whenever peace seems to be within reach, warmongering forces undertake aggressive actions which push the process backwards, Potezica said.

Balkan countries should adopt a joint political platform "Balkan for the Balkan peoples" as the only way to re-establish peace, trust, cooperation and prosperity in the region, he said.

Serbia**DS Leader Favors B-H Political Settlement***LD0206183595 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1729 GMT 2 Jun 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 2 (TANJUG)—Serbian opposition Democratic Party (DS) leader Zoran Djindjic said Friday that the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina was still going on because no political settlement had been offered yet.

Djindjic told a news conference that 'the war could be over soon if the "Contact Group" came out with a clear-cut political idea of a state concept of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the co-existence of two entities—the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation.'

He said NATO air strikes and taking U.N. troops prisoner resulted from a confusion faced by the U.N. Security Council due to an obvious violation of a basic resolution related to the embargo on arms sales to the former Yugoslavia.

Jovan Glamocanin, leader of the opposition Serbian radical party 'Nikola Pasic', said Friday that NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions had brought about Bosnian Serbs' taking U.N. troops prisoner.

Glamocanin told a news conference that 'this move does not serve the purpose of retaliation but defense of civilian population and targets.'

The Serbian assembly, a non-government and non-political association of Serb intellectuals for the human rights protection, said Friday that the international community was applying double standards in the treatment of participants of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and thereby supported belligerent forces.

'Whatever the (Bosnian) Muslims do, the Serbs will be the ones to be bombed. All air strikes launched so far came following the same pattern: Muslims would launch an offensive from U.N.-designated "safe areas," the U.N. Security Council would fail to oppose, then the Serbs would respond to the attacks and face air strikes,' the association said.

Protesters Support Unification, Attack SPS*AU0206214495 Belgrade NASA BORBA
in Serbo-Croatian 2 Jun 95 p 2*

[Article by S.N.A.-M.M: "Only Salvation—Pan-Serbian Unification"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—"Unification of all Serbian Lands," "Unification Now," or "Full Support to the Unification of the Srpska republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK]"—were the most common slogans of the speakers at yesterday's meeting, which was organized by the Committee for the Protection of Rights and Liberties and held in front of a little more than 1,000 people on Belgrade Square of the Republic.

"There has never been a small nation that would have so many states," historian Rados Ljusic exclaimed, assessing that "the Serbian unification is the only solution." "Without the unification of all Serbian lands there is no peace in the Balkans," Ljusic said and

concluded his speech with an exclamation: "Brother Serbs unite, what have you been waiting for so far!"

Concluding that the Serbian state is the basic factor of the Balkan's integrity, academician Milorad Ekmecic announced that "the unification on the River Una means the beginning of unification on the River Drina."

"The authorities in Belgrade want peace now that they have stuffed their pockets and bank accounts abroad," writer Zoran Gluscevic said. "We should not give them the peace they do not deserve," he added.

Slobodan Rakitic, president of the Association of Writers of Serbia, proposed that "this square, which has been renamed many times so far, finally be called the Square of the Serbian Unification." "Our biggest enemy is indifference," was the observation by academician Ljubomir Tadic, who, among other things said that he hopes that our negotiator will resist the pressures of America "otherwise his fate is doomed."

There is another side in Belgrade, the universalists [mondijalisti], small parties that are actually American parties in Serbia and whose leaders only look after their own interests, Tadic said.

Professor Leon Kojen fiercely attacked the ruling party in Serbia: "There is not an idea or a shameful act that the officials of the SPS [Serbian Socialist Party] would not bring into life. They do not know anything about it yet they have already embraced it. Our only way out is a joint defense with unification."

The meeting passed without any incidents, the slogans on the cardboard placards, usual for such meetings, were not observed, and the speeches were interrupted by sporadic exclamations: "Treason, treason," "Down With Milosevic," and with disgruntlement to any mention of America and the current Serbian and Yugoslav authorities.

[Box, p 2]

"Milosevic Does Not Want Unification but Wants To Recognize NDH"

The only speaker at yesterday's meeting who directly accused Slobodan Milosevic for the flop of the Serbian national dream was Dr. Kosta Cavoski: Milosevic does not want Pan-Serbian unification, however, he wants to prevent unification of the Srpska republic and the RSK. He does not wish to recognize Western Serbian lands, however, he wants to recognize HND [the World War II Croatia] in their Communist, AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders. He does not want to admit the Srpska republic and the RSK into Yugoslavia, however, he wants to make

them live in the countries that have committed grave, unprecedented crimes against the Serbian people.

Accusing the Serbian President for causing more harm to the Serbian people than anybody else in the last 200 years, Cavoski at the end of his speech shouted: "Down with Slobodan Milosevic! Long live unification!"

Jovic Condemns Bosnian Serbs' 'Wrong Moves'

AU0206202595 Belgrade RTB Television Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 2 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Attending the expanded session of the municipal committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] of Apatin, SPS Deputy Chairman Borisav Jovic spoke about the latest events in connection with the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here is a report by Smiljan Njagul:

[Begin recording] [Jovic] Well, the leadership of the Serb Republic has made a wrong move by not accepting the policy advocated by the mother state, the FRY, regarding the peace process, of not accepting the Contact Group plan as a basis for the further course of seeking solutions for the denouement of the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, but has taken up an option that is at variance with the stand of the international community, as well as the mother state. This is what everything else developed from. In this, the Muslims sought an excuse to carry out military actions. What also emerged from this was that, of course, the Serbs then defended themselves and then they shelled Sarajevo and other facilities. What came next was the bombing of Serb positions, then the hostages, and so on. Therefore, in the wake of one wrong move, there has been no end to the wrong moves, and of course we condemn all that. We think that this is generally a wrong way. One must go back to negotiating and reaching agreements, because, through the war option, the Serb side cannot achieve more than it already has achieved as it has 70 percent of the territory and a rather substantial basis for further negotiations. Therefore, the peace option is the only right road.

[Njagul] Commenting on the opposition parties' attempts to condemn the policy of the SPS and the FRY from extreme nationalist positions, Borisav Jovic said the following:

[Jovic] Our country has helped to the maximum the Serbian people outside our borders, that is, in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and continues helping the Serbian people there today as well. We are deeply convinced that what we are doing represents salvation to the Serbian people there and is not in conflict with the Serbian people there. Of course, opposition parties,

trying to ingratiate themselves with the voters, are always trying to belittle our party's policy regardless of whether it is deeply in the interest of the people or not, and trying to show that the war option into which they would pull the entire FRY would be cleverer. However, it is fully clear that this war option would lead to a catastrophe and a tragedy. Perhaps they think that it is through tragedy, for which they would blame our party, that they would come to power. We are not going to enter such a great risk and such a great stupidity for them. [end recording]

Seselj: Serb Captivity of Blue Helmets Justified

LD0406090195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0705 GMT 4 Jun 95

[Interview with Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, by correspondent Szilveszter Varga in Belgrade; date not given; from the "World Clock" program—recorded; Seselj speaks in Serbo-Croatian fading into Hungarian translation]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Varga] [Passage omitted] In the interview he gave to MTI and Hungarian Radio, Vojislav Seselj said:

[Seselj] NATO's intervention has proved that the United States and the big powers have stepped onto the side of the enemy. In other words, they have formed an alliance with the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For this reason, the Serbs were totally justified in taking captive those Blue Helmets who were within reach. We would like a settlement of the situation. In other words, we are willing to release the Blue Helmets if the United Nations publicly renounces the bombings. If, on the other hand, the big powers harden their stance, then we have no other choice. We have to fight.

[Varga] What will happen if President Clinton keeps his promise and the Americans come over?

[Seselj] Tension will increase, but we are not afraid. We have nothing to lose. We have only one asset: the land on which we live. For that, we will fight until the end.

[Varga] There are also volunteers you have recruited in Bosnia.

[Seselj] Yes, we send volunteers to Bosnia as much as possible. We send them to those fronts where their help is most needed.

[Varga] So, they organize (?semi)-military units?

[Seselj] No, our fighters are members of the Serb Army and do not form separate units.

[Varga] How many volunteers do you have?

[Seselj] Naturally, we cannot talk about numbers, but I can say that in Sarajevo, in the Majevisa hills near Tuzla, in Herzegovina, and in the Serb territories of Croatia, you can find volunteers whom we have recruited.

[Varga] Despite this, the Croats and the Bosnians have achieved significant military successes. How do you explain this?

[Seselj] The Serb Army has not suffered any major defeats. It is true that the Muslims have begun a major offensive, but I trust that the Serbs will stop them on every front in the coming days.

SRS Chairman Seselj Arrested in Kosovo

LD0306210595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2015 GMT 3 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 3 Jun (TANJUG)—Aleksandar Vucic, secretary general of the Serbian Radical Party [Srpska Radikalna Stranka; SRS] of Serbian Lands, confirmed tonight that the party's chairman, Vojislav Seselj, was arrested in Gnjilane (Kosovo); federal deputies Filip Stojanovic and Ranko Babic were wounded.

"Following a rally in Leskovac, Seselj left for Gnjilane, where another rally was scheduled to take place. After walking along the main street in the company of the party's deputies, the chairman climbed a bench outside the theater and began addressing citizens," Vucic explained. He added: "Two or three minutes later, special forces of the Ministry for Internal Affairs from Pristina, 'armed to the teeth,' were dropped from a helicopter. They approached the gathering and started shooting—some shots were fired in the air, some at the citizens themselves."

According to Vucic, this is when Filip Stojanovic and Ranko Babic were shot.

"Babic received treatment at the casualty department of Gnjilane's hospital. He is feeling OK. Stojanovic refused help, so we do not know about his condition", he said.

Seselj and the arrested deputies have been put in separate prison cells and other people were also arrested.

Radicals Protest Arrest

LD0406143795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1335 GMT 4 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 4 Jun (SRNA)—The Serb Radical Parties [SRS] of the [Bosnian] Serb republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] issued a public statement today in protest against the arrest of

Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the SRS of Serb Lands, his deputy Tomislav Nikolic, and a large group of SRS members.

"The regime in Serbia staged the unrest immediately before the meeting of the SRS of Serb Lands in Gnjilane in order to arrest the most prominent Serbian patriots under the thin pretext of violating public peace and order," the statement says. It adds that the SRS leaders were arrested just before the announced major protest meeting in Belgrade and at a time when the final details concerning the unification of the Serb republic and the RSK are being completed.

"We are calling on all the members and bodies of the SRS, and on all patriots and state bodies in the Serb republic and the RSK, to issue sharp protests against the illegal arrest and the anti-Serb and antipatriotic actions by the dictator-like communist regime in Serbia," the statement of the SRS of the Serb republic and RSK says.

Receives Jail Sentence

LD0406184095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1804 GMT 4 Jun 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Gnjilane, 4 Jun (TANJUG)—This afternoon the magistrates' court in Gnjilane sentenced Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serb Radical Party [Srpska Radikalna Stranka, SRS], to 20 days in jail for disturbing public peace and order and causing a clash with the police. [passage omitted]

Jovica Stojmenovic, a SRS deputy, was sentenced to 10 days in jail and charges were dropped against SRS deputy Filip Stojanovic. [passage omitted]

Montenegro

Djukanovic Discusses UN Sanctions, Bosnia

Sanctions 'Disastrous' for All

LD0206193895 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1758 GMT 2 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budva, June 2 (TANJUG)—Premier of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro Milo Djukanovic said in Budva Friday that the U.N. sanctions against the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro had caused the severest economic and financial crisis since the end of World War Two.

The sanctions have brought about hyperinflation and a devaluation of the capital and work unprecedented in the world's economic history, Djukanovic said addressing the 33rd international meeting of journalists.

Djukanovic said that the effects of the three-year-old sanctions were disastrous even for the international community which imposed them and for everyone in the former Yugoslavia.

The civil war is raging unabated, the interests and goals of the leaderships of the belligerent sides are still more far-off from sincere peace intentions and Yugoslavia's population and economy are absolutely exhausted, Djukanovic said.

It is high time that the United Nations and the leading international factors, besides giving verbal support to Yugoslavia's policy, gave concrete proof of backing peace and stability in these territories by lifting the sanctions, Djukanovic said.

Yugoslavia's losses caused by the U.N. sanctions have been officially estimated at a total of 148 billion U.S. dollars.

The international meeting in Budva is attended by journalists from 24 countries.

'No Territorial Aspirations'

LD0206202395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1956 GMT 2 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Budva, 2 Jun (SRNA)—Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic said today that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "has no territorial aspirations toward the former [as received] Bosnia-Herzegovina," but that it believed that the issue of its internal setup was a matter to be negotiated between the warring sides.

Addressing Yugoslav and foreign journalists at the 33rd international meeting of journalists in Budva, Djukanovic stressed that "the internal organization of that state is an issue that needs to be discussed later by the warring sides, with the international community's mediation and FRY's active participation."

"The setting up of the Croat-Muslim federation in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and its confederal links with Croatia, which the international community has already legally approved, in a certain way suggest a solution whereby Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be a common state [of the three nations]," Djukanovic said.

He added that he believed that "the future of that area lay in a division and in granting all sides equal choice in forming links with parent countries."

The Montenegrin prime minister said that "the authority of the international community and the United Nations is diminishing, and their assessments of and steps taken in the Yugoslav conflict are becoming worse."

"This is why I would like to tell the United Nations that it is high time they replace their verbal support for the FRY's peaceful policy with concrete steps and lift the international sanctions, which would also be the greatest boost to peace," Djukanovic said.

Kosovo

Rugova Condemns B-H Hostage Taking, 'Repression'

AU0206182095 Pristina Kosova Daily Report in English 2 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Speaking at a press conference today in Prishtina, President of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova condemned the staged trial against 72 former Albanian police officers of Kosova. "Given the very grave repressive conditions in Kosova, holding of this trial in the occupied building of the Parliament of Kosova was a great provocation against the Albanians. The trial took place in the meeting room of the Kosova Parliament, which, after the violent ruining of the Kosova's sovereignty, has been turned into a courtroom, physical courtroom, not only a political courtroom as it used to be five years ago when the autonomy of Kosova was destroyed," President Rugova underscored. He also said that this trial was nothing but a continuation of staged trials and demanded an immediate cessation of framed political trials and the release of all Albanian political prisoners.

Speaking on the recent developments in the spaces of former Yugoslavia, President Rugova condemned Bosnian Serb actions against UN peacekeepers and observers, taking and keeping them as hostages, and expressed support to the efforts of the international community to end the war in former Yugoslavia.

Dr. Rugova warned the international community that over the recent years in Kosova hundreds of women, elderly and children, have been taken hostages, and that de facto the entire population of Kosova are hostages for almost five years now. "Therefore, I have to repeat my call for international presence and protection in Kosova," he said.

Continuing, President Rugova said that the ordinary repression has been continuing everywhere throughout Kosova, pointing out that over the past week home searches were followed by harsh ill-treatment of people, including women, elderly, and children. He also pointed out violence against political activists, mentioning a number of cases over the past week. He said that education in Albanian language continued to be under the target of the Serbian police. President Rugova told the reporters also that campaign for forceful recruitment of Albanian youngsters in the Serbian Army has been continuing with impunity.

Commenting on the treatment of the Kosova issue in the international stage, President Rugova hailed the statement of the U.S. Foreign Secretary Christopher for the prevention of war in the south of the Balkans, and a statement of the British Prime Minister Major saying that reconfiguration in Bosnia, besides at stopping the war there, is also aimed at preventing a conflict in Kosova and FYROM.

Recalling the international day for the protection of children, Dr. Rugova said that children in Kosova are probably the most endangered strata of the population. Over the few past years alone, 21 Albanian children have been killed by the police, he said, and called on UNICEF to be more present in Kosova.

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